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ABSTRACT

This Article examines Information Warfare-that is,
actions taken to affect adversary information and information
systems conducted during a crisis or conflict to achieve or
promote specific objectives against the adversary. The Article
begins with an explanation of the development and structure
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of the Internet. It then cites examples of the use of
information strategiesin recent conflicts.
Next, the Article turns to a discussion of the principles of
neutrality in the U.N. Charter era. Specifically, the Article
examines neutrality in the context of land warfare, naval
warfare, aerial warfare, and outer space. Next, the Author
discusses application of principles from each of these
neutrality contexts to Information Warfare, including
additionalanalysis of the principlesof self-defense, reprisals,
and retorsions.
The Author continues by exploring the difficulties in
analogizingprinciples of neutrality, customary law, as well
as treaty law to the information warfare context. Finally, the
Author describes additional considerations that must be
addressed in determining guiding principles of international
law in the information age.
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Information warfare (IW)l may become a new full-scale
modality of conflict in this century as part of a revolutionary

1.
Cyberwar, information warfare, info-warfare and IW are used
interchangeably in this analysis. Information warfare is information operations
(10), Le. actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems
while defending one's own information and information systems, conducted
during crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific
adversary or adversaries.
U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02:
DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 422 (1998). See also WALTER GARY
SHARP, SR., CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE 23-24 (1999). Kenneth W. Dam
and Herbert S. Lin define IW as follows:
[H]ostile action that targets the information systems and information
infrastructure of an opponent (Le., offensive actions that attack an
opponent's communications, weapons systems, comman d and control
systems, intelligence systems, information components of the civil and
societal infrastructure such as the power grid and banking system)
coupled with simultaneous actions seeking to protect U.S. and allied
systems and infrastructure from such attacks.
CRYPTOGRAPHY'S ROLE IN SECURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 49 (Kenneth W. Dam &
Herbert S. Lin eds., 1996). Dam and Lin note that "looser uses" of the term
include "information and tactical intelligence to apply weapon systems more
effectively," "targeting . . . companies' information systems for IW attacks," and
fighting "terrorism, organized crime, and even street crime .... " Greenberg et al.
note that the U.S. Air Force broadly defines IW as "any action to deny, exploit,
corrupt, or destroy the enemy's information and its functions; protecting ourselves
against those actions; and exploiting our own military information functions."
LAWRENCE T. GREENBERG ET AL., INFORMATION WARFARE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1
(1997) (quoting U.S. DEPt OF THE AIR FORCE, CORNERSTONES OF INFORMATION
WARFARE 2 (1995)). The ensuing analysis concentrates on the U.S. Department of
Defense (DOD), U.S. Air Force, Greenberg et al. and Dam and Lin core definitions
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global shift from tangible to intangible methods of production and
destruction. 2 Recent conflicts and other events illustrate the
trend.

I. INTRODUCTION:

CONFLICTS AND COMPUTER-BASED ATTACKS

During the 1999 Kosovo crisis and NATO bombing campaign,
Yugoslav hackers reportedly inundated a NATO web site with
viruses and thousands of e-mails daily, overloading the site.3
Serbian supporters clogged non-military Internet sites in the
United States in what has been characterized as the "first
cyberwar. " 4 Backers of Serbia also used e-mail to warn of NATO
strikes and to send messages of support. s After NATO mistakenly

in a context of neutrality during international armed conflict. See generally
Richard W. Aldrich, How Do You Know You Are at War in the Information Age?, 22
Hous. J. INT'L L. 223, 225 (2000); infra notes 4, 36, 41, 123 and accompanying
text.
2.
Alvin Toffler & Heidi Toffler, Forewordto IN ATHENA'S CAMP: PREPARING
FOR CONFLICT IN THE INFORMATION AGE xiii, xiv-xvi (John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt
eds., 1997). See also ALVIN TOFFLER, POWERSHIFT (1990) [hereinafter TOFFLER,
POWERSHIFT]; ALVIN TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE (1980) [hereinafter TOFFLER, THE
THIRD WAVE] (exploring transitions from land-based agrarian economies, the "first
wave," to industrial economies, the "second wave," to information-based
economies, the "third wave," in more detail). The fact that some countries are in
each wave today can result in asymmetrical conflict.
3.
NATO Site Being Targeted by Hackers, WINSTON-SALEM J., Apr. 1, 1999,
at A6. See also infra note 69 and accompanying text.
4.
Ellen Joan Pollock & Andrea Petersen, Serbs Take Offensive in the First
Cyberwar, Bombing America, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1999, at Al. Some commentators
claim that nongovernmental organization (NGO) use of the Internet to promote the
Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) was the first active Internet response to
a distant upheaval and the first "netwar," i.e. cyberwar.
David Ronfeldt &
Armando Martinez, A Comment on the Zapatista 'Netwar," in IN ATHENA'S CAMP:
PREPARING FOR CONFLICT IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 2, at 369, 371. The
short-lived EZLN uprising in Chiapas State, Mexico was a non-international
conflict, beyond the scope of this article. See generally DAVID RONFELDT ET AL., THE
ZAPATISTA SOCIAL NETWAR IN MEXICO (1998); infra notes 41, 80 and accompanying
text. For an analysis of the potential impact of NGOs in cyberwar, see infra notes
80-83 and accompanying text. See also JOHN ARQUILLA & DAVID RONFELDT, THE
ADVENT OF NETWAR 3-6, 45-46 (1996) (predicting that much of the world is ripe for
netwar); RONFELDT ET AL., supra, at 8; John Arquilla et al., Networks, Netwar, and
Information-Age Terrorism, in IAN 0. LESSER ET AL., COUNTERING THE NEW TERRORISM
39, 46 (1999) [hereinafter Arquilla et al. in LESSER ET AL.] (defining netwar as
small-scale contingencies, ie. "low-intensity conflict (LIC) [or] operations other
than war (OOTW), and nonmilitary modes of conflict and crime," as distinguished
from cyberwar, which includes high-intensity and middle-range conflicts); John
Arquilla et al., Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism, in STRATEGIC
APPRAISAL:

THE CHANGING ROLE OF INFORMATION

IN WARFARE

75 (Zalmay M.

Khalilzad & John P. White eds., 1999) [hereinafter Arquilla et al. in STRATEGIC
APPRAISAL].
5.
Serb Supporters Use E-mail as Pipelinefor Warnings and Messages of
Support, WINSTON-SALEM J., Apr. 25, 1999, at A18.
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bombed the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) embassy in
Belgrade, PRC-based sources brought down the U.S. White House
web page and defaced the U.S. Embassy website in Beijing.6 The
U.S. military has acknowledged that NATO's air war against
Serbia included "limited" computer warfare. 7 The United States
mounted computer attacks on Yugoslav President Slobodon
Milosevic's and other Serbian leaders' foreign bank accounts over
the summer of 1999; "[iun future wars, United States
cyberwarriors will try to disable air defense systems, upset
logistics and infect software
. . . . according to a Pentagon
official."8 Other countries or alliances, including rogue nations,
9
may be tempted to resort to IW in the future.
These Internet incursions and the responses to them had
counterparts in more traditional methods of aiding Serbia. New
NATO partner Hungary blocked a seventy-three-truck convoy,
which included fuel tankers, armored trucks, and cargoes of food,
medicine, and children's toys, from Belarus and Russia. The
situation defused when Russia agreed to leave behind the
armored trucks and truckloads of fuel.10 Television broadcasts
from Republika Srpska, an ethnic Serb ministate within
neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina,
had unbalanced
content
favoring Serbia, including Serb state television programs, beamed

6.
David Stout, China Protests Crash White House Web Site, N.Y. TIMES,
May 12, 1999, at A12. See also David C. Gompert, National Security in the
Information Age, NAVAL WAR C. REV., Autumn 1998, at 22, 23, 34.
This
phenomenon has happened elsewhere. See, e.g., Stephen J. Glain, Blind Arab
Brothers, Allegedly Hackers, Disconcert Israel, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1999, at Al.
The U.S. General Accounting Office estimated that the Department of Defense
experienced 250,000 cyber-attacks in 1995 and that the number of these would
increase in the future. COMM. TO REVIEW DOD C41 PLANS AND PROGRAMS, NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, REALIZING THE POTENTIAL OF C41: FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGES
131 n.2 (1999) [hereinafter COMM. TO REVIEW DOD C41 PLANS AND PROGRAMS]. See
also GREENBERG ET AL., supranote 1, at 65-66 (stating that the 1994 attack on the
U.S. Air Force system was probably from the United Kingdom); SHARP, supra note
1, at 20; Aldrich, supranote 1, at 229-31.
The private sector has also experienced a high volume of intrusions. Robert L.
Dunne, Deterring Unauthorized Access to Computers: Controlling Behavior in
Cyberspace Through a Contract Law Paradigm,35 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 6 (1994).' C41
refers to Command, Control, Computing, Communications and Intelligence. A
related acronym, C4ISR, adds Surveillance and Reconnaissance. See id. at 29.
7.
Elizabeth Becker, Pentagon Sets Up New Center For Waging
Cyberwarfare,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1999, at A16.
8.
Id. For other C41 methods used in Bosnia-Herzegovina, see COMM. TO
REVIEW DOD C41 PLANS AND PROGRAMS, supra note 6, at 35-36. See generally
RICHARD HUNDLEY ET AL., SECURITY IN CYBERSPACE: CHALLENGES FOR SOCIETY 10-13
(1996) (noting that cyber-attacks on banks have occurred before).
9.
Gompert, supranote 6, at 32.
10.
Michael R. Gordon, Convoy Sent from Russia Is Blocked by Hungary,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1999, at A8; The Russian Trucks Arrive in Belgrade, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 14, 1999, at A14. See also infra notes 272, 292 and accompanying
text.
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to Bosnian broadcasters by satellite. British and U.S. officials
threatened to close the station unless it changed its coverage.' 1
Although the Kosovo campaign was the first known major
use of IW, the 1990-91 Gulf War was a harbinger of the future;
information played a major role and decisively affected the battle
for Al-Khafji. Coalition forces detected the night movement of
Iraqi divisions far behind enemy lines through Joint Surveillance
and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft and
aunmanned reconnaissance aircraft." 12
Hackers in the

Netherlands reportedly offered to help Iraq by penetrating and
attacking coalition information networks, but Iraq rejected the
offer.' 3
Opponents' IW tactics could disrupt future coalition
wars, however. 1 4
The same could be true for one-on-one
disputes, such as the PRC-Taiwan confrontation or the Indonesia-

11.
Daniel Pearl, PropagandaWar: A Bosnian TV Station, Staffed by Serbs,
Runs Afoul of U.S., NATO, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1999, at Al. For analysis of the
NATO campaign and the former Yugoslavia's suits against NATO members in the
International Court of Justice, see J.D. Godwin, NATO's Role in Peace Operations:
Reexamining the Treaty After Bosnia and Kosovo, 160 MILITARY L. REV. 1 (1999)
and Aaron Schwabach, Yugoslavia v. NATO, Security Council Resolution 1244, and
the Law of HumanitarianIntervention, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 77 (2000).
12.
Jeremy Shapiro, Information and War: Is It a Revolution?, in STRATEGIC
APPRAISAL: THE CHANGING ROLE OF INFORMATION IN WARFARE, supra note 4, at 113.
See also COMM. TO REVIEW DOD C41 PLANS AND PROGRAMS, supra note 6, at 35.
Two authors see the war as a clash between two war-forms, the Second Wave and
the Third Wave, or a collision between a predominantly industry-based
"smokestack" economy state, Iraq, and an information-based U.S.-led coalition.
ALVIN TOFFLER & HEIDI TOFFLER, WAR AND ANTI-WAR: SURVIVAL AT THE DAWN OF THE
21ST CENTURY 64-71 (1993). These ideas are more fully developed by Toffler
elsewhere. See TOFFLER, POWERSHIFT, supra note 2; TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE,
supra note 2 (describing the First Wave as an agriculture-based economy).
Michael N. Schmitt states that this was not the first "smart" war. Michael N.
Schmitt, The Principle of Discriminationin 21st Century Warfare, 2 YALE HUM. RTS.
& DEV. L.J. 143, 164 (1999).
13.
TRUST IN CYBERSPACE 18 (Fred B. Schneider ed., 1999); Aldrich, supra
note 1, at 227. The story may, however, be apocryphal. Zalmay Khalilzad,
Defense in a Wired World: Protection, Deterrence, and Prevention, in STRATEGIC
APPRAISAL: THE CHANGING ROLE OF INFORMATION IN WARFARE, supra note 4, at 403,
408. In January 1999 Indonesia reportedly attacked non-government computers
in Ireland and brought down the East Timor virtual country domain and Internet
service to more than 3000 customers. SHARP, supra note 1, at 22.
14.
HUNDLEY ET AL., supra note 8, at 16 ("[I]f Saddam Hussein were to make
another effort to capture Kuwait, he would likely give more attention to splitting
the coalition opposing him-possibly through IW attacks.'); ROGER C. MOLANDER
ET AL., STRATEGIC INFORMATION WARFARE: A NEW FACE OF WAR 28-30 (1996). Cf.
Stephen T. Hosmer, The Information Revolution and Psychological Effects, in
STRATEGIC APPRAISAL: THE CHANGING ROLE OF INFORMATION IN WARFARE, supra note
4, at 217, 238-42. Coalition operations also pose problems for coalition partners,
such as the inability to fully predict partners' actions, partners' incompatible or
inadequate resources, the unwillingness to share sensitive information with
partners, and differences in operational doctrine or language. See COMM. TO
REVIEW DOD C41 PLANS AND PROGRAMS, supranote 6, at 193-94.
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East Timor independence issue.1 s "Knowledge . . . is now the
central resource of destructivity, just as it is the central resource
16

of productivity."
Internet use (or abuse) on a worldwide scale not involving
military action has occurred within the United States and other
countries. In 1997, military security analysts uncovered and
stopped computer hackers who had discovered a new way to
attack open Pentagon networks on the Internet. The hackers
tried to cover their tracks by initiating intrusions through an
overseas site not related to where the hackers were. 1 7 Another
attack in 1998 could have compromised military air strike
planning.18 In 1999 the Chernobyl and Melissa viruses wreaked
havoc among unprotected computers worldwide. 19 In early 2000,
attacks on Internet service providers, such as Yahoo!, and other
major websites, such as eBay, E*Trade, and CNN.com, shut down
major parts of the Internet. In May 2000 the "I love you" virus
20
attacked e-mail systems, causing millions in damage worldwide.

15.
E.g., SHARP, supra note 1, at 22; Jon G. Auerbach & William M.
Bulkeley, Web in Modern Age Is Arena for Activism, Terrorism, Even War, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 10, 2000, at BI.
16.
TOFFLER & TOFFLER, supra note 12, at 71.
17.
Elizabeth Becker, Computer Hackers Are Stopped; Pentagon Networks
Were Victim, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1999, at A15. See also TRUST IN CYBERSPACE,
supra note 13, at 17-18; John Simons, How a Cyber Sleuth, Using a "Data Tap,"
Busted a Hacker Ring, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 1999, at AI (describing a similar group,
the "Phonemasters"). Ten years before, hackers were discovered in the Federal
Republic of Germany selling secrets to the KGB. SYSTEM SEC. STUDY COMM.,
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPUTERS AT RISK:
SAFE COMPUTING IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 9 (1991); TOFFLER, POWERSHIFT, supra note 2, at 160; Billy
Barron, Crackers and Viruses, in THE INTERNET UNLEASHED 1027, 1029 (Sams
Publishing 1994). These were only a few among many similar attacks. Although
Tom Caldwell and others prefer "cracker," which to computer experts has a
nonpejorative connotation, to "hacker"; however, this article refers to those who
intentionally try to break into others' computer systems as hackers. See Tom
Caldwell, Managing Internet Security, in THE INTERNET UNLEASHED, supra, at 155,
160.
18.
SHARP, supra note 1, at 20. Some commentators see a possibility of an
"electronic Pearl Harbor" attack on defense facilities. Aldrich, supra note 1, at
225.
19.
E.g., Lawyer Likens the Melissa Virus to Graffiti, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9,
1999, at B2; Taiwan College Says Ex-Student Wrote Chernobyl Virus Program, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 30, 1999, at A10. See also infra note 69 and accompanying text.
20.
See generally Ted Bridis, PoisonousMessage's Potential to Destroy Files
Prompted Vast E-Mail Shutdown, WALL ST. J., May 5, 2000, at B1; Adam Cohen,
School for Hackers,TIME, May 22, 2000, at 59; Lee Gomes, Hacker Hunters Follow
Crumbs on Cybertrail,WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2000, at B1; Lee Gomes & Thomas E.
Weber, Hackers' Weapon Exploits Internet's Open Nature, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10,
2000, at B1; David P. Hamilton, Redesigning the Internet: Can It Be Made Less
Vulnerable?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2000, at B1; David P. Hamilton & David S.
Cloud, FBI Launches a Vast Manhunt, But the Trail is Byzantine and the Suspects
Legion, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2000, at B 1; Internet Sites Across EuropeMove to Step
Up Security, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2000, at B5; John Markoff, The Strength of the
Internet Proves to Be Its Weakness, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2000, at Cl; Matt Richtel
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It has been suggested that cyberspace usage was a factor in the
21
Columbine High School tragedy in Littleton, Colorado.
Afterward, a wave of threats, some via the Internet and others in
writing, graffiti, or by telephone, swept the United States.
Commentators, as well as a 1996 presidential Executive
Order, postulate scenarios ranging from precipitation of major
disasters-including the destruction of continuity of government,
destruction of a national air control system, bringing down a
military command and control system during a crucial battle, and
alteration of medical data with resulting loss of life-to other

serious problems-including major theft from banking systems
and a loss of electric power, telecommunications, energy sources,
water supply, or vital human services. 22 Computer misuse can
distort election campaigns, thereby perverting the democratic
process. 23
A possibility of domestic terrorist attacks through

& Joel Brinkley, Spread of Attacks on Web Sites Is Slowing Traffic on the Internet,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2000, at Al. Canadian police arrested "Maliaboy," a 15-yearold accused of hacking a CNN website; more arrests are expected and damage may
run into the millions. Matt Richtel, CanadaArrests 15-Year-Old in Web Attack,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2000, at Cl. Attacks came through a University of California
at Santa Barbara computer. See id. at C6. Although the "love" attack started in
the Philippines, copycat viruses proliferated thereafter. John Schwartz & David A.
Vise, 'Love" Virus Is Traced to Philippines, WASH. POST, May 6, 2000, at Al. See
also infra note 69 and accompanying text.
21.
Thomas E. Weber, Did a Web Site Foreshadow a Killing Spree?, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 22, 1999, at B1.
22.
In some instances these invasions have already occurred. Exec. Order
No. 13010, 61 Fed. Reg. 37347 (1996); ROBERT H. ANDERSON ET AL., SECURING THE
U.S. DEFENSE INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: A PROPOSED APPROACH 1-3 (1999);
CRYPTOGRAPHY'S ROLE IN SECURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, supra note 1, at 23,
30-38, 294-95; GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 3-6, 35-38; HUNDLEY ET AL.,
supra note 8, at 13-16; SHARP, supra note 1, at 20-23; SYSTEM SEC. STUDY COMM.,
supra note 17, at 9; TRUST IN CYPERSPACE, supranote 13, at 17-19, 47-54; Aldrich,
supra note 1, at 231-32, 235, 262; Robert H. Anderson & Anthony C. Hearn, An
Exploration of Cyberspace Security R&D Investment Strategies for DARPA, in IN
ATHENA'S CAMP:

PREPARING FOR CONFLICT IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 2, at

253, 253-71; Richard 0. Hundley & Robert H. Anderson, Emerging Challenge:
Security and Safety in Cyberspace, in IN ATHENA'S CAMP: PREPARING FOR CONFLICT IN
THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 2, at 231, 235; Roger C. Molander et al., U.S.
Strategic Vulnerabilities: Threats Against Society, in STRATEGIC APPRAISAL: THE
CHANGING ROLE OF INFORMATION IN WARFARE, supranote 4, at 253, 256-63; Schmitt,
supra note 12, at 156-57. See also NASA Vulnerable to Attack from Cyberspace,
PROVIDENCE J., May 23, 1999, at A3 (reporting NASA computer systems defects
that could lead to a major space exploration disaster like the loss of Challenger).
On the plus side, however, patients can use computers for a "second opinion' in
medical matters. Gina Kolata, Web Research Transforms Visit to the Doctor, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2000, at Al. This may be part of a general trend toward patients
seeking medical knowledge independently of a doctor's diagnosis.
TOFFLER,
POWERSHIFT, supra note 2, at 7-8.
23.
For example, hackers tried but failed to get into the Gallup
Organization's system before Super Tuesday 2000. This might have had a ripple
effect on how people voted in those U.S. primary elections. Hacker Strikes Gallup
Site, WINSTON-SALEM J., Mar. 7, 2000, at A4. See also Exec. Order No. 13010,
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computer networks continues. 24 Commentators have suggested
that some Internet misuse ripple effects may exist, including
hijacking e-mail 25 and criminal activity preying on Internet users'
fear of Y2K shutdowns. 2 6 (There was a hiccup in e-trading, and
several big Internet stocks fell on U.S. exchanges after the early
2000 assault on the Internet.)27 Any of the following may affect
the Internet:
natural phenomena, such as storms, floods,
earthquakes; human carelessness like backhoes cutting phone
lines; accidents such as rats chewing cables and system
component failure; and oversights due to operator action,
28
inaction, or lack of training.
A recent series of war games involving attacks on U.S.
"cyberspace" suggests that this country's ability and resolve to

supra note 22 (stating that continuity of government is a "critical infrastructure"
that if incapacitated would lead to a "debilitating" effect on U.S. "economic
security"). Use of e-mail can have a similar effect, to the extent voters might read
and believe false messages before voting. This is, of course, no more than
electronic rumor-mongering, but it might be equally or more effective than word of
mouth or similar communications. There is, of course, a possibility of interactivity
with an e-mail sender that traditional media communications cannot afford.
TOFFLER & TOFFLER, supra note 12, at 208-10. This kind of hacking is also
analogous to propaganda attacks that have been used to try to topple
governments in prior wars; only the method is different. See generally Aldrich,
supranote 1, at 245.
24.
Americans' 'Addiction" to Computers May Leave U.S. Open to Terror
Attacks, WINSTON-SALEM J., Nov. 5, 1999, at A14. See also supra note 15 and
accompanying text. Treaties to help combat cyber-terrorism have been proposed.
See ABRAHAM SOFAER & SEYMOUR E. GOODMAN, STANFORD UNIV. CENTER FOR INT'L
SECURITY & COOPERATION, A PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON CYBER
CRIME AND TERRORISM (2000).
25.
Michael Moss, Inside the Game ofE-mail Hijacking, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9,
1999, at B1.
26.
Y2K referred to the anticipated disruption of computers and related
systems, such as banking and businesses, on January 1, 2000 because older
computers were programmed to read "00" as 1900. Upgrades tried to correct
problems worldwide.
See generally Americans' "Addiction" to Computers May
Leave U.S. Open to Terror Attacks, supra note 24; Marc Lacey, F.B.I. Warns
Criminals That It's Year 2000 Ready, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1999, at A24. An
electronic ripple effect might have been combining viruses with Y2K.
Dean
Takahashi, Y2K and Viruses Could Be an Explosive Mix, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16,
1999, at B6. As it happened, the millennium began with few ripples in the United
States and most "wired" countries. However, perceived emergencies like Y2K or
the shift to the Euro may accelerate improvement in information systems or
defenses. TRUST IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 13, at 187-88. See also infra notes
72-79 and accompanying text.
27.
E.S. Browning, Rate Fears, Hackers Fuel Bearish Session Touching All
Sectors, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2000, at Cl; Rebecca Buckman, Cyberassaults
Raise Jitters for Investors, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2000, at Cl; Nick Wingfield &
Scott Thurm, As More Sites Get Hit, Web Companies Fortify, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10,
2000, at B1. See also supranote 20 and accompanying text.
28.
See SYSTEM SEC. STUDY COMM., supra note 17, at 9; TRUST IN
CYBERSPACE, supra note 13, at 16-17, 37-38, 41-47; WILLIS H. WARE, THE CYBERPOSTURE OF THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 9-10 (1998).
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defend its overseas interests are put at risk by the sorts of IW
attacks that could be within the means of unfriendly states in the
near future. Coordinated attacks on the command and control of
deploying U.S. forces, on U.S. allies, and on the public telephone
network could derail an otherwise "routine" projection of military
The games also show that neither government nor
power.
industry

is

well

prepared

29

for

this

threat,

technically,

institutionally, or intellectually.
Nonstate actors, such as international crime rings, terrorists,
separatists, and cults, can get IW weapons or hire 1W warriors.
"Compared to the acts of clumsy governments, their attacks could
These are increasingly
be hard to trace, punish, and deter.
dispersed entities, interconnected by... information technology."30
Roberta Cooper Ramo, American Bar Association President,
likened the Internet to the Wild West of the United States in the

nineteenth century:
What is remarkable about the Internet is that it creates a realLike the first communities of all
time, worldwide community.
cultures, but particularly those of America's Old West, it is a
community without laws, judges, or even sheriffs. It is a global
village where the citizens are . . . good Samaritans, holy monks,
and evil Rasputins, where they devise self-help solutions to
problems, and use capital punishment with no due process. An
entire world exists on your home or office computer screen. In the
electronic window you can see American ingenuity, public-spirited
volunteers that rival the Red Cross, and a can-do attitude along
with the rough-and-ready behavior of the OK Corral. It is a place
The global economy was made
without race, gender, or age.
global society exists in its
possible by modem transportation. The
31
earliest primitive stage on the Intemet.

Ms. Ramo may have misstated one point and overstated another.
More than American ingenuity is afoot on the Internet. There is
law, including international law, to be applied in the information
age like any other time, including the era of the Old West. What

Aldrich, supra note 1, at 228; Gompert, supra note 6, at 32. See also
29.
COMM. TO REVIEw DOD C41 PLANS AND PROGRAMS, supra note 6, at 132; SHARP,
supra note 1, at 19-20; TRUST IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 13, at 18-19. To a
certain extent the game anticipated reality. Cf. Simons, supra note 17, at Al.
Gompert, supranote 6, at 33. See generally Arquilla et al. in LESSER ET
30.
AL., supra note 4; Arquilla et al. in STRATEGIC APPRAISAL, supra note 4. At least one
faction in the Yugoslav civil war, the Muslims, was involved in drug-smuggling
operations. "Even more disturbing are the reports that the Italian and Russian
Maflas may be organizing international networks to sell weapons-grade nuclear
materials from the former Soviet Union to the highest bidder." BRIAN NICHIPORUK
& CARL H. BUILDER, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND THE FUTURE OF LAND WARFARE

34 (1995). See also supranotes 4, 15, 24 and accompanying text; infra notes 43,
85 and accompanying text.
Roberta Cooper Ramo, Executive Forewordto G. BURGESS ALLISON, THE
31.
LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNET xi (1995). See also ALLISON, supra, at 29, 42-43
(discussing "community" on the "E-Frontier").
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will be interesting to observe, from a social perspective, is not
whether the new frontier of the information age closes, but when
it does. The U.S. western frontier is said to have closed about
1890,32 scant decades after the U.S. Army, Native Americans,
Wyatt Earp, Wild Bill Hickok, Doc Holliday, the James brothers,
other gangs of bank robbers and cattle thieves, miners and timber
companies, feuding sheepmen and cattle barons and their ilk,
rode and sometimes abused the range and the great spaces of the
West. Their east and west coast counterparts, U.S. industry's socalled robber barons, some of whom were involved in the West's
economic infrastructure (e.g., the railroads carrying the mails the
gangs robbed), began to fall to the Sherman Antitrust Act and the
trust-busters, beginning about the same time.3 3
Will the
information age head to OK Corrals even more quickly? 34 We
may not be at high noon, but that time may be coming soon.

32.

FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 38-39

(Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1962) (1920). Historians debate the validity of Turner's
thesis, but it is fairly clear that this aspect of life in the western United States was
mostly over by 1893, when Turner first spoke. Id. at 1 n.1. For an example of
this debate, see THE TURNER THESIS CONCERNING THE ROLE OF THE FRONTIER IN

AMERICAN HISTORY (George Rogers Taylor ed., rev. ed. 1956).
33.
See generally HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY (1955)
(discussing the origins and application of An Act to Protect Trade and Commerce
Against Unlawful Restraints and Monopolies, popularly known as the Sherman
Antitrust Act, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994)). Turner linked these industrialists and capitalists with the
frontier spirit of democracy, singling out Andrew Carnegie for praise. TURNER,
supra note 32, at 264-65. However, Carnegie's media image, which Turner
apparently believed, was not reality.
Carnegie became an absentee owner,
spending much time in Europe and leaving management of his empire to Henry
Clay Frick. MARTHA FRICK SYMINGTON SANGER, HENRY CLAY FRICK: AN INTIMATE
PORTRAIT 223-38, 277-85 (1998). For an example of some of these participants at
work, see DAVID HAWARD BAIN, EMPIRE EXPRESS:
BUILDING THE FIRST
TRANSCONTINENTAL RAILROAD (1999) (describing the government support, financing
and building of the Central Pacific and Union Pacific Railroads, which ended in
the Credit Mobilier scandal).
34.
Cf. ALVIN TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK (1970). Turner declared the frontier
closed about 400 years after Columbus's discovery of America and 100 years after
the Constitution became the legal foundation for the United States. TURNER,
supra note 32, at 38. Thorelli says the aftermath of the Civil War, the heyday of
unbridled growth of U.S. combinations in restraint of trade, was partly impelled by
the phenomenal growth of industry in the North and high war tariffs to protect
Northern industry and provide revenue for the war. THORELLI, supra note 33, at
55-96. If so, the 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act, supra note 33, and the cases
decided under it lowered import duties. For example the McKinley and WilsonGorman Tariff Acts signaled the beginning of the end for the trusts twenty-five
years later. E.g., United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911);
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Swift & Co. v. United States,
196 U.S. 375 (1905); Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197
(1904); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); THORELLI,
supra note 33, at 240-247, 466-77, 598-601. Given accelerating computer and
Internet technical developments, might changes in Internet structure or freedom
occur even more quickly, particularly in view of the risks to society that continue
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This Article examines issues from the perspective of the
international law of neutrality and its relationship to responses
that a target country, such as the United States, might make
through claims of individual or collective self-defense, necessity,
and other sources of law-jus ad bellum. The Article also
considers issues arising once international armed conflict or war
has begun-jus in bello, and neutrals' and belligerents' roles in
the context of the Internet. As noted above,3 5 IW can range from
tactical, battlefield contexts to global strategic warfare.3 6 This
37
spectrum of intensity in armed conflict may occur in any war.
The information revolution can be a "force multiplier" and "force
38
modifier" for networks, not only in non-international conflicts,
but also in international armed conflicts, which are this Article's
primary focus. Part II discusses the history and development of
the Internet and discusses problems facing neutral countries in
Part III reviews the law of
information warfare situations.
to unfold? See supra notes 3-9, 12-29 and accompanying text; infra notes 80-107
and accompanying text. Another novel rapid communication method, the Pony
Express, lasted only a few years before transcontinental telegraphs supplanted it.
See supranotes 3-9, 12-29 and accompanying text.
35.
See generally ROGER C. MOLANDER ET AL., STRATEGIC INFORMATION
36.
WARFARE RISING xi, 5 (1998) (noting that strategic IW could pose threats to U.S.
economic or military security); MOLANDER ET AL., supra note 14; Edward
Harshberger & David Ochmanek, Information and Warfare: New Opportunitiesfor
U.S. Military Forces, in STRATEGIC APPRAISAL: THE CHANGING ROLE OF INFORMATION IN
WARFARE, supra note 4, at 157-78 (stating that IW will be most useful at tactical
through operational levels of conflict); Michael N. Schmitt, Bellum Americanum:
The U.S. View of Twenty-First Century War and Its Possible Implicationsfor the Law
of Armed Conflict, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1051, 1057 (1998) [hereinafter Schmitt,
Bellum] (describing U.S. advanced operational concepts for use in the future);
Schmitt, supra note 12, at 164; Shapiro, supra note 12, at 131-42 (discussing
strategic information warfare). Netwar, i.e., noninternational situations involving
IW tactics, can also proceed at strategic, operational and tactical levels in a given
confrontation. ARQUILLA & RONFELDT, supra note 4, at 77-78. See also supra note
4 and accompanying text; infra note 41 and accompanying text. Although it is not
known to have involved computer interactions, changes in information technology
facilitated the USSR's collapse. Zalmay Khalilzad & John White, Introduction to
STRATEGIC APPRAISAL: THE CHANGING ROLE OF INFORMATION IN WARFARE, supra note
4, at 7, 8. Measures for countering IW threats by improved cyberspace security
can range from local to strategic efforts. See HUNDLEY ET AL., supra note 8, at 37.
See also infra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
To illustrate the spectrum, see OCEANS LAW & POLICY DEP'T, NAVAL WAR
37.
COLL.

CENTER FOR NAVAL

WARFARE

STUDIES,

ANNOTATED

SUPPLEMENT

TO THE

COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (NWP 1-14M/MCWP 52.1/COMDTPUB P5800.1) (1997), reprinted in A.R. THOMAS & JAMES C. DUNCAN,
ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, fig. A5-1, at 314 (U.S. Naval War Coil. Intl Law Studies vol. 73, 1999)
[hereinafter NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED]. Similar spectra might illustrate the physical
destructiveness of attacks and the relative physical intrusiveness or character of
the targets attacked. See generally GREENBERG ET AL., supranote 1.
Cf ARQUILLA & RONFELDT, supranote 4, at 43-44 (discussing the use of
38.
an information revolution in the context of nonstate adversaries such as
criminals).
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neutrality and self-defense in the U.N. Charter context,3 9 together
with other responses international law allows in claims of
information security once war begins, 40 and the law of neutrality
during war. Part IV synthesizes Charter law and the law of
neutrality in IW contexts, offering analogies that may be useful in
a new area of jurisprudence. Part V is a brief appraisal.
This Article does not discuss IW during non-international
armed conflicts or low intensity conflict (LIC) situations not
amounting to international armed conflict. 4 1 Nor does this Article
analyze cyberwar-style intrusions that are or might be criminal
law violations, tactics in business competition, or products of
individuals or groups with lawful intentions resulting in

39.
U.N. CHARTER arts. 25 (binding force of decisions), 48 (action to carry
out Security Council decisions), 51 (right of self-defense), 103 (conflict between
Charter and other obligations).
See also infra notes 124, 168-75, 190 and
accompanying text.
40.
Cf. Becker, supra note 7 (describing U.S. measures to counteract
cyberwarfare risks).
41.
For information on this topic, see generally ARQUILLA & RONFELDT,
supra note 4; John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netware, in IN
ATHENA'S CAMP: PREPARING FOR CONFLICT IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 2, at
275. Arquilla and Ronfeldt argue that "netwar" will figure increasingly at the
societal end-where the language is normally about LIC and OOTW, a broader
concept than LIC-including peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations.
Although cyberwar usually has formal military forces pitted against each other,
netwar will more likely involve non-state, paramilitary and other irregular forces.
Arquilla and Ronfeldt believe that netwar is more likely than cyberwar. ARQUILLA
& RONFELDT, supra note 4, at 45-46, 53-56.
The LOAC recognizes differences between international armed conflicts, the
theme of this article, and non-international armed conflicts, which are excluded
from consideration. Compare, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]
(stating supplemental principles for international armed conflicts), with Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II] (stating principles for noninternational armed conflicts such as civil wars). For LIC analysis, see generally
ARQUILLA & RONFELDT, supra note 4, at 73 (analyzing the 1994-96 Zapatista LIC
netwar, perhaps the first cyber campaign of its kind); LEGAL AND MORAL
CONSTRAINTS ON LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT (Alberto R. Coll et al. eds., U.S. Naval War
Coll. Int'l Law Studies vol. 67, 1995). See also supra note 4 and accompanying
text.
Military OOTW operations involve different factors and different C41
requirements. See COMM. TO REVIEW DOD C41 PLANS AND PROGRAMS, supra note 6,
at 53-56. For analysis of U.S. military OOTW IW policy, see Roger D. Scott, Legal
Aspects of Information Warfare: Military Disruptionof Communications,45 NAVAL L.
REV. 57, 60 (1998). Moreover, IW may blur distinctions between Protocol I- and
Protocol II-governed conflicts and principles and, for example, discrimination
within these principles. Schmitt, Bellum, supra note 36, at 1074; Schmitt, supra
note 12, at 158-59. Nevertheless, this analysis proceeds along traditional lines of
distinction that present law makes between international and non-international
armed conflicts.
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disruptions. 42 Thus, cyberwar by state-supported terrorists is
considered, but an Internet campaign or use by terrorists for
private gain, 43 analogous to piracy on the high seas, 44 is not.

For information on this topic, see generally ARQUILLA & RONFELDT,
42.
supra note 4 (discussing transnational criminal organizations (TCO)); RONFELDT ET
AL., supra note 4, at 20; Gompert, supra note 6, at 33 (listing various sources of
threats).
Some commentators suggest the possibility of transnational terrorism
43.
without differentiating between state-supported and other terrorist groups and
note the possibility of groups with mixed motives, for example ethnic Muslims
involved in drug smuggling and the Italian and Russian Mafiosi, that may be
organizing international networks to sell weapons-grade nuclear materials from
the former USSR. Brian Nichiporuk & Carl H. Builder, Societal Implications, in IN
ATHENA'S CAMP: PREPARING FOR CONFLICT IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 2, at
295, 302-03. See also ARQUILLA & RONFELDT, supra note 4, at 67-70; RONFELDT ET
AL., supra note 4, at 19-20; John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt, Looking Ahead:
PREPARING FOR
Preparing for Information-Age Conflict, in IN ATHENA'S CAMP:
CONFLICT IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 2, at 439, 457-58 [hereinafter
Arquilla & Ronfeldt, Looking Ahead]; Phil Williams, Transnational Criminal
Organisations and International Security, in IN ATHENA'S CAMP: PREPARING FOR
CONFLICT IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 2, at 315, 315-37. Bruce Hoffman
predicts a rise in religion-based terrorism, more "amateur" terrorism, and,
paradoxically, the improved "professionalism" of some terrorist groups. Bruce
Hoffman, Responding to Terrorism Across the Technological Spectrum, in IN
ATHENA'S CAMP: PREPARING FOR CONFLICT IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 2, at
339, 339-67. The PRC may be considering IW terrorism. Auerbach & Bulkeley,
supra note 15, at B6. See also supra notes 4, 15, 24, 30 and accompanying text.
E.g., ARQUILLA & RONFELDT, supra note 4, at 65-66. High seas piracy is
44.
a universal crime; anyone who seizes a pirate may try him. See generally U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, arts. 100-07, 110, 1833
U.N.T.S. 3, 397, 436-38 [hereinafter UNCLOS]; Convention on the High Seas, Apr.
29, 1958, arts. 14-22, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2317-18, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 90-94
[hereinafter High Seas Convention]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
§ 404 (1987); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 235-37 (5th
ed. 1998); C. JOHN COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA §§ 457-64 (6th
rev. ed. 1967); 2 D.P. O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 966-78 (I.A.
Shearer ed., 1984); 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 299-305 (Robert Jennings
& Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996) [hereinafter OPPENHEIM]; 3 UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY §§ 101.1-107.7(d),
110.1-110.1 1(h) (Satya N. Nandan & Shabtal Rosenne eds., 1995).
Guyana ratified UNCLOS on Nov. 16, 1993, and the treaty is now in force for
By April 30, 1999, 129 countries had ratified, acceded or
ratifying states.
succeeded to UNCLOS including many states with large navies or significant
merchant marines. Some of these states have flag of convenience registries whose
beneficial ownerships often list U.S. interests, for example PRC, France, Germany,
Greece, Honduras, Japan, Republic of Korea, Norway, Panama, Russia and the
United Kingdom. UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE
STATUS AS OF 30 APRIL 1999 at 754-56, U.N. Doc.
SECRETARY-GENERAL:
ST/LEG/SER.E/17, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.5 (1999).
The Clinton Administration sent UNCLOS to the U.S. Senate for advice and
consent with a supplemental protocol, Agreement Relating to the Implementation
of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, colloquially
known as the "Boat Agreement," which amended UNCLOS deep seabed articles
not relevant to this analysis. The United States and most other industrialized
nations declined to sign UNCLOS in 1982 because of objectionable terms in its
Recognizing that
Part XI, which was concerned with deep seabed mining.
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amending Part XI would be difficult once UNCLOS entered into force, U.N.
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali spearheaded a multinational effort to
modify Part XI. That initiative was successful and on July 28, 1994 the U.N.
General Assembly adopted the Boat Agreement. G.A. Res. 48/263, U.N. GAOR,
48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/263 (1994).
The amended
UNCLOS has been before the U.S. Senate since that time. See PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES, MESSAGE TRANSMITTING UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
THE SEA, WITH ANNEXES, DONE AT MONTEGO BAY, JAMAICA, DECEMBER 10, 1982 (THE
"CONVENTION"), AND THE AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PART XI OF
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OF DECEMBER 10, 1982,
WITH ANNEX, ADOPTED AT NEW YORK, JULY 28, 1994 (THE "AGREEMENT"), AND SIGNED
BY THE UNITED STATES, SUBJECT TO RATIFICATION, ON JULY 28, 1994, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 103-39, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), reprinted in 6 U.S. Dep't St. Dispatch,
Supp. No. 1, at 1-52 (1995). Many states have agreed to be bound by the Boat
Agreement, have signed it, or have agreed to apply it provisionally. The United
States is in the last category.
The United States has recognized UNCLOS' navigational articles, the principal
interface for the law of naval warfare and the LOS, as representing customary
international law for nearly two decades. See United States Ocean Policy, Mar.
10, 1983, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 383 (Mar. 14, 1983). Commentators
generally agree that these provisions reflect customary international law. See,
e.g., NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 1.1; U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAVY,
ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS: NWP 9A (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10 & 1.1 (1989) [hereinafter NWP 9A
ANNOTATED]; IntroductoryNote, in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, Part
V, at 3-5. Cf. John Norton Moore, Introductionto I UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY, supra,at xxv, xxvii; Bernard H. Oxman,
International Law and Naval and Air Operations at Sea, in THE LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS 19, 29 (Horace B. Robertson, Jr., ed., U.S. Naval War Coil. Int'l Law
Studies vol. 64, 1991).
But see 1 O'CONNELL, supra, at 48-49.
O'Connell
researched using UNCLOS drafts but died before the treaty text was available. I.A.
Shearer made changes and additions and published O'Connell's treatise before
final negotiations produced UNCLOS.
I.A. Shearer, Editor's Preface to 1
O'CONNELL, supra, at vii. O'Connell's volumes may reflect views of the decade
before the Restatement (Third)of ForeignRelations was published.
UNCLOS declares that it supersedes the High Seas Convention between
UNCLOS parties. UNCLOS, supra, art. 311(1). See also Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 59, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 345-46 [hereinafter
Vienna Convention]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 323; LORD
MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 506-09 (2d ed. 1961); IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 184 (2d ed. 1984); 5 UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY, supra, §§ 311.1-311.5,
311.11.
Vaughan Lowe states that the 1958 LOS conventions cannot be
denounced because they have no denunciation clauses.
A.V. Lowe, The
Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations and the Contemporary
Law of the Sea, in THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra, at 109, 120-2 1. However,
the Vienna Convention, supra, art. 56, recites conditional opportunities for
denunciation.
See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 333;
SINCLAIR, supra, at 183-84. The issue is moot for those states that ratify UNCLOS.
45.
Unless otherwise noted, the following are general sources for Part I:
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-38 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 521 U.S. 844,
849-53 (1997); ALLISON, supra note 31; THE INTERNET UNLEASHED, supra note 17;
KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE ORIGINS OF THE
INTERNET (1996); NICHIPORUK & BUILDER, supra note 30, at 1-5; George Johnson,
From Two Small Nodes, a Mighty Web Has Grown, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1999, at
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II. THE INTERNET: DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE
As its title suggested, Part I analyzed issues neutral countries
and countries in international armed conflict may face in IW and
other contexts involving the Internet. To understand the current
IW context, one must consider the Internet's development and
structure.
The Internet is an international network of interconnected
computers. The network began in 1969 as the ARPANET military
program 4 6 to enable computers operated by the military, defense
contractors, and defense-related universities to communicate by
redundant channels even if enemy attack damaged parts of the
network. ARPANET was designed to survive nuclear attack and
the possibility of an atomic blast's disruption of atmospheric
ARPANET provided an
communications, such as by radio. 4 7
example for developing linked non-military networks through

Fl. The Supreme Court and District Court's ACLU opinions give the most
compact analysis.
46.
ARPANET is the acronym for Advanced Research Projects Agency
Network. The Defense Communications Agency split the network into MILNET for
unclassified information and ARPANET for the computer research community in
1983. HAFNER & LYON, supra note 45, at 249. As World War II ended, Vannevar
Bush suggested the basic idea of a personal computer. He traced the history of
calculators, discussed speech-controlled typewriters, and advocated document
storage on super-fine grained microfilm shuffled by mechanical fingers. Bush
believed that new logic and new symbolism would be necessary. Although he did
not conceive of the idea of electronic communication, much that Bush predicted
has become reality, albeit in different modalities. Vannevar Bush, As We May
Think, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1945, at 101; Johnson, supra note 45, at Fl.
Mechanical computers have been aboard U.S. warships since World War II to
supply fire control solutions to naval guns through electric circuits. Although
most firing corrections on these computers are made aboard ship by telephone
communications among gunners (fire control personnel who operated visual or
radar-assisted gun directors and ships' combat information centers, that is a room
aboard ship where radar repeaters portrayed shell splashes), shore bombardment
effects and recommendations for corrections sometimes came by radio
communications between ships and shore spotters, for example U.S. Army or
Marine Corps forward artillery observers on the ground or in aircraft. The ship's
computer "stored" prior information that had been inserted and retained it until
Information might be relayed through intra-ship
changed by operators.
communications, perhaps to other shipboard computers, but there was no data
transfer among external computers, such as those on other vessels. Antisubmarine warfare systems, shipboard torpedo attack systems, and submarine
fire control systems for torpedo attack employed similar fire control solutions
using electronics-based systems like sonar and radar. Mechanical devices
operated in similar fashion, but there was little if any information exchange
between an attacking ship and other stations, except perhaps in "wolfpack"
attacks. The World War II Norden bombsight aboard aircraft operated on similar
principles; the bombardier "flew" a plane on final target approach and released
bombs based on onboard computer calculations. These systems operate similarly
today. Electronics-based computers have replaced mechanical ones, and missiles
have replaced gun projectiles in many applications.
47.

HAFNER & LYON, supranote 45, at 54-59.
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which millions of people could communicate and access
ARPANET was renamed
information on a worldwide basis.
DARPANet and ended in 1989.48 With other formal or loose
computer networks, such as BITNET, CSNET, FIDONET and
USENET, these linked networks are today commonly known as
the Internet.
Although ARPANET started with a handful of linked
computers, by 1996 host computers numbered over nine million,
with sixty percent in the United States. By 1999, Internet users
49
were expected to mushroom to two hundred million worldwide.
ARPANET began communicating through special telephone lines;
today Internet communications can travel through ordinary
telephone lines, relays from microwave relay towers through the
atmosphere, and satellite uplinks and downlinks. 5 0 Transistors,
microchips, and fiber optic cables were major factors in
Fiber optic cable capacity,
development of the Internet.5 1
computer power, and communications capacities may grow
exponentially, while computers and communications devices may
become lighter, smaller, more reliable, more portable, less
expensive, and consume less power in an increasingly globalized
market for the next twenty years, varying in rate of change in
Satellites, imagery, and
different parts of the world.
52
communications will also improve for satellite-based systems.
A message can travel many routes to a destination over this
redundant system of linked computers. A message might begin
in Country A and be sent to a computer in Country B, and then
be forwarded to and through computers in Countries C, D, and E

48.
Its sponsoring agency was reacronymed DARPA, which it remained
until being retitled Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). Id. at 219. More
recently ARPA was renamed DARPA. U.S. Space Command is the U.S. military
lead agency for coordinating computer network defense and attack. PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES, MEMORANDUM TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (Sept. 29, 1999)
(attaching revised UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN para. 22a(12) (1999)).
49.
C. RICHARD NEU ET AL., SENDING YOUR GOVERNMENT A MESSAGE: E-MAIL
COMMUNICATION BETWEEN CITIZENS AND GOVERNMENT xxi-xxii, 119-48 (1999)
(reporting that major gaps in home computer availability in 1993 and 1997 had
widened, particularly among less educated, lower income, Hispanic, Black, and
more senior or rural people in the United States). See also NICHIPORUK & BUILDER,
supra note 30, at 24 (stating computer connectivity will be much less rapid in
Africa and the Middle East than in Europe and North America).
50.
Wireless Internet communication is now a reality for anyone who buys
a cheap hand-held device like a cellular telephone. See generally The Internet Cuts
the Cord, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 1999, at Al.
51.
NICHIPORUK & BUILDER, supra note 30, at 8-10, 14-15.
52.
Id. at 15-24; Brian Nichiporuk, U.S. Military Opportunities: InformationWarfare Concepts of Operation, in STRATEGIC APPRAISAL: THE CHANGING ROLE OF
INFORMATION IN WARFARE, supra note 4, at 179, 187. See also TOFFLER, THE THIRD
WAVE, supra note 2, at 169 (writing in 1980 and predicting these developments);
Lisa Guernsey, Unplugged on Campus, But Always Connected, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20,
2000, at G1; The Internet Cuts the Cord, supranote 50.
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before reaching its addressee in Country F. If a message cannot
travel the A-B-C-D-E-F path because of attack on or destruction
of the route or system overload, for example, the Internet allows
transmission by alternate routes through other nations, for
Transmission and rerouting occur in
instance A-G-H-I-F.
seconds. Messages between computers on the Internet do not
"Packet
necessarily travel entirely along the same path.
switching" protocols s3 allow individual messages to be subdivided
message-sent
of the
into
smaller
"packets"-chunks
independently to its destination. While all packets of a message
often travel the same path to the destination, if computers along
the way are overloaded or cannot transmit for other reasons,
packets, like entire messages, can be rerouted to other
computers. Thus the A-F message, if long enough, might be
broken into three packets, one of which travels through
computers in Countries A-B-C-D-E-F, the second through
computers in Countries A-G-H-B-C-F, and the third through
computers in Countries A-B-X-Y-Z-F. The destination computer
in Country F reassembles the message from the packets.
Although these hypotheticals describe transmissions through
different countries, it is possible that some or all computers will
be in the same country, except the destination computer (F), or
that the message or packet will loop back through the same
in Country F, and maybe
country or countries, before arriving
54
links.
satellite
through
space
into

53.
A protocol is a collective agreement among network users so that
respective computer systems can communicate. It has a different meaning in
diplomacy and international law, usually referring to international agreements
supplementary to a prior treaty, for example Protocol I, supra note 41. HAFNER &
LYON, supra note 45, at 145-46; 2 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW,
CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES § 514 (2d rev. ed. 1947);
1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 44, § 586 n.2. There are seven layers of Internet
protocols: the physical, data link, network, transport, session, presentation and
application. Martin Moore, The Network of Networks, in THE INTERNET UNLEASHED,
supranote 17, at 64-67.
54.
Message routing, or rerouting, has been a feature of telephone
networks, over which Internet messages travel, for awhile. TOFFLER, POWERSHIFT,
supranote 2, at 108-09. "Neural" networks may "remember" where traffic is great
Internet addresses
and automatically shift messages to less-traveled paths.
typically include a final extension to their Uniform Resource Locator (URL). In the
United States the most familiar URL extensions for Internet users are ".com"
(commercial), ".edu" (educational), ".gov" (government agency), ".mil" (military),
".org" (non-profit organization) and ".net" (networking organization). TRUST IN
CYBERSPACE, supra note 13, at 31; Martin Moore, Domain Names and Internet
Addresses, in THE INTERNET UNLEASHED, supra note 17, at 71, 75. URLs locate a
Web site, sound file, graphic image, or Web page. URLs have five elements: a
protocol access, an Internet site, a path to locate an item on a Web server, a file
name, and an anchor name referencing a specific location within a long Web page.
Ivan Pope, World Wide Web: Linking Information with Hypertext, in THE INTERNET
UNLEASHED, supra note 17, at 619, 635. See also ALLISON, supra note 31, at 60;
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Anyone with Internet access may use many communication
and information retrieval methods, which are constantly evolving
and difficult to categorize. These include:
[Eliectronic mail (e-mail), automatic mailing services ("mail
exploders,' sometimes referred to as "listservs"), "newsgroups,'
.chat rooms,' and the 'World Wide Web.' All of these methods can
be used to transmit text; most can transmit sound, pictures, and
moving video images. Taken together, these tools constitute a
unique medium-known to its users as "cyberspace'--located in no
particular geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere
55
in the world, with access to the Internet.

E-mail allows sending an electronic message to another party
or a group of addressees. The message is stored electronically,
awaiting a recipient's checking her "mailbox" or making its
presence known through a prompt signal. Unlike postal mail, email usually is not sealed or secure.

5 6

It

can be accessed or

viewed on intermediate computers between sender and recipient
57
send
Mail exploders
unless messages are encrypted.

TRUST IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 13, at 29-33. For example, a complete URL is
The protocol is "http"; "www.law.
http://www.law.wfu.edu/lawreview/info.html.
wfu.edu" refers to the Web server name; "law review" refers to the path; and
"info.html" refers to a document name. A sender, or hacker, has a good idea
where a query or message is going when it is sent, as distinguished from mass
mail or junk mail sent to all sites.
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997).
55.
56.
See generally NEU ET AL., supra note 49, at xix-xxi, 95-117. Neu et al.
state that "many see the extension of at least some postal regulations to e-mail as
useful in the maturation of the new medium." Id. at 108. For an early analysis of
e-mail, see generally ROBERT H. ANDERSON, UNIVERSAL ACCESS TO E-MAIL:
FEASIBILITY AND SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS (1995).
57.
Computer programs may have encryption options among type font
options. For example, the type font "Wingdings' looks like this when the word
U)*Ujo 2a.H(y1. However, anyone with the same
"wingdings" is encrypted:
Skilled
program or elementary decryption skills can break such a code.
programmers can develop more sophisticated encryption programs and
confidential data, such as bank or business financial information, is routinely
encrypted. See generally NEU ET AL., supranote 49, at 102-10. For an analysis of
Internet security and cryptography issues, see generally COMM. TO REVIEW DOD
C41 PLANS AND PROGRAMS, supra note 6, at 137-39; CRYPTOGRAPHY'S ROLE IN
SECURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, supra note 1; HUNDLEY ET AL., supra note 8
(focusing on improved internet security); SYSTEM SEC. STUDY COMM., supra note
17. See also infra notes 72-79 and accompanying text. National policies on
cryptography and the Internet vary widely. See generally Wayne Madsen et al.,
Cryptography and Liberty: An International Survey of Encryption Policy, 16 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER& INFO. L. 475 (1998).
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messages s s to a common e-mail address,5 9 which forwards them

to other subscribers. 60

Newsgroups serve regular participants,

but others can read these postings.

There are thousands

of

newsgroups, fostering information or opinion exchange on a topic.
About

purged

100,000 new messages may be posted daily;

regularly.

Those

wishing

to

they are

communicate

more

immediately may enter chat rooms to engage in real-time dialogue
with others through computers. An alternative to newsgroups
and chat rooms is videoconferencing, where participants can see

and hear each other in real time; videoconferencing is expensive
and limited in

access

for many, who can spend $1000

on a

computer plus a small monthly fee to have the same access.
Before long, video cameras will upload to the Internet; cost
61
differences may disappear.
The best known category of communication over the Internet is
the World Wide Web, which allows users to search for and retrieve
information stored in remote computers, as well as, in some cases,
to communicate back to designated sites ....
IT]he Web [is] . . . a

58.
E-mail is analogous to facsimile mail (fax), by which documents are
sent to a recipient through telephone systems. Fax has existed for years but only
recently has become generally available for everyone through inexpensive fax
machines. While fax is relatively slow and expensive compared with e-mail
because it is dependent on telephone long distance rates, fax has an advantage in
sending exact documents, including signatures. Cf. NEU ET AL., supra note 49, at
xxiii, 149-51 (noting that e-mail is cheaper than postal service, the medium may
allow improved information service between citizens and governments, increased
government e-mail use may spur Internet access, and citizens will eventually
insist on communicating with government through e-mail). E-mail proliferation,
however, may create its own communication and information clog. James Rosen,
chair and chief operating officer of an Internet software company, was recently
quoted, "'[T]he more you use and respond to e-mail, the more of it you generate, so
I'm now spending more and more of my day on it.' He is beginning to wonder
whether e-mail has become more of a burden than benefit-lowering his
productivity, rather than boosting it." Carol Hymowitz, Flooded with E-Mail? Try
Screening, Sorting, or Maybe Just Phoning, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2000, at B-1.
Rosen's experience reflects anecdotal evidence communicated to me by academics,
lawyers, business people, and other professionals, for example military officers.
Fax is relatively confidential, unless a sender enters the wrong fax number,
which can result in misdelivery; the same applies to e-mail. E-mail is sufficiently
confidential so that messages involving lawyer-client matters may be sent with
reasonable expectations of privacy; e-mail does not violate the lawyer-client
privilege. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 43 F.3d 966, 968 (5th Cir. 1994). But see
United States v. Keystone Sanitation Co., 903 F. Supp. 803, 808 (M.D. Pa. 1995);
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999)
(construing Model Rules of Professional Conduct R. 1.6 but not considering the
possibility of e-mail sent other than by land lines and noting that some state bars
accept this principle even though earlier ethics opinions had rejected it).
59.
I recall an incident in which an employee e-mailed a fellow employee,
professing undying love, etc. Instead of sending it to only the employee, he hit the
mail exploder key and routed it to everyone. How the affair's succeeding chapters
unfolded is unknown, but other employees receiving the e-mail enjoyed a chuckle.
60.
Today facsimiles can also transmit documents to multiple addressees.
61.
Arquilla & Ronfeldt, Looking Ahead, supra note 43, at 490.
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vast number of documents stored in different computers all over
the world. Some of these documents are simply files containing
information ....
[M]ore elaborate documents, commonly known as
Web "pages," are also prevalent. Each has its own address---"rather
like a telephone number.'
Web pages frequently contain
information and sometimes allow the viewer to communicate with
the page's (or 'site's') author. They generally also contain "links" to
other documents created by that site's author or to other (generally)
related sites ....
Navigating the Web is relatively straightforward.
A user may
either type the address of a known page or enter one or more
keywords into a commercial "search engine" [e.g., Altavista, Excite,
Lycos, Magellan, Webcrawler, Yahool] . . . to locate sites on a
subject of interest.
A particular Web page may contain the
information sought by the "surfer," or, through its links, it may be
an avenue to other documents located anywhere on the Internet.
Users generally explore a given Web page, or move to another, by
clicking a computer "mouse" on one of the page's icons or links.
Access to most Web pages is freely available, but some allow access
only to those who [buy] . . . the right from a commercial provider.
The Web is thus comparable . . . to . . . a vast library including
millions of readily available and indexed publications and a
62
sprawling mall offering goods and services.

From a sender's point of view, the Web is:
[A] vast platform from which to address and hear from a worldwide
audience of millions of readers, viewers, researchers, and buyers.
[Anyone] . . . with a computer connected to the Internet can
.publish' information.
Publishers include government agencies,
educational institutions, commercial entities, advocacy groups, and
individuals. Publishers may either make their material available to
the entire pool of Internet users, or confine access to a selected
group, such as those willing to pay for the privilege. "No single
organization controls any membership in the Web, nor is there any
centralized point from which individual Web site or services can be
" 63
blocked from the Web.

The simplicity of web publishing allows millions of individuals
and small organizations to use the Web to publish personal
"home pages," which function like individual newsletters. These
are available to everyone on the Web. 6 4 Systems have been
developed to control certain kinds of material, for instance,
sexually explicit images, which may be available on computers
with Internet access. 65
On the other hand, the Web is
sophisticated and flexible enough to meet the needs of large
corporations, brokerages, newspapers, and magazines, which
publish on-line versions of their material. Government agencies

62.
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 852-53 (1997) (quoting ACLU v. Reno,
929 F.Supp. 824, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
63.
Reno, 521 U.S. at 853 (quoting and citing ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 838).
64.
Cf. Reno, 521 U.S. at 853 n.9 (quoting ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 837, and
reporting "thousands" of web pages even though the number is in the millions
today).
65.
Reno, 521 U.S. at 854-55.
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and the courts can use the Web to distribute information. The
potential for education is tremendous.6 6 The Web is not a
67
component network of the Internet; it is a part of the software.
By contrast to the open, distributed, decentralized Web,
private databases such as Dialog, Lexis-Nexis, and Westlaw have
storehouses of information but can be accessed from the Internet
only by passwords and access software. These databases are not
linked into a single whole, as is the Web. The U.S. Department of
Defense and other U.S. agencies have separate systems, such as
the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) and the Global
Combat Support System (GCSS). GCCS and GCSS, like other
closed systems including Lexis-Nexis and Westlaw, also depend at
least in part on the public telecommunications system and the
Internet. The U.S. Defense Data Network has two principal
networks, NIPRNet (Sensitive But Unclassified Internet Protocol
Router Network) and SIPRNet (Sensitive Internet Protocol Router
Network), which have connections to the Internet and the public
telecommunications system besides being capable of being used
independently. 68 Other countries have similar closed systems
equally dependent on public telecommunications and the
Internet.
Hackers have many ways to intrude into networked
computers, some of them applying to all systems and some
involving a particular system or kind of system. These include
password attacks, where hackers guess at passwords needed to
enter a computer system, perhaps with help of programs that try
letter combinations or check for words through an electronic
dictionary; logic bombs, which cause a computer program or
system to perform operations departing from normal operating
parameters; Trojan horses, which are programs appearing to
perform legitimate and preauthorized functions but which conceal
covert functions performing unauthorized operations within a
system or network; viruses, which are code fragments within a
computer program that reproduce by attaching themselves to
another program with resulting damaged data, degraded system
performance, or unauthorized system access; GPS fuzzer, which

66.
See generally, e.g., DAVID J. MCARTHUR & MATTHEW W. LEWIS,
UNTANGLING THE WEB:
APPLICATIONS OF THE INTERNET AND OTHER INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGIES TO HIGHER LEARNING (1998).

67.
Pope, supra note 54, at 620-21.
68.
ANDERSON, supra note 56, at 18-23; COMM. TO REVIEW DOD C41 PLANS
AND PROGRAMS, supra note 6, at 31-35. "Ambitious plans are afoot ... to create a
single seamless, globe-girdling military communications network that goes beyond
the U.S. forces-a modular system that can be shared by the forces of many
nations at once." TOFFLER & TOFFLER, supra note 12, at 145. This may eliminate
Tower of Babel problems that confronted Coalition forces during the 1990-91 Gulf
War and that continue to challenge NATO communications. Id.
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scrambles local reception of global positioning satellite (GPS)
timing signals, thus inhibiting their use in navigation, etc.;
flooding, whereby automated calls are made to a particular circuit
to deny access to authorized users; packet sniffing, which occurs
through programs placed on intermediate host computers to
intercept and examine passing data packets for information, for
which encryption is a protection; IP spoofing, which entails
fooling another computer about one's computer identity by
sending a fake Internet Protocol (IP) address; confidence games
not unlike the pigeon drop, where hackers exploit user naivete to
gain system access; exploiting software bugs. In addition, more
traditional threats exist, such as physical destruction of facilities
and wiretapping. 6 9 The types of attack the Defense Department
systems and their counterparts face in other countries "are much
broader and potentially much more serious and intense than
those usually faced by commercial (nonmilitary) network
information systems. The reason is that attacks on DOD C41
systems that are part of an attack sponsored or instigated by a
foreign government can draw upon virtually unlimited resources
70
devoted to those attacks."
Two basic principles of note are that cyber-attack is easier
than cyber-defense, and cyber-attackers attack a defense's
weakest points.7 1 There are computer-based defenses, including
authentication, firewalls, encryption, audit logging, intrusion

69.
See generally ANDERSON, supra note 56, at 7, 24-36; COMM. TO REVIEW
DOD C41 PLANS AND PROGRAMS, supra note 6, at 135-36; CRYPTOGRAPHY'S ROLE IN
SECURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, supra note 1, at 24, 49; MOLANDER ET AL.,
STRATEGIC INFORMATION WARFARE RISING, supra note 36, at 75; SYSTEM SEC. STUDY
COMM., supranote 17, at 61; TOFFLER & TOFFLER, supra note 12, at 105; Khalilzad,
supra note 13, at 410-12 (examining the vulnerability of information systems at
the physical systems, tranmission systems, software, and data levels); Schmitt,
Bellum, supra note 36, at 1067 (discussing refinement of traditional warfare
tactics, such as logic bombs and sniffer programs). GPS aids, first developed for
military use, are now in the public domain. Besides navigation and help for
hikers, surveyors and fishermen, GPS may be used for missile guidance. The
military can jam GPS in a focused region during crisis and the rest of the world
can still use its signals for locations outside the crisis area. See generally SCOTT
PACE ET AL., THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM: ASSESSING NATIONAL POLICIES 45-91,
app. B (1995); Carla Anne Robbins, Government Will Authorize Civilian Use of
Military-QualityPositioning Signal, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2000, at A36.
70.
COMM. TO REVIEW DOD C41 PLANS AND PROGRAMS, supra note 6, at 136.
Whether this source is correct in saying that foreign government-sponsored or
government-supported perpetrators are largely immune to retaliation or
punishment through law enforcement channels, and are thus free to act virtually
without constraint, depends on where the perpetrators operate.
If within a
sponsoring country, this is true. If they are within a target or cooperating state,
however, they may be subject to those countries' laws denouncing this activity.
Although government sites may be quite vulnerable to attack, companies
operating internationally are not far behind.
See CRYPTOGRAPHY'S ROLE IN
SECURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, supranote 1, at 2.
71.
COMM. TO REVIEW DOD C41 PLANS AND PROGRAMS, supranote 6, at 12.
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detection and monitoring, virus protection, and vulnerability
assessment tools. 72 Other defenses include developing standard
operating procedures and training personnel; many are common
to any defense system. 73
Like any weapons system, IW
deterrence is also a defense modality. Deterrence components
include: identifying attacks or attackers; having the will to
retaliate; giving a credible perception to an attacker that response
is certain; and perhaps ensuring a "mutually assured disruption,"
in other words, that like a nuclear attack, an IW attack is likely to
mean utter ruin to an attacker. 74 Prevention, or hindering an
enemy from acquiring, deploying, or using IW weapons and
techniques, is another possible response. Preventing deployment
or use of IW weapons requires the ability to identify potential
attackers, the ability to warn a target when 1W attack is
imminent, and the offensive IW capability to collect information
about potential attackers and to respond preemptively to
warnings of imminent IW attack 7 5-that is, to respond in
72.

See generally ANDERSON, supra note 56, at 47-76, 113-42; SYSTEM SEC.

STUDY COMM., supra note 17, at 74-142. See also generally CRYPTOGRAPHY'S ROLE
IN SECURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, supra note 1; TRUST IN CYBERSPACE, supra

note 13, at 33-36, 109-70, 293-95; Lee Gomes, The Internet Under Siege: Digital
Forensics' Sleuths Focus on Routers, Hope for Some Luck, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11,
2000, at B5; Khalilzad, supra note 13, at 413. Some defenses like firewalls may
be unnecessary for most home computers. Hackers usually cannot intrude into
computers that are not on the Web regularly or long enough for penetration.
Home computers linked by cable modems or high-speed DSL phone lines,
however, may be penetrated more easily, since they are connected constantly.
Walter S. Mossberg, In the Age of Hackers, A Guide to Firewalls for Home
Computers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2000, at B1. Other defenses are in development
but were not available to counter the Yahool attack. William M. Bulkeley, The
Internet Under Siege: Security Firm Says It Has Web Defense, But It Won't Be
Available Right Away, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2000, at B5; Wingfield & Thurm,
supra note 27. The computer may be useful in detecting and fighting attacks
through data collation. TOFFLER & TOFFLER, supranote 12, at 157.
73.
See generally ANDERSON, supra note 56, at 47-76, 113-42; SYSTEM SEC.
STUDY COMM., supra note 17, at 74-142; TRUST IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 13, at
94-104; Khalilzad, supra note 13, at 414.
74.
Khalilzad, supra note 13, at 418-26. See also infra note 168 and
accompanying text.
75.
Khalilzad, supra note 13, at 426-32. The U.S. Government-sponsored
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), affiliated with Camegie Mellon
University, is a 12-year-old advisory service for Internet security issues having a
potential of affecting large numbers of computers. It plays an important role as an
early-warning system for viruses and other attacks. DARPA created CERT as a
clearinghouse for information on the Internet after an early crippling attack.
SYSTEM SEC. STUDY COMM., supra note 17, at 276-77; Dunne, supra note 6, at 4;
Nick Wingfield & Clare Ansberry, Expert Team Monitors Web's Security Holes, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 11, 2000, at B1.
The Defense Data Network (DDN) Security
Coordination Center (SSC) serves the unclassified DDN community as a
clearinghouse for host and user security problems and fixes. The Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory established Computer Incident Advisory Capability
(CIAC) to provide CERT-type services for computing within the U.S. Department of
Energy. SYSTEM SEC. STUDY COMM., supranote 17, at 276-77.
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One problem, however, with
anticipatory self-defense. 76
responses to attacks on information systems is that attacks can
happen too fast-more rapidly than other attack modalities such
as supersonic missiles-to permit a response before damage is
done. 7 7 This phenomenon has implications for the law of selfdefense.
Good system security depends on several general principles:
defense in depth; ensuring graceful compromised system
degradation-in other words, assuring functionality despite local
security failures; managing tensions between security and
desirable system attributes, such as user convenience,
interoperability, and standardization; doing what is possible, not
what is perfect; and recognizing inherent weaknesses in passive
defense. 78 Opponents to an IW-based response can use IW-based
defenses or more conventional defenses, such as camouflage,
79
concealment, dispersion, deception, and human intelligence.
These defenses are available to all states, including those with IW
capability.
No state, intergovernmental organization (IGO), like the
United Nations, or nongovernmental organization (NGO), like the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), s ° owns or
administers the Internet.

76.
See infra note 168 and accompanying text for an analysis of
anticipatory self-defense. As that analysis demonstrates, lawful IW responses can
To that extent the National Research Council's
be anticipatory in nature.
conclusion that "[l]egal and technical constraints preclude retaliation against the
perpetrator of an information systems attack . . . " is not correct. COMM. TO
REVIEW DOD C41 PLANS AND PROGRAMS, supra note 6, at 143. Although technical
constraints may be limiting factors, international law, particularly as viewed by
the United States, does not bar anticipatory responses provided they are
necessary, proportional, and admit of no other alternative.
Glenn C. Buchan, Implications of Information Vulnerabilitiesfor Military
77.
THE CHANGING ROLE OF INFORMATION IN
Operations, in STRATEGIC APPRAISAL:
WARFARE, supra note 4, at 283, 315; Harshberger & Ochmanek, supra note 36, at
161-62 (noting that speed and decisiveness is a two-sided game); Nichiporuk,
supranote 52, at 188, 191.
78.
COMM. TO REVIEW DOD C41 PLANS AND PROGRAMS, supra note 6, at 1213.
Stephen T. Hosmer, The Information Revolution and Psychological
79.
Effects, in STRATEGIC APPRAISAL: THE CHANGING ROLE OF INFORMATION IN WARFARE,
supranote 4, at 217, 241.
NGOs figured prominently in the Zapatista uprising. There may be
80.
See generally
implications far beyond Mexico for this kind of insurgency.
ARQUILLA & RONFELDT, supra note 4, at 73-76 (mentioning Cuba, Nigeria, Russia,
and Saudi Arabia as possible scenes of future netwars); RONFELDT ET AL., supra
note 4, at 35-42; supra notes 4, 41 and accompanying text. NGO influence and
NGOs have been defined to include nonprofit
advocacy may increase.
organizations, private voluntary organizations, and grass-roots organizations but
not government-organized NGOs (GONGOs), government-inspired NGOs (GINGOs),
or quasi-NGOs (QUANGOs). RONFELDT ET AL., supra note 4, at 35. See also
ARQUILLA & RONFELDT, supranote 4, at 23-24. However:
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No single entity-academic, corporate, or non-profit-administers
the Internet. It exists and functions [because] ... hundreds of
thousands of separate operators of computers independently
decided to use common data transfer protocols to exchange
communications and information with other computers (which in
turn exchange communications and information with still other
computers). There is no centralized storage location, control point,
or communications channel for the Internet, and it would not be
technically feasible for a single entity to control all of the
81
information conveyed on the Internet.

A fortiori, no state has sovereignty over the Internet. Today,
governments, IGOs, NGOs, public institutions, nonprofit
organizations, businesses, and individuals own Internet-linked
computers. NGOs have been seen as "the vanguard of social
netwar," the "point people" in social concern movements like
economic development, the environment, human rights and the
like. 8 2 They may have the same role in the future, as may

The term NGO has many different meanings.

Some . . . use it to

mean all nongovernmental organizations everywhere, including Northern
NGOs based in one developed country that operate internationally,
international NGOs (INGOs) or networks based in three or more countries,
Southern NGOs from the Third World, and many other kinds of nonprofit
organizations throughout the world.
The term also has numerous
culturally specific meanings. In Western Europe, it generally means
nonprofit[s] . . . that are active internationally.

In the transitional

countries of Europe and the former Soviet Union, it tends to mean all
charitable and nonprofit organizations.
In the Third World,... NGO generally refers to organizations involved
in development, broadly defined. Hospitals, charitable organizations, and
universities are usually called voluntary or nonprofit organizations rather
than NGOs. Although some.., use... NGO to mean only intermediary or
grassroots support organizations, all four types of NGOs are involved in
sustainable development, and many individual organizations interact with
governments.
JULIE FISHER, NONGOVERNMENTS:

NGOs AND THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE

THIRD WORLD 4-7 (1999).
Grassroots organizations (GROs) are membersupporting NGOs, and GRSOs (grassroots support organizations) support them.
There are perhaps 200,000 GROs and 50,000 GRSOs in Africa, Asia and Latin
America. Id. The ICRC, a Swiss corporation, sponsors humanitarian law treaties
and advocates respect for humanitarian law, among its other activities. See
generally David Weissbrodt, The Role of International Organizations in the
Implementation of Human Rights and HumanitarianLaw in Situations of Armed
Conflict, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 313, 345-55 (1988).

81.
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 832 (E.D. Pa. 1996). See supra note
53 and accompanying text for a definition of protocols in the Internet and
international law contexts.
82.
Some NGOs are devoted to computer-related activity, for example the
Electronic Freedom Foundation, Internet Society, Computer Professionals for
Social Responsibility, and W3C. ARQUILLA & RONFELDT, supra note 4, at 71; JOHN
ARQUILLA & DAVID RONFELDT, THE EMERGENCE OF NOOPOLITIK: TOWARD AN AMERICAN
INFORMATION STRATEGY xi, 7-8 (1999) [hereinafter ARQUILLA & RONFELDT, THE
EMERGENCE]; TOFFLER, POWERSHIFT, supranote 2, at 242-43; Auerbach & Bulkeley,
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transnational corporations.
The Internet, as part of the information revolution, may have
important societal implications, such as the weakening of
In addition, a shift from relative poverty to
hierarchies.
abundance of information may allow individuals to bypass
hierarchies that deliberately or inadvertently control or limit
information. Furthermore, alternative organizational forms based
84
on the Internet may prove more effective than hierarchies.
Transnational enterprises, some beneficial-such as international
to
society
generallydetrimental
some
banking-and
transnational terrorism, including "info-terrorism," organized
crime, and some religious fundamentalist terrorism, for
These groups may even hire
example-may be facilitated.8 s
"cybermercenaries."86
Although the nation-state will likely "remain the most
powerful actor in international events for the foreseeable future,"
states "will increasingly find their powers curtailed by the
availability of information to those who reside . . . within and
outside their borders; and those powers that remain will
increasingly have to contend with nonstate actors who are
87
acquiring power through the availability of information."

supra note 15, at B1; David P. Hamilton, A Look at the Webureaucracy, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 11, 2000, at B 1. See also Symposium, Transitions to Democracy and the
Rule of Law, 5 AM. U.J. INTL L. & POL'Y 965, 970 (1990) (remarks of Aryeh Neier);
Weissbrodt, supra note 80, at 317, 365.
83.
ARQUILLA & RONFELDT, THE EMERGENCE, supra note 82, at 62-64;
TOFFLER, POWERSHIFT, supra note 2, at 457-60; TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE, supra
note 2, at 322-24; Auerbach & Bulkeley, supra note 15, at B1; Peter J. Spiro,
Globalization,InternationalLaw, and the Academy, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POLITICS
567, 569-72 (2000). Although Toffler suggests that the structure of the U.N. may
change, this is not likely in the near future, given the number of U.N. Members
(approaching 190) and how the Charter is modified. TOFFLER, POWERSHIFT, supra
note 2, at 456-57. See also U.N. CHARTER arts. 108-09; LELAND M. GOODRICH ET
AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 638-47 (Columbia Univ. Press 1969) (1946);
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 1163-89 (Bruno Simma ed.,

1994).
84.
NICHIPORUK & BUILDER, supra note 30, at 27-32. See also ARQUILLA
RONFELDT, supra note 4, at 29-30; TOFFLER, supra note 34, at 112-35; TOFFLER,
POWERSHIFT, supra note 2, at 165-232; TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE, supra note 2, at
195-223.
NICHIPORUK & BUILDER, supra note 30, at 32-35. See also SYSTEM SEC.
85.
STUDY COMM., supra note 17, at 9; TOFFLER, POWERSHIFT, supra note 2, at 450-56;
TOFFLER & TOFFLER, supra note 12, at 105, 145; Aldrich, supra note 1, at 235;
Arquilla et al. in LESSER ET AL., supra note 4, at 39; Arquilla et al. in STRATEGIC
APPRAISAL, supra note 4, at 75; Auerbach & Bulkeley, supranote 15, at BI; Carl H.
Builder, The American Military Enterprise in the Information Age, in STRATEGIC
APPRAISAL: THE CHANGING ROLE OF INFORMATION IN WARFARE, supra note 4, at 19,
31; Jessica Mathews, Power Shift, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 50, 51.
Buchan, supra note 77, at 314; Khalilzad, supranote 13, at 408.
86.
87.
NICHIPORUK & BUILDER, supra note 30, at 35. See also TOFFLER, THE
THIRD WAVE, supra note 2, at 325; TOFFLER & TOFFLER, supra note 12, at 242;
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National governments may have considerably less control over
currencies and their valuation, markets and prices, businesses
and their regulation, national borders and people and commodity
movements across them, and information available to the
public. 88 Along with these trends exists the possibility of new
identities, loyalties, and "virtual communities."
Some "new"
affiliations may be resurrections of old identities,8 9 for example
tribalism. 90 Some commentators are less convinced these trends
91
are occurring.
New organizational behavior models may be more turbulent,
chaotic, and complex. 9 2
Now may be a time of "blurry
boundaries," with the biggest boundary blur of all being between
"foreign" and "domestic," such that a new term, "intermestic,"
may apply.9
Organizational structures within business and military
communities may change from hierarchical structures to more
decentralized models. 94 A "leaner" military that is more "joint,"

Builder, supra note 85, at 25-26; Andrew W. Marshall, Foreword to STRATEGIC
APPRAISAL: THE CHANGING ROLE OF INFORMATION IN WARFARE, supra note 4, at 1, 45; Toffler & Toffier, supra note 2, at xix-xx.
88.
ARQUILLA & RONFELDT, supra note 4, at 17-18; NICHIPORUK & BUILDER,
supra note 30, at 35-38; TOFFLER & TOFFLER, supra note 12, at 169. But see
Shapiro, supra note 12, at 123-29 (noting that information manipulation, perhaps
through other forms such as newspapers, is not a new phenomenon and that the
trend may not continue). The information revolution may promote new methods
of citizen participation. TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE, supra note 2, at 428-31.
89.
ARQUILLA & RONFELDT, supra note 4, at 17-18, 27-28, 33-34;
CRYPTOGRAPHY'S ROLE IN SECURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, supra note 1, at 2526. See also TOFFLER, supranote 34, at 251-67; TOFFLER, POWERSHIFT, supra note
2, at 450-52; TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE, supra note 2, at 232, 311-19; Toffler &
Toffler, supra note 2, at xx-xxiii. In some instances these movements may try to
turn back the clock, for example returning to a simpler, more primitive system.
TOFFLER, POWERSHIFT, supra note 2, at 364-79; TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE, supra
note 2, at 256.
90.
TOFFLER, POWERSHIFT, supra note 2, at 243-44; TOFFLER & TOFFLER,
supra note 12, at 3; Walter Goldstein, Europe After Maastricht, FOREIGN AFF.,
Winter 1992-93, at 117, 123; Robert S. Wood, Europe:
Transfigured or
Trans!fed?, NAVAL WAR C. REV., Autumn 1992, at 20, 22-23.
91.
E.g., Shapiro, supranote 12, at 118-23, 146-47.
92.
ARQUILLA & RONFELDT, supranote 4, at 17-18.
93.
Toffler & Toffler, supra note 2, at xvi-xix. Cf. Schmitt, Bellum, supra
note 36 (IW will blur or stress traditional concepts of U.N. Charter law and the
LOAC); Schmitt, supranote 12, at 158-59 (IW will also blur principles within these
bodies of law such as discrimination between legitimate military targets and
forbidden civilian objects). This is why I advocate applying general principles of
law to IW situations where international issues are involved and there are no
developed customary norms or treaty law. Even here different rules and policies
may be at stake for noninternational armed conflicts. See supra note 41 and
accompanying text; infra Part IV.
94.
CRYPTOGRAPHY'S ROLE IN SECURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, supra note
1, at 25-26; NICHIPORUK & BUILDER, supra note 30, at 38-54, 63-79; TOFFLER,
supra note 34, at 112-35; TOFFLER, POWERSHIFT, supra note 2, at 165-232;
TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE, supranote 2, at 195-223; Francis Fukuyama & Abram
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where space, air, naval, and ground forces operate as integrated
units, may result.95 The "enemy" and the military missions may
be quite different in the new era,9 6 although a possibility remains
that an opponent may rely on conventional, rather than IW,
technology in conflict with a "wired" country like the United
States. 97 The immediate effects of information warfare may differ
from the long-range effects, including the parties' reactions to
vulnerabilities and whether attackers keep ahead of the
development of defenses. 98 "[Tihe way we make war reflects the
way we make wealth-and the way we make anti-war must reflect
the way we make war."9 9 Commentators have disagreed about
whether a true "revolution in military affairs" (RMA)1° ° is
underway, or whether the military's response to the information
age should be more evolutionary, adaptive, and flexible. False
revolutions can impose severe costs, such as causing the failure
to adapt to a genuine revolution, which is a relatively infrequent

N. Shulsky, Military Organizationin the Information Age: Lessonsfrom the World of
Business, in STRATEGIC APPRAISAL: THE CHANGING ROLE OF INFORMATION IN WARFARE,
supra note 4, at 327. This is already so in some countries, where the military is
reorganizing along the new corporate lines. E.g., Stephen J. Glain, Israel'sMilitary
Is High-Tech Incubator,WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2000, at A18.
95.
Fukuyama & Shulsky, supra note 94, at 357-58; David C. Gompert,
Right Makes Might: Freedom and Power in the Information Age, in STRATEGIC
APPRAISAL: THE CHANGING ROLE OF INFORMATION IN WARFARE, supra note 4, at 45,
60-61. "Jointness" or "purple," a combination of colors of all U.S. military forces,
is a feature of today's downsized U.S. military.
96.
The information revolution for the U.S. military will probably not be
acquiring new tools for fighting traditional wars but serving a changed society that
has new and different expectations, assignments and support for its military.
Some commentators recognize eight enterprises for the military, some of them
quite traditional: providing constabulary capabilities, for example in BosniaHerzegovina; mounting expeditionary forces, for example in the 1990-91 Gulf War;
keeping military arts and sciences alive; providing deterrents; providing forward
defenses; providing global presence; defending the homeland; and maintaining a
mobilization base, all of which could be at stake in the information age.
NICHIPORUK & BUILDER, supra note 30, at 54-58; Builder, supra note 85, at 28-32,
38-42.
97.
This was the U.S. experience in the Vietnam War, in which the North
Vietnamese fought on foot. Gompert, supra note 95, at 61. See also TOFFLER &
TOFFLER, supra note 12, at 81-86 (collision of war-forms between or among
agriculture, industry and information-based countries, i.e., Toffler's First, Second
and Third Waves); Hosmer, supra note 14, at 241-42 (U.S. fighting urban warfare
in World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and opponents' use
of civilian populations and facilities as shields); Schmitt, supra note 12, at 155-56.
Other opponents may try to right the balance through weapons of mass
destruction and their delivery systems, maybe using cheap communications
means such as satellites that are available to all. They may use a strategy of
targeting a key vulnerability, perhaps by traditional attack modes on telephone
lines or supply centers. Nichiporuk, supra note 52, at 179, 183-90.
98.
Marshall, supranote 87, at 4.
99.
TOFFLER & TOFFLER, supranote 12, at 3.
100.
See generally IN ATHENA'S CAMP:
PREPARING FOR CONFLICT IN THE
INFORMATION AGE, supranote 2, at 23-17 1; Fukuyama & Shulsky, supra note 94.
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and cataclysmic event. 10 1 The current RMA debate, 0 2s like the
more general arguments over the advent of an information
revolution affecting many aspects of world and national social
orders, falls into that analysis. Even so, fighting a war by silicon

chip, with its inevitable casualties, may be cheaper than waging
war involving heavy human casualties. Waging IW, however, will
10 3
not provide perfect security.
The prospect remains, however, that 1W may make
traditional war among wired countries, including less developed
nations, less likely, and that information technology may help
enhance
international
security.' 0 4
One
possibility
is
psychological warfare through IW means, such as informing an
opponent of the absolute weakness of its position at strategic,
operational, and tactical levels because every aspect of its
planned operations is known.' 0 5 New dimensions of the ethics,
or "rightness," of armed conflict in a given situation may arise,
however, 10 6 perhaps as part of "noopolitik,"-that is, politics
based on ethics and ideas-compared with realpolitik-politics

101.

Shapiro, supranote 12, at 114-16.

102.
E.g., IN ATHENA'S CAMP: PREPARING FOR CONFLICT IN THE INFORMATION
AGE, supra note 2, at 23-171; Fukuyama & Shulsky, supra note 94; Schmitt,
Bellum, supra note 36, at 1058-62.

103.
Martin Libicki & Jeremy Shapiro, Conclusion: The Changing Role of
Information in Warfare, in STRATEGIC APPRAISAL:
THE CHANGING ROLE OF
INFORMATION IN WARFARE, supra note 4, at 437, 438-42; Schmitt, Bellum, supra
note 36, at 1063-64; Schmitt, supra note 12, at 155 (danger of asymmetrical
warfare). See also supra note 97 and accompanying text.
104.
Gompert, supranote 95, at 66-73.
105.
As Hosmer states, advanced technological systems capability "should
be severely demoralizing to enemy forces because they would face the following
prospects":
If we
If we
If we
If we
If we
If we

fly, we die.
fire, we die.
communicate, we die.
radiate [radars or other electronic emissions], we die.
move with our vehicles, we die.
remain with our weapons, we die.

Hosmer, supra note 79, at 233. This was true during the 1990-91 Gulf War. Id.
at 234-35. See also Schmitt, Bellum, supranote 36, at 1057-63. Some IW-based
weapons' lethality may raise opposition based on principles of humanity. Id. at
1083-85.
Adversaries may try their own brands of psychological warfare,
including methods threatening or causing high casualties, which is America's
"Achilles heel." IW can help protect against these threats. Hosmer, supranote 79,
at 237-38, 247. See also ANDERSON, supra note 56, at 107-12. Web sites can be
used for other kinds of psychological warfare, such as a fraudulent credit card
scheme to destroy senior officers' credit ratings during a conflict. Thomas E.
Ricks, This Stealth Offensive Turns Military Brass into Sitting Ducks, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 8, 1999, at Al.
106.
See generally John Arquilla, Ethics and Information Warfare, in
STRATEGIC APPRAISAL: THE CHANGING ROLE OF INFORMATION IN WARFARE, supra note
4, at 379.
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based on practical and material factors, which has dominated
international relations for two centuries. 10 7
Many of the latter
issues have particular relevance for this Article's analysis, which
involves conduct of belligerent countries in less than total or
worldwide war and, more critically, belligerents' conduct toward
neutral nations or neutrals' conduct toward belligerents or with
each other. For the place of neutrality in the era of the U.N.
Charter, we turn to Part III.

III.

NEUTRALITY IN THE CHARTER ERA'

08

"There is
undergone an
Philip Jessup
"nothing could

nothing new about revising neutrality; it has
almost constant process of revision in detail,"
concluded in 1936.109
He also believed that
be more fallacious than the attempt to test the
application of rules of neutrality by the principles of logic. Since
they are products of compromise and of experience, logic has
found practically no place in their development and cannot
properly be used in their application."" i0 Over half a century into
the U.N. Charter era, little would change these observations, even
i2
in the IW1 i 1 context. New considerations have appeared,"
including the Charter.

107. The conceptual reach of the noosphere, or globe-circling realm of the
mind or thinking circuit, is larger than the infosphere, which includes cyberspace
plus a range of other information systems such as libraries and the electronic
systems of the military information environment above and around a battlespace.
Cyberspace is the global system of systems of Internet-connected computers. See
generally ARQUILLA & RONFELDT, THE EMERGENCE, supra note 82, at 4-5, 7-53, 7173 (citing Henry Kissinger and Hans Morgenthau as realpolitik proponents). See
also HENRY A. KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY (1994); HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG
NATIONS (Alfred A. Knopf 1953) (1948).
108.
Portions of Part Ill have been adapted from: GEORGE K. WALKER, THE
TANKER WAR 1980-88: LAW AND POLICY (U.S. Naval War Coll. Int'l Law Studies vol.
74, 2000) [hereinafter WALKER, THE TANKER WAR]; George K. Walker, Maritime
Neutrality in the CharterEra, 17 CENTER OCEANS L. & POL'Y PROC. 124 (Univ. of Va.
Sch. of Law ed., 1993) [hereinafter Walker, Maritime Neutrality].
109.
PHILIP C. JESSUP, NEUTRALITY: TODAY AND TOMORROW 156 (1936).
110. Id. at 16 (quoting PHILIP C. JESSUP & FRANCIS DEAK, NEUTRALITY: THE
ORIGINS xiii-xiv (1935)). Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote in a similar vein that a page
of history is worth a volume of logic and that the life of the law has not been logic
but experience. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921); OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 5, 244 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963).
111.
For IW definitions, see supranote 1.
112.
E.g., MYRES S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 384-519
(1961); NILS ORVIK, THE DECLINE OF NEUTRALITY: 1914-1941 at 279-302 (2d ed.
1971); Walter L. Williams, Jr., Neutrality in Modem Armed Conflict: A Survey of the
Developing Law, 90 MILITARY L. REV. 9 (1980) (considering a multifactor approach
to neutrality law and its place in the law of war (LOW), i.e., the law of armed
conflict (LOAC)). Williams cites the LOW and the LOAC interchangeably and also
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The process of analyzing the law of neutrality defies a
straightforward, positivist, black-letter approach. For example,
principles of neutrality for maritime warfare have been seen to be
less rigid, from a historical perspective, than those for air or land
warfare.

113

Some claim neutrality is in "chronic obsolescence." 1 14 A
major reason, according to those who say future applications of

refers to "war" and "armed conflict" interchangeably. Williams, supra. For more
conventional analyses, see D.W. BOwErr, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15681 (1958); IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES
(1963); ERIK CASTREN, THE PRESENT LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY 421 (1954);
COLOMBOS, supra note 44, at 627-825; YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND
SELF-DEFENCE 25-30, 163-67 (2d ed. 1994); JURG MARTIN GABRIEL, THE AMERICAN
CONCEPTION OF NEUTRALITY AFTER 1941 (1988); MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE MODERN
LAW OF LAND WARFARE 515-86 (1959); 7 GREEN HAYWOOD HAcKWORTH, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, §§ 656-91 (1943); 3 HYDE, supra note 53; HANS KELSEN,
COLLECTIVE SECURITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 154-71 (U.S. Naval War Coll. Intl
Law Studies vol. 49, 1957) [hereinafter KELSEN, COLLECTIVE]; HANS KELSEN,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 154-73 (Robert W. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1966); NWP
1- 14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37; NWP 9A ANNOTATED, supra note 44; 2
O'CONNELL, supra note 44, at 1141-58; 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 624879 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952) [hereinafter OPPENHEIM]; JOHN F.L. Ross,
NEUTRALITY AND INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS: SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND AND COLLECTIVE
SECURITY (1989); JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT (1959);
ROBERT W. TUCKER, THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA 165-356 (U.S. Naval
War Coll. Intl Law Studies vol. 50, 1955); 11 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 139-475 (1968); Michael Bothe, Neutrality at Sea, in THE GULF
WAR OF 1980-1988: THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR IN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 205
(Ige F. Dekker & Harry H.G. Post eds., 1992) [hereinafter Bothe, Neutrality at Sea];
Michael Bothe, Neutrality in Naval Warfare: What Is Left of Traditional Law?, in
HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT:
CHALLENGES AHEAD 387 (Astrid J.M.
Delissen & Gerard J. Tanja eds., 1991); Francis De.Ak, Neutrality Revisited, in
TRANSNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PHILIP C. JESSUP
137 (Wolfgang Friedman et al. eds., 1972); Andrea Gioia, Neutrality and NonBelligerency, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT 51 (Harry H.G.
Post ed., 1995); A. Gioia & N. Ronzitti, The Law of Neutrality: Third States'
Commercial Rights and Duties, in THE GULF WAR OF 1980-1988, supra, at 221;
Mark W. Janis, Neutrality, in THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 44, at 148;
Titus Komarnicki, The Place of Neutrality in the Modem System of International
Law, 80 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADPMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 395 (1952);
J.F. Lalive, International Organizations and Neutrality, 24 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 72
(1972); John H. McNeill, Neutral Rights and Maritime Sanctions: The Effects of Two
Wars, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 631 (1991); Patrick M. Norton, Between the Ideology and
the Reality: The Shadow of the Law of Neutrality, 17 HARV. INTIL L.J. 249 (1976);
Dietrich Schindler, Transformations in the Law of Neutrality Since 1945, in
HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: CHALLENGES AHEAD, supra, at 367; Frank
L. Wiswall, Jr., Neutrality, the Rights of Shipping and the Use of Force in the
PersianGulf,31 VA. J. INT'L L. 619 (1991).
113.
CASTREN, supranote 112, at 427.
114. Janis, supra note 112, at 148 (citing NEILL H. ALFORD, JR., MODERN
ECONOMIC WARFARE (LAW AND THE NAVAL PARTICIPANT) 326 (U.S. Naval War Coll. Int'l
Law Studies vol. 56, 1963)). See also Norton, supra note 112, at 249 (citing
Richard R. Baxter, Humanitarian Law or Humanitarian Politics? The 1974
Conference on HumanitarianLaw, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 2 (1975) (noting that
neutrality has had a "juridical half-life" since World War II)).
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the law of neutrality will be minimal, is an argument that the
Charter has ended the rights and duties of the old law of
neutrality. 1 15 Another argument is that since the Charter has
outlawed war,11 6 there can be no state of war, and therefore there
is no need for a law of neutrality. 1 17 This position, however,
should be considered in light of the 1928 Pact of Paris, outlawing
aggressive war. 1 18 World War II began a decade later.
Many others, reflecting state practice and Charter era claims,
maintain that the law of neutrality continues to exist. The San
Remo Manual recognizes maritime neutrality. 11 9 The 1992-96
International Law Association Committee on Maritime Neutrality
studied neutrality, and the 1998 International Law Association
120
(ILA) conference accepted the Committee's final report.
Individual researchers assert that neutrality remains a valid
law
and
other
concept,
albeit modified
by
Charter
considerations. 121

115. Janis, supra note 112, at 148 (citing C.G. Fenwick, Is Neutrality Still a
Term of PresentLaw?, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 102 (1969)).
Cf. U.N. CHARTER pmbl., arts. 2(3)-(4). Although attempts to include
116.
economic coercion as use of force within the meaning of Article 2(4) failed at the
Charter drafting conference, these arguments still surface, particularly from
developing and communist countries. See generally GOODRICH ET AL., supra note
83, at 19-25, 41-55; THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra
note 83, at 45-48, 97-128; Aldrich, supranote 1, at 241.
117.
GABRIEL, supra note 112, at 69. See also Orvik, supra note 112, at
251-56.
Treaty Providing for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National
118.
Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, arts. 1-2, 46 Stat. 2343, 2345-46, 94 L.N.T.S. 57, 63
[hereinafter Pact of Paris]. See also infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
119.
INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA paras. 13(d), 14-26, 29-32, 34-36, 6771, 74-75, 86-88, 92-94, 99, 106, 109, 111, 113-16, 118-20, 122-24, 126-27,
130, 132-34, 146-58 (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995) [hereinafter INT'L INST. OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL].
120.
Neutrality and Naval Warfare, in INT'L LAW ASSN, REPORT OF THE SIXTYFIFTH CONFERENCE: CAIRO, EGYPT 163 (1993); Neutrality and Naval Warfare, in
INT'L LAW ASSN, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-SIXTH CONFERENCE: BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA
570 (1994); Neutrality and Naval Warfare, in INT'L LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE SIXTYSEVENTH CONFERENCE:
HELSINKI, FINLAND 367 (1996); Final Report: Helsinki
Principles on the Law of Maritime Neutrality, in INT'L LAW ASS N, REPORT OF THE
SIXTY-EIGHTH CONFERENCE HELD AT TAIPEI, TAIWAN, REPUBLIC OF CHINA 496 (1998)
[hereinafter Helsinki Principles]. See also Walker, Maritime Neutrality, supra note
108 (critiquing the Cairo report).
121.
E.g., COLOMBOS, supra note 44, § 759; MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra
note 112, at 197-436; 2 O'CONNELL, supra note 44, at 1141-42; John Astley III &
Michael N. Schmitt, The Law of the Sea and Naval Operations, 42 AIR FORCE L.
REV. 119, 146-47 (1997); Bothe, Neutrality at Sea, supra note 112, at 205; Thomas
A. Clingan, Jr., Submarine Mines in International Law, in THE LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, supra note 44, at 351, 352 (noting that the argument that neutrality
no longer exists is specious); Gioia & Ronzitti, supra note 112, at 223; Lowe, supra
note 44, at 134-38; McNeill, supra note 112, at 642-43; Natalino Ronzitti, The
Crisis of the Traditional Law Regulating InternationalArmed Conflicts at Sea and
the Need for Its Revision, in THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: A COLLECTION OF
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Like reports of Mark Twain's passing, accounts of neutrality's
demise in the Charter era have been greatly exaggerated, as the
ensuing analysis demonstrates.
A. Introduction
Jessup, his associates and others traced the law of neutrality
before World War II and the Charter era; 12 2 more analysis is
needlessly repetitive. Two groups' research during 1919-39 is
noteworthy, however, particularly for their collection and
summary of state practice. They had considerable impact on
state practice as World War II widened but before it became global
in 1941 with the entry into the war of the United States and other
Western countries. Part III.A.1 traces those developments and
projections into the Charter era-1945 to the present. Part III.A.2
discusses the law of neutrality in the context of the right of selfdefense and other principles, such as reprisal and retorsion. Part
III.A.3 analyzes the law of neutrality and actions that may be
taken pursuant to the Charter. Part III.A.4 sketches the law of
treaties and sources of law that may affect the law of neutrality
and is followed by Conclusions in Part III.A.5.
Part III.B
discusses the principles of the law of neutrality in land, sea, air,
and space warfare. Its thrust is in the context of warfare in the
traditional sense, as distinguished from non-international
conflicts, low-intensity conflicts, or situations involving non-war
23
situations, such as individual intruding hackers.1
1. Neutrality, 1928-41, and in the Charter Era; "NonBelligerency"
The Pact of Paris was concluded in 1928. Subject to later
agreements, including the Charter, the Pact remains in force
today. 12 4 The understanding concerning the inherent right of

AGREEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS WITH COMMENTARIES 1, 6-12 (N. Ronzitti ed., 1988);

Williams, supra note 112, at 47-48; Wiswall, supra note 112, at 619. Even
commentators arguing that the force of the law of neutrality has been greatly
diminished do not say it has disappeared in the Charter era. E.g., ALFORD, supra
note 114, at 326; Janis, supranote 112, at 153; Norton, supranote 112, at 311.
122.
JESSUP, supra note 109; JESSUP & DEAR, supra note 110; W. ALISON
PHILLIPS & ARTHUR H. REEDE, NEUTRALITY: THE NAPOLEONIC PERIOD (1936); EDGAR
TURLINGTON, NEUTRALITY: ITS HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND LAW (1936).

123.
Cf. NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 7.1, at 7-2. For an
analysis of LIC issues, see generally LEGAL AND MORAL CONSTRAINTS ON LOWINTENSITY CONFLICT, supra note 41.
See also supra notes 4, 36, 41 and
accompanying text.
124.
U.N. CHARTER art. 103; Pact of Paris, supra note 118; THE CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supranote 83, at 1116-25; GOODRICH ET AL.,
supranote 83, at 614-17; U.S. DEP'r OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 447 (1999).
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self-defense under the Pact applies in the Charter era and can be
claimed today, subject to principles of necessity, proportionality,
and, in the case of anticipatory self-defense, the principle of a
situation admitting of no other alternative. 125
Neutrality
principles also carried forward into the Charter era, subject to
modification by Charter law and the processes of change in the
law Jessup foresaw in 1936.126
The Pact of Paris did not address the neutrality issue,
although other agreements contemporaneous with it stated the
term without defining it,' 1 2 7 including the Havana Convention on
Maritime Neutrality (to which eight American countries were
parties), 12 8 the 1938 five-state Nordic Rules of Neutrality (which
was not a formal treaty but published in the League of Nations
Treaty Series (L.N.T.S.), 12 9 and the 1939 General Declaration of
30
Neutrality of the American Republics.
A 1934 ILA conference approved the Budapest Articles of
Interpretation(Articles) of the Pact of Paris, which provide in part:

125.
See generally Walker, Maritime Neutrality, supra note 108, at 142-44.
See also infra notes 168-74 and accompanying text.
126.
U.N. CHARTER art. 103. See also supra note 124 and accompanying
text.
127.
E.g., Convention Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27,
1929, arts. 69-70, 72-73, 77, 47 Stat. 2021, 2053-57, 118 L.N.T.S. 343, 385-86,
superseded by Convention Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, arts. 4(B)(2), 10, 134, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3320-22, 3326, 3420, 75 U.N.T.S. 135,
238-40, 144, 238 [hereinafter Third Convention]. The 1929 Convention also
referred to "non-belligerents." See also 3 JEAN S. PIcTET, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
OF 12 AUGUST1949 at 69-72 (1960).
128. Convention on Maritime Neutrality, Feb. 28, 1928, 47 Stat. 1989, 135
L.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Maritime Neutrality Convention]. The United States is
party to it and to the Convention Regarding Rights of Neutrals at Sea, July 22,
1854, in force among Nicaragua, the former USSR, and the United States. U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 124, at 448, 450-5 1.
129.
Insofar as the Nordic Neutrality Rules, infra note 130, parallel the
customary norms of other agreements, they reflect general international law.
Insofar as they elaborate detailed provisions, they specify regional custom for
Scandinavia.
Ove Bring, Commentary, in THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: A
COLLECTION OF AGREEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS WITH COMMENTARIES, supra note 121,

at 839, 841, 843.
130.
General Declaration of Neutrality of the American Republics, Oct. 3,
1939, reprinted in 3 Bevans 604 [hereinafter General Declaration] (among 21
Western Hemisphere countries including the United States); Declaration for the
Purpose of Establishing Similar Rules of Neutrality, May 27, 1938, 188 L.N.T.S.
294 [hereinafter Nordic Neutrality Rules], among Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway and Sweden. The twenty-one Western Hemisphere states also signed the
Declaration of Panama, Oct. 3, 1939, § 1, 3 Bevans 608, 609, which established a
200-mile belt off the Americas that would be "free from the commission of any
hostile act by any non-American belligerent nation, whether such act be
attempted or made from land, sea or air" except waters off European colonies and
possessions.
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(1) A signatory State cannot, by denunciation or non-observance of
the Pact, release itself from its obligations thereunder.
(2) A signatory State which threatens to resort to armed force for
the solution of an international dispute or conflict is guilty of a
violation of the Pact.
(3) A signatory State which aids a violating State thereby itself
violates the Pact.
(4) In the event of a violation of the Pact by a resort to armed force
or war by one signatory State against another, the other States
may, without thereby committing a breach of the Pact or of any
rule of International Law, do all or any of the following things:
(a) Refuse to admit the exercise by the State violating
the Pact of belligerent rights, such as visit and search,
blockade, etc.;
(b) Decline to observe towards the State violating the
Pact the duties prescribed by International Law, apart from
the Pact, for a neutral in relation to a belligerent;
(c) Supply the State attacked with financial or material
assistance, including munitions of war;
(d) Assist with armed forces the State attacked.
(5) The signatory States are not entitled to recognise as acquired
de jure any territorial or other advantages acquired de facto by
means of a violation of the Pact.
(6) A violating State is liable to pay compensation for all damage
caused by a violation of the Pact to any signatory State or to its
nationals.
obligations as are
(7) The Pact does not affect such humanitarian
13 1
contained in general treaties ....
l3 3
said when the
Although some states1 3 2 and commentators
Articles were approved that no state had adopted them as policy,
in 1941 the U.S. Congress heard former Secretary of State Henry
L. Stimson's testimony on the pending Lend-Lease Bill; he
interpreted the Articles as an authoritative statement of the

law.' 3 4 He echoed Secretary of State Cordell Hull's and Attorney
General Robert H. Jackson's views, that since Axis states had

131.

Budapest Articles of Interpretation: Final Text arts. 1-7, in INT'L LAW

ASS'N, REPORT OF THE 38TH CONFERENCE 67-68 (1935).

132.

E.g., Lord Chancellor Viscount Sankey, 95 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.)

cols. 1007, 1043. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson took the opposite view. See
Henry L. Stimson, The Pact of Paris: Three Years of Development, 11 FOREIGN AFF.,
Oct. 1932, at i, vii-viii.

133.

JESSUP, supra note 109, at 121-23; H. Lauterpacht, The Pact of Paris

and the Budapest Articles of Interpretation,20 TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SOCky 178
(1935).

134. Arrangement Relating to Naval and Air Bases, Sept. 2, 1940, 54 Stat.
2405, 203 L.N.T.S. 201 (citing Budapest Articles of Interpretation: Final Text,
supra note 131); U.S. Secretary of War Stimson Testimony, Jan.29, 1941, Hearings
Before the House Committee on ForeignAffairs on H.R. 1776 Regarding the LendLease Bill, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 89-90 (1941) [hereinafter Hearings]; Rights and
Duties of States in Case of Aggression, 33 AM J. INT'L L. 819 (Supp. 1939)
[hereinafter HarvardDraftAggression Convention]; Stimson, supranote 132, at viiviii (expressing this view in 1932); Quincy Wright, The Transfer of Destroyers to
Great Britain, 34 AM. J. INT'L L. 680, 685-89 (1940) (making an analogous
argument after the destroyers-for-bases deal).
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breached the Pact of Paris, the United States could resort to self135
defense.
Besides self-defense, under the Articles states can adopt nonbelligerency status and decline to observe neutrality toward a
Pact violator. States can supply a state that is a target of a Pact
violator with "financial or material assistance, including
munitions of war." 13 6 Put differently, Pact parties could engage in
reprisals involving force or other modalities, or retorsions. In the
3 7
Charter era, reprisals involving use of force are inadmissible.1
In addition, assisting victims of aggression or armed attacks was
styled as non-belligerency, an intermediate step between
neutrality and belligerency.
Congress, by enacting 3 8 Lend-Lease in this context, can be
said to have stated U.S. practice at that time,' 3 9 and approved
the Articles as part of that practice. When the Allies and other
neutrals accepted Lend-Lease through bilateral agreements, they
ratified and accepted this practice. 14 °
The 1940 U.K.-U.S.

135.
U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull Testimony, Jan. 15, 1941, in
Hearings, supra note 134, at 9-10; Robert H. Jackson, Address to the InterAmerican BarAssociation, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 349 (1941).
136.
Budapest Articles of Interpretation: Final Text, supra note 131, arts.
4(b)-(d), at 67.
137.
See infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
138.
Lend-Lease Act, ch. 11, 55 Stat. 31 (1941).
139.
Vienna Convention, supra note 44, pmbl., art. 38, 1159 U.N.T.S. at
333, 341; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102(3) & cmt. f; BROWNLIE,
supra note 44, at 13-14 (citing The Scotia, 81 U.S. (5 Wall.) 170, 181-82 (1872)); 1
OPPENHEIM, supra note 44, § 10, at 15. Most Lend-Lease agreements were not
formalized until after the United States was at war; at least two were in force
between the United States and countries at war with Axis states before then.
Lend-Lease Agreement, Aug. 9, 1941, Neth.-U.S., 10 Bevans 140; Lend Lease
Agreement, Nov. 21, 1941, Ice.-U.S., 58 Stat. 1455. Informal arrangements had
undoubtedly already begun, for example with Great Britain. See Preliminary
Agreement, Feb. 23, 1942, U.K.-U.S., arts. 1-2, 56 Stat. 1433-34. See also George
K. Walker, Anticipatory Collective Self-Defense in the Charter Era: What the
Treaties Have Said, in THE LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS:
LIBER AMICORUM
PROFESSOR JACK GRUNAWALT 365, 379 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., Naval War Col. Int'l
Law Studies vol. 72, 1998) [hereinafter Walker, in THE LAW OF MILITARY
OPERATIONS]; George K. Walker, Anticipating Collective Self-Defense in the Charter
Era: What the Treaties Have Said, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 321, 347 n.171 (1998)
[hereinafter Walker, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J.] (referring to ROBERT H. SHERWOOD,
ROOSEVELT AND HOPKINS: AN INTIMATE HISTORY 308, 310-11 (rev. ed. 1950) and an
informal U.K.-U.S. defense arrangement).
140. Vienna Convention, supra note 44, pmbl., art. 38, 1155 U.N.T.S. at
333, 341; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102(3) & cmt. f.; BROWNLIE,
supra note 44, at 5; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 44, § 10, at 28; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra
note 112, § 292aa, at 639 (stating that U.S. practice resurrected older custom that
had not died out). The United States negotiated Lend-Lease treaties with states
not at war with the Axis before it went to war. To the extent these treaties
benefited the United States after it was at war, and before the other state declared
war, the other state became a non-belligerent.
Examples of non-belligerent
provisions included reciprocal commodity pledges and pledges to supply the
United States with "defense articles, strategic or critical materials, or defense
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destroyers-for-bases agreements 14 1 were also examples of the
United States' assuming non-belligerent status. 142 These,
although the general
however, were only bilateral arrangements,
143
U.S. pro-Allied stance was then apparent.
The United States was not the only country to assume a nonFor example, neutral
belligerency posture during 1939-45.
Norway's November 1939 charter arrangement with Britain for
1.5 million tons of tankers' 4 4 favored the United Kingdom against
the Axis. Others officially or unofficially adopted policies tending
to favor one side or the other, sometimes before becoming
belligerents

(for example,

Italy, which supported Germany,

or

American states participating in U.S. Lend-Lease agreements
before declaring war)14 s and in other cases staying out of the war
but keeping non-belligerent status (such as Spain). 14 6 This World
War II practice supports recognizing non-belligerency as an
intermediate position between neutrality and belligerency.
The ILA was not the only group of scholars in the interwar

years with a view that there could be gradations

or stages

The 1939 Harvard Draft
between belligerency and neutrality.
among
aggressors,
differentiated
Convention
Aggression

information." For an example of non-belligerent provisions, see Lend-Lease
Agreement, Oct. 1, 1941, Brazil-U.S., 5 Bevans 905, 906-07. The United States
had Lend-Lease treaties with 36 nations, including the USSR. See 13 Bevans 64.
As Bevans indicates, some treaties were not published and were perhaps not
available for consideration as evidence of practice until 1968-76 when the thirteen
volumes of Bevans were published.
141. Arrangement Relating to Naval and Air Bases, supra note 134,
supplemented by Protocol Concerning Defense of Newfoundland, Mar. 27, 1941,
U.K.-U.S., 55 Stat. 1560, 204 L.N.T.S. 70. See also BowETT, supra note 112, at
166 (stating that Lend-Lease and the destroyers-for-bases deal violated
international law). Viewed in the context of trends, particularly the law of selfdefense as then stated, Bowett's view is not the law now. He may have written
differently if all Lend-Lease treaties had been published in 1958 when Self-Defense
in InternationalLaw, supra note 112, was published. See supra note 140.
142.
McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 112, at 425.
143.
0RVIK, supra note 112, at 195-215.
144.
Id. at 587.
145.
See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
146.
CASTREN, supra note 112, at 450-51 (listing Bulgaria, China, Hungary,
Italy, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, and the United States as pursuing these
policies, without stating which side Spain favored). Although Francisco Franco's
Spain played both sides, throughout the war it supported the Axis, primarily
Germany, providing ports for submarine support, infrared, radar and sonar
listening stations, the Blue Division for the USSR front, civilian labor in Germany,
war material, credits and other services. These countries signed a Treaty of
Friendship on March 31, 1939 and a Secret Protocol on February 12, 1943, which
was not implemented. U.S. DEP'r OF STATE, THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT AND THE AXIS
(1946); PAUL PRESTON, FRANCO: A BIOGRAPHY 323-562 (1993). But see Antonio
Marquina, The Spanish Neutrality During the Second World War, 14 AM. U. INTL L.
REV. 171 (1998) (stating that Spain lost neutrality status by its cooperation with
Germany and that Italy later joined the Axis as a cobeligerent).
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defending and co-defending states (which were entitled to all
rights of self-defense), and "supporting States" (which were
entitled to discriminate against an aggressor by other than armed
force). A supporting state was entitled to "rights which, if it were
neutral, it would have against a belligerent." An aggressor
retained its duties to those entitled to neutrality status. Other
states would have had these rights under Articles 12 and 13 of
the Convention:
A State which is not an aggressor, a defending State, a codefending State, or a supporting State, does not, in its relations
with the aggressor, have the duties which, if it were neutral, it
would have to a belligerent, but, against the aggressor, it has the
rights which, if it were a neutral, it would have against a
belligerent.

Subject to ...

Article 7 and 8, a State which is not an aggressor,

a defending State, a co-defending State, or a supporting State, has,
in its relations with a defending State, a co-defending State or a
supporting State, the duties which, if it were neutral, it would have
to a belligerent; and has against those States the rights which, if it
14 7
were a neutral, it would have against a belligerent.

The Comment to the "supporting state" definition elaborates on
the term in the Draft Convention:
"[Sjupporting State" is used in a special way. A "supporting
State" might give to a defending State even greater assistance than
was given by a "co-defending State" but it would do so without use
of armed force.
The action taken by a supporting State to assist a defending State
would take the form of some kind of discrimination against the
aggressor or in favor of the defending State. The State may take
such action and assume such status for a variety of reasons but
presumably its reasons will include a desire to deter, restrain or
even perhaps to punish an aggressor. The discriminatory action
may take the form of economic or financial embargoes directed
against the aggressor. It might be restricted to a withdrawal of
diplomatic and consular representatives from that State or to
participation in the determination that the State violated its
obligation not to resort to force. It might not take the form of any
measures directly against an aggressor but might rather be in the
form of aid-financial, economic or otherwise-to the defending
State. 148

Recitations of state and League of Nations practices demonstrate
that there was support among states, great and small, for the
form of non-belligerency not involving direct use of force. In
effect, the Draft Convention's supporting state definition comes

147. Harvard Draft Aggression Convention, supra note 134, arts. 12-13, at
830.
148
Id. at 879-80. See also id. at 902. Bowett stated that these Convention
principles were de legeferenda. BowETr, supranote 112, at 161.
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close to the armed neutralities of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries and the Napoleonic Wars, when neutrals cooperated to
get cargoes through. 14 9 This was also almost precisely the United
States' circumstance in the destroyers-bases deal,' s° its North
Atlantic convoy operations before entry into World War II,151 and
Lend-Lease.' s2 The U.S. posture was the same during the Tanker
War when it convoyed U.S.-flag merchantmen to and from
Kuwait.' 5 3

The same was true for states other than belligerents

149.
JESSUP, supra note 109, at 7, 160-62, 181 (referring to JESSUP & DEAx,
supra note 110, at 44, 109, 117, 160); PHILLIPS & REEDE, supra note 122, at 91111. The United States was among the maritime powers recognizing the 1780
armed neutrality; the neutrality of 1800 collapsed with the defeat of the Danish
fleet. COLOMBOS, supra note 44, §§ 700-0 1; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112, § 290.
U.S. bilateral treaties now no longer in force restated these principles during the
19th century. E.g., Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Dec.
12, 1828, Braz.-U.S., art. 22, 8 Stat. 390, 395; U.S. DEP r OF STATE, supra note
124, at 29.
150. Wright, supra note 134, at 689 (citing the Draft Convention for
legitimacy of the destroyers-for-bases deal as discussed supranote 141 and in the
accompanying text).
151.
See generally 1 SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, HISTORY OF UNITED STATES
NAVAL OPERATIONS DURING WORLD WAR II: THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC, SEPTEMBER
1939-MAY 1943 at 56-113 (1947).
152.
See supranotes 134-39 and accompanying text.
153.
See generally SHAHRAM CHUBIN & CHARLES TRIPP, IRAN AND IRAQ AT WAR
215 (1988); 2 ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN & ABRAHAM R. WAGNER, THE LESSONS OF
MODERN WAR 290-92, 298-300 (1990); DILIP HIRO, THE LONGEST WAR: THE IRANIRAQ MILITARY CONFLICT 187 (1991); TAMARA MOSER MELIA, "DAMN THE TORPEDOES":
A SHORT HISTORY OF U.S. NAVAL MINE COUNTERMEASURES, 1777-1991 at 120-21
(1991); Elizabeth Gamlen & Paul Rogers, U.S. Reflagging of Kuwaiti Tankers, in
THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR: THE POLITICS OF AGGRESSION 123, 141 (Farhang Rajaee ed.,
1993); Walter Isaacson, Into Rough Water, TIME, Aug. 10, 1987, at 8; Maxwell
Orme Johnson, The Role of U.S. MilitaryForce in the Gulf War, in THE PERSIAN GULF
WAR: LESSONS FOR STRATEGY, LAW, AND DIPLOMACY 127, 131-32 (Christopher C.
Joyner ed., 1990); Thomas L. McNaugher, Walking Tightropes in the Gulf, in THE
IRAN-IRAQ WAR: IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS 171, 173-74 (Efrain Karsh ed., 1989);
McNeill, supra note 112, at 635, 638; Samuel Pyatt Menefee, Commentary, in THE
IRAN-IRAQ WAR (1980-1988) AND THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE 99, 121-23, 126-27
(Andrea de Guttry & Natalino Ronzitti eds., 1993); Ronald O'Rourke, Gulf Ops,
U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC., May 1989, at 43; Ronald O'Rourke, The Tanker War, U.S.
NAVAL INST. PROC., May 1988, at 33; David L. Peace, Major Maritime Events in the
Persian Gulf War, 1988 AM. SOC. INTL L. PROC. 146, 149; David L. Peace, Major
Maritime Events in the Persian Gulf War Between 1984 and 1991: A Juridical
Analysis, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 545, 554 (1991); Frank C. Seitz, Jr., S.S. Bridgeton:
The First Convoy, U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC., May 1988, at 52; Wolff Heintschel von
Heinegg, Visit, Search, Diversion and Capture in Naval Warfare: Part II,
Developments Since 1945, 1992 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 89, 104; U.S. Secretary of
Defense Frank Carlucci Statement, DEPT ST. BULL., July 1988, at 61 [hereinafter
Carlucci]; U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs Statement Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the
U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee, DEPr ST. BULL., July 1987, at 59, 60; U.S.
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Michael H. Armacost's Statement
Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Policy in the PersianGulf and
Kuwaiti Reflagging, DEPI " ST. BULL., Aug. 1987, at 78; Rudiger Wolfrum,
Reflagging and Escort Operations in the Persian Gulf: An International Law
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that accompanied or escorted merchantmen flying flags of states
other than the belligerents, upon request of those ships,
regardless of who was the aggressor, during the Tanker War,
which was the maritime aspect of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq
4
conflict.15
At least one commentator says the Articles' principle of aid
against an aggressor, or its correlative of supporting state action
under the Draft Convention, applies in the Charter era.1 5 5 Most
recent commentators, however, say there is no intermediate
position between belligerency and neutrality-that is, there is no
legal foundation, or perhaps need, for non-belligerency. Unlike
the Harvard Draft Aggression Convention view, non-belligerents
can claim no rights from that status.' 5 6 The problem, however,
may lie more in defining neutrality, according to Tucker. If
neutrality is defined as non-participation in hostilities (as a
belligerent or non-belligerent), a nonparticipant neutral incurs
belligerent responses only when, and to the extent, favoritism is
shown.
Belligerents can respond by non-force reprisals or
retorsions.1 5 7 Assuming the United States and others connected
with Gulf commerce during the Tanker War favored one
belligerent over the other, (for example, Iraq over Iran), Iran could
impose proportional non-force reprisals after giving due notice

Perspective, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 387, 397-98 (1989). Chubin & Tripp, supra, err in
christening S.S. Bridgeton as a commissioned U.S. Navy warship; it was a
merchant tanker.
154.
See generally U.K. Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report: Current
UK Policy Towards the Iran-Iraq Conflict, June 1988, §§ 6.11-6.14, reprinted in
THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR (1980-1988) AND THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 153, at
291-98; 2 CORDESMAN & WAGNER, supra note 153, at 234; Carlucci, supra note
153; Norman Cigar, The Soviet Navy in the Persian Gulfi Naval Diplomacy in a
Combat Zone, NAVAL WAR C. REV., Spring 1989, at 56; A.V. Lowe, Commentary, in
THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR (1980-1988) AND THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 153, at
241, 248; Jean Mallein, Commentary, in THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR (1980-1988) AND THE
LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 153, at 389, 391 (citing a written answer by
the French Secretary of State for Maritime Affairs, Question 36188, J.O., Mar. 21,
1988, at 1301, translatedand reprinted in THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR (1980-1988) AND THE
LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 153, at 408); Statement by the [Italian]
Minister for the Merchant Navy Before the IX Permanent Commission (Transport,
Posts and Telecommunications), Sept. 10, 1987, translated and reprinted in THE
IRAN-IRAQ WAR (1980-1988) AND THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 153, at
446-47.
155.
CASTREN, supranote 112, at 434, 651.
156. Helsinki Principles,supra note 120, at 497; CASTREN, supra note 112, at
452; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 7.1; TUCKER, supra note 112, at
199 n.5 (citing STONE, supra note 112, at 383); Dei.k, supra note 112, at 153;
Josef Kunz, Neutrality and the European War 1939-1940, 39 MICH. L. REV. 719,
747-54 (1941). The San Remo Manual reports the debate but defines neutrals as
states not party to a conflict. INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL,
supranote 119, § 13(d) & cmts. 13.11-13.14.
157.
TUCKER, supra note 112, at 199 n.5. See also infra notes 175-76 and
accompanying text.
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and opportunity for correction necessary in the situation. Iraq
could do the same, and could employ retorsions, too.' 5 8 Iran
could not, even under this theory of neutrality, move
straightaway, without notice, to forcible response, such as
attacks on and destruction of neutral shipping, unless those
vessels would have been considered as aiding the enemy under
159
LOAC principles.
Besides the U.S. position before entry into World War II and
its stance during the Iran-Iraq war, nearly every conflict of
reasonable duration during the Charter era has involved
situations of non-belligerency in maritime warfare. This was true
for the Korean War, 160 with its U.N. law overtones. It was also
true for the Arab-Israeli conflicts. 161 The India-Pakistan conflicts
were less clear on the point. 1 62 The United States materially
assisted the United Kingdom in the Falklands/Malvinas war,
supplying fuel and intelligence; the United States and other
countries, through economic sanctions, also indirectly assisted
the United Kingdom.' 6 3 Moreover, if one takes the view that
negative preferences for one belligerent over another, including
cutting off arms supplies to one side as opposed to aiding one
belligerent while embargoing the other, amounts to nonbelligerency, during the Tanker War many states had nonbelligerent status, including France, the USSR, and most Arab
The United Kingdom, with its 1987 export credit
states.

See infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
158.
Unless a neutral merchantman engages in conduct amounting to
159.
aiding an enemy, these attacks would violate U.N. Charter, art. 2(4). Assisting an
enemy includes, for example, acting as an auxiliary to enemy armed forces by
carrying troops or replenishing warships; being incorporated into an enemy
intelligence-gathering system; sailing under an enemy warship or aircraft convoy;
and refusing orders to stop or actively resisting visit, search or capture. INTL INST.
OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 119, para. 60; NWP 1-14M
See also infra notes 373-78 and
ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 7.5.2.
accompanying text.
E.g., McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 112, at 492, 499 (indirect aid
160.
to North Korea, Peoples Republic of China, the subjects of Security Council and
General Assembly resolutions); Norton, supra note 112, at 263-67, 294.
Norton, supra note 112, at 257-62, 295-97, 298-301, 304-05; Ronzitti,
161.
supranote 121, at 4.
.162.
Norton, supra note 112, at 262-63. The short duration of the conflicts
was a factor.
E.g., E.C. Council Regulation Suspending Imports of All Products
163.
Originating in Argentina, Apr. 16, 1982 O.J. (L 102) 1; E.C.S.C. Council Decision
82/228/ECSC Suspending Imports of All Products Originating in Argentina, Apr.
16, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 548, 549-50 (1982); United States Statements Concerning
Assistance to and Sales to Argentina, 21 I.L.M. 682, 682-84 (1982); 3 ANTHONY H.
CORDESMAN & ABRAHAM R. WAGNER, THE LESSONS OF MODERN WAR 260-63, 270,

280-81, 331-32 (1990).
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its evenhanded strict
agreement with Iraq, despite asserting
16 4
neutrality, might fall into this category.
Despite the commentators' position, the record of armed
conflicts since World War II has been that if the confrontation is
of any length, states may declare and practice strict neutrality,
declare neutrality and act as non-belligerents, or do nothing,
perhaps ignoring (or being unaware of) the situation. 16 S The law
of neutrality has been applied in the Charter era, perhaps not
consistently; claims persist for a right to act as a non-belligerent,
that is, favoring one or more belligerents at the expense of others.
Is non-belligerency a violation of the law of neutrality, or a
status without legal standing between the traditional roles of
neutrality and belligerency? The response today lies not in the
traditional analyses, stretching back centuries, but in the
developing of norms under the Charter. The advent of the
Charter modified the old principles of neutrality recited in
treaties. 16 6 The same is true for non-belligerency, where an
overlay of Charter law may help defme these situations and can
give them legitimacy, not as an exception to traditional rules of
but in the
neutrality (whether stated in treaties or custom)
67
application and interpretation of the Charter.1

164. Gioia & Ronzitti, supranote 112, at 226-31.
For other conflicts through 1975, see Norton, supra note 112, at 268165.
75 (noting Vietnam and twenty-seven civil wars). See also CASTREN, supra note
112, at 452.
166.
The Charter prevails over older neutrality treaty obligations where they
Dedk, supra note 112, at 143 (citing U.N.
conflict with Charter obligations.
CHARTER art. 103). See also supra note 124 and accompanying text. The later in
time rule recites the same principle for newer agreements to assist states that are
victims of aggression. Vienna Convention, supra note 44, pmbl., art. 30, 1155
U.N.T.S. at 332, 339. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 323;
SINCLAIR, supra note 44, at 94-98, 184-85. To the extent that the Charter and
action pursuant to it is customary law or perhaps jus cogens, later custom or jus
cogens might trump inconsistent earlier customary obligations or an older treaty.
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, JUNE 26, 1945, art. 38(1)
(hereinafter I.C.J. STATUTE]; Vienna Convention, supra note 44, pmbl., arts. 53,
64, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 332, 344, 347; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
§§ 102-03, 331, 338(2); BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 4, 19, 514-17 (content ofjus
cogens uncertain); T.O. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 177-87 (1974); 1
OPPENHEIM, supra note 44, § 2; SINCLAIR, supra note 44, at 17-18, 218-26 (noting
that the Convention principles are a progressive development); Eduardo Jimenez
de Arechaga, InternationalLaw in the Past Third of a Century, 159 RECUEIL DES
COURS DE L'ACADtIMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1, 64-67 (1978); Mark Weisburd, The
Emptiness of the Concept of Jus Cogens, As Illustrated by the War in BosniaHerzegovina, 17 MICH. J. INTL L. 1 (1995).
167.
See infra notes 187-218 and accompanying text.
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2. Self-Defense; Reprisals; Retorsions; Other Considerations
Commentators and countries continue to debate whether
anticipatory self-defense, which is a response with force that is
necessary, proportional, and admitting of no other alternative, is
permitted in the U.N. Charter era.1 6 8 The Charter, Article 51,

Compare, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996
168.
I.C.J. 226, 245 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]; Military and Paramilitary
Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 94 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua
Case]; 1996 I.C.J. at 347 (Schwebel, J., dissenting); STANIMAR A. ALEXANDROV,
SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 296 (1996);
BOWETT, supra note 112, at 187-93; KELSEN, COLLECTIVE, supra note 112, at 27;
TIMOTHY L.H. MCCORMACK, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ISRAELI RAID
ON THE IRAQI NUCLEAR REACTOR 122-24, 238-39, 253-84, 302 (1996); McDOUGAL &
FELICIANO, supra note 112, at 232-41; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 44, § 127; OSCAR
SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 152-55 (1991); SHARP,
supra note 1, at 33-48 (noting that the real debate is the scope of the anticipatory
self-defense right and that responses must be proportional); JULIUS STONE, OF LAW
AND NATIONS: BETWEEN POWER POLITICS AND HUMAN HOPES 3 (1974); ANN VAN WYNEN
THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, THE CONCEPT OF AGGRESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 127
(1972); Aldrich, supra note 1, at 231, 248; Louis Rene Beres, After the Scud
Attacks: Israel, 'Palestine," and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 6 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
71, 75-77 (1992); George Bunn, International Law and the Use of Force in
Peacetime: Do U.S. Ships Have to Take the First Hit?, NAVAL WAR C. REV., MayJune 1986, at 69-70; Christopher Greenwood, Remarks, 1988 A. Soc. INT'L L.
PROC. 158, 160-61; David K. Linnan, Self-Defense, Necessity and U.N. Collective
Security: United States and Other Views, 1991 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 57, 65-84,
122; Lowe, supra note 44, at 127-30; James McHugh, Forcible Self-Help in
InternationalLaw, NAVAL WAR C. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1972, at 61; Rein Mullerson &
David J. Scheffer, Legal Regulation of the Use of Force, in BEYOND CONFRONTATION:
INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 93, 109-14 (Lori Fisler Damrosch
et al. eds., 1995); John F. Murphy, Commentary on Intervention to Combat
Terrorism and Drug Trafficking, in LORI FISLER DAMROSCH & DAVID J. SCHEFFER,
LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 241 (1991); W. Michael Reisman,
Allocating Competences to Use Coercion in the Post-Cold War World: Practices,
Conditions, and Prospects, in DAHROSCH & SCHEFFER, supra, at 25, 45; Horace B.
Robertson, Jr., Contemporary InternationalLaw: Relevant to Today's World?,
NAVAL WAR C. REV., Summer 1992, at 89, 101; Schmitt, Bellum, supra note 36, at
1071, 1080-83; Abraham D. Sofaer, Sixth Annual Waldemar A. SoWf Lecture:
InternationalTerrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MILITARY L. REV.
89, 95 (1989); Robert F. Turner, State Sovereignty, InternationalLaw, and the Use
of Force in CounteringLow-Intensity Aggression in the Modem World, in LEGAL AND
MORAL CONSTRAINTS ON LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT, supra note 41, at 43, 62-80;
Claude Humphrey Meredith Waldock, The Regulation of Force by Individual States
in InternationalLaw, 81 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADtMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
451, 496-99 (1952) (noting that anticipatory self-defense is permissible, as long as
principles of necessity and proportionality are observed); Ruth Wedgwood,
Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 559,
566 (1999), with, e.g., BROWNLIE, supranote 112, at 257-61, 275-78, 366-67; THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 83, at 675-76;
DINSTEIN, supra note 112, at 182-87, 190; LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
POLITICS AND VALUES 121-22 (1995); PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS
166-67 (1948); D.P. O'CONNELL, THE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON SEA POWER 83, 171
(1979); 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112, § 52aa, at 156; AHMED M. RIFAAT,
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provides that states may exercise the "inherent right of individual

and collective self-defense" against armed attack until the
Security Council takes measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. 1 69 The rights of individual state
and unit anticipatory self-defense also appear to carry forward
into the Charter era because a right of anticipatory collective selfdefense existed before the Charter went into force, and because
mutual defense treaties since 1945 have continued to provide for
anticipatory self-defense. 170 The right of self-defense also inheres

INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION:

A STUDY OF THE LEGAL CONCEPT, ITS DEVELOPMENT AND

DEFINITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 126 (1979); Tom Farer, Law and War, in CYRIL E.
BLACK & RICHARD A. FALK, 3 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 30, 3637 (1971); Yuri M. Kolosov, Limiting the Use of Force: Self-Defense, Terrorism, and
Drug Trafficking, in DAHROSCH & SCHEFFER, supra, at 232, 234; Josef L. Kunz,
Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 872, 878 (1947); Rainer Lagoni, Remarks, 1988 AM.
SOC. INT'L L. Proc. 161, 162; Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Terrorist Attacks, 24
YALE J. INT'L L. 537, 541 (1999); Robert W. Tucker, The Interpretationof War Under
Present International Law, 4 INTL L.Q. 11, 29-30 (1951). See also Robert W.
Tucker, Reprisals and Self-Defense, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 586 (1972) [hereinafter
Tucker, Reprisals] (stating that states may respond only after being attacked). The
former USSR generally subscribed to the restrictive view. Kolosov, supra, at 232;
Mullerson & Scheffer, supra, at 93. U.S. and Israeli policy provides that states
may respond in anticipatory self-defense, subject to necessity and proportionality
principles, and admitting of no other alternative. NWP 1- 14M ANNOTATED, supra
note 37, paras. 4.3.2-4.3.2.1; Beres, supra, at 76-77. The Nicaragua Case, 1986
I.C.J. 14, declined to address the issue. The I.C.J. in Nuclear Weapons, 1996
I.C.J. 226, could not decide whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would
be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, when a State's
very survival is at stake. 1996 I.C.J. at 266 (citing UN CHARTER art. 51). The I.C.J.
in Legality of Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1996 I.C.J. 66,
84 (July 8), declined to rule on the World Health Organization's request for an
advisory opinion on the same subject. Judge Schwebel, dissenting in Nuclear
Weapons, supra, wrote: "[Flar from justifying the Court's inconclusiveness,
contemporary events rather demonstrate the legality of the threat or use of
nuclear weapons in extraordinary circumstances," citing inter alia a 1990-91 Gulf
War situation. Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 311, 323. For an analysis of the
opinions and reactions of governments, see generally VED P. NANDA &' DAVID
KRIEGER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE WORLD COURT (1998); Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.,
Taming Shiva: Applying InternationalLaw to Nuclear Operations,42 AIR FORCE L.
REV. 157, 159-64 (1997) (presenting U.S. views); Michael J. Matheson, The
Opinions of the International Court of Justice on the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 417 (1997); Symposium, Nuclear Weapons, the World
Court, and GlobalSecurity, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. &, CONTEMP. PROBS. 313 (1998).
169.
U.N. CHARTER art. 51. See also Walker, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J., supra
note 139, at 351-59; Walker, in THE LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, supra note 139,
at 381-86 (discussing the drafting of Article 51). Aldrich states that the right of
self-defense is not limited to responses to states' actions, citing the U.S. attack on
the bin Laden facilities in Afghanistan. Aldrich, supra note 1, at 236.
International reaction to this and the Sudan raid was mixed. See generally Lobel,
supranote 168.
170.
As with most issues in international law, this view is debatable. See
generally Walker, in THE LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, supra note 139; Walker, 31
CORNELL INT'L L.J., supranote 139.
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to belligerents' warships while in neutral waters and neutral
warships in belligerents' waters1 71 and on the high seas.
Moreover, principles of informal self-defense arrangements,
which also continue in the Charter era,1 7 2 permit responses by
states that are not parties to conflicts involving force, provided
that other criteria, such as necessity and proportionality, are
met. 173 One problem with informal self-defense arrangements,
like the situation of aid to a country which is a target of
aggression, is the stance the purported aggressor may take. If the
purported aggressor says, rightly or wrongly, that the target is the
aggressor, then the aiding state may subject itself to claims of
aiding the aggressor and worse. Another problem with relatively
clandestine material aid and with informal self-defense is notice.
Although some defense treaties are not published, 174 many are,
and all can see who is aligned with whom. This is not the case
with clandestine aid to target states and informal collective selfdefense agreements. These kinds of transactions carry with them
the risks of misinterpretation and accusations when states act
pursuant to them without notifying other states of the reasons for
their actions. States so acting must consider these factors when
assisting target states pursuant to these modalities. Adequate
notice under the circumstances seems to be a practical
requirement, if not a prerequisite, before states engage in
informal collective self-defense or assistance to target countries.

171.
Helsinki Principles5.1.1 & cmt., supra note 120, at 506.
172.
Walker, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J., supra note 139, at 359; Walker, in THE
LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, supranote 139, at 386.
173.
See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
174.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 312 n.5.

See also 1

U.S.C. §112a(b) (1994). Article 102 of the U.N. Charter requires treaties to be
published in United Nations Treaty Series if parties wish to invoke them before a
U.N. organ. U.N. CHARTER art. 102. Article 18 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations required members to register all treaties with the League; they were not
binding until registered. Article 18 was among U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's
Fourteen Points. THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note
83, at 1103-16; GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 83, at 610-14. National legislation
may require publication of agreements or notifying the national legislature of all
international agreements, for example, 1 U.S.C. § 112b (1994).
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Responses to aggressors also can include proportional
reprisals not involving the use of force 175 or retorsions, 17 6 and
states that are not belligerents (neutral states), but whose
interests have been damaged by belligerent action can invoke
these responses, along with a state of necessity (sometimes

175.
Reprisal has been characterized as a kind of self-help or sanction.
Most commentators say reprisals involving force against a state not engaged in
armed conflict with the acting state committing a reprisal are not lawful in the
Charter era. Other coercion that is unlawful, however, for example the deliberate
breach of a trade treaty to compel a state engaging in unlawful conduct to comply
with international norms, is admissible. Anticipatory reprisal using force is
forbidden. A state considering reprisal must first call upon an offending state to
mend its ways.
Compare Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess.,
Supp. No. 28, §§ 1, 3, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970), 9 I.L.M. 1292, 1294, 1297 (1970);
Gab6ikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 54 (Sept. 25);
Nicaragua Case, 1986 I.C.J. at 127; Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946
Between the United States of America and France (Dec. 9, 1978), BowErT, supra
note 112, at 13; J.B. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 401-02 (Humphrey Waldock
ed., 6th ed. 1963); BROWNLIE, supra note 112, at 281; THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 83, at 105; GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 83,
at 340-47; ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE
POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 217 (1963); NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED,

supra note 37, para. 6.2.3.1; NWP 9A ANNOTATED, supra note 44, para. 6.2.3.1, at
6-19; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112, §§ 43, 52a, at 152-53; 18 REPORTS OF INT'L
ARBITRAL AWARDS 417, 443; STONE, supra note 112, at 286-87; Roberto Ago,
Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility, [1980] 2(1) Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 13, 39, 42, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1 (Part 1); Anthony
Clark Arend, InternationalLaw and the Recourse to Force: A Shift in Paradigms,27
STAN. L. REV. 1, 14 (1990); Roberto Barsotti, Armed Reprisals, in THE CURRENT
LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 79 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1986); D.W.
Bowett, ReprisalsInvolving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 20 (1972);
Rosalyn Higgins, The Attitude of Western States Toward Legal Aspects of the Use of
Force, in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE, supra, at 435, 444;
Tucker, Reprisals, supra note 168, at 586-87, with DINSTEIN, supra note 112, at
215-16 (reprisals using force admissible in Charter era); GREENBERG ET AL., supra
note 1, at 26-27. (reprisals using force admissible in Charter era).
Lobel
unfortunately does not distinguish clearly between reprisals involving force and
those that do not; however, from the context of his colloquy it would appear that
he considers only the former. LOBEL, supra note 168, at 540, 542 (citing W.
Michael Reisman, Defence or Reprisals? The Raid on Baghdad: Some Reflections
on Its Lawfulness and Implications, 5 EUR. J. INTL L. 120, 125 (1994), for the
proposition that the 1993 U.S. attack on Baghdad in response to threats against
former President George W. Bush might be better characterized as a reprisal).
176.
Retorsion, or retortion, is a target state's lawful but unfriendly
response to another state's unfriendly practice or act, whether illegal or not, to
coerce the latter to discontinue that practice or act. Retorsionary responses must
be proportional. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 905 & n.8; BRIERLY,
supra note 175, at 399; THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY,
supra note 83, at 104; WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
§ 120 (A. Pearce Higgins ed., 8th ed. 1924); 2 HYDE, supra note 53, § 588; FRITS
KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISALS 27 (1971); 7 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW § 1090; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112, § 135; STONE, supra note
112, at 288-89; Waldock, supranote 168, at 458.
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known as self-help) against third states. 17 7 Although not all
agree on the admissibility of the necessity doctrine, 1 78 law of the
sea [LOS] treaties approve it for protecting coastlines from grave
and imminent danger of pollution or threat of pollution. 17 9 The
Charter prohibition on threats or uses of force against any state's

177. State of necessity and the now-outmoded concept of self-preservation
have been confused, sometimes with a notion that necessity as a component of
self-defense or that the LOAC may be so intense that in a situation involving the
state's survival, necessity overrides all other factors to allow any action by a target
state. This kind of self-preservation or self-help claim is now inadmissible. There
is, however, a separate, distinct concept of necessity, apart from a similar term
that is a conditioning factor for self-defense or the LOAC. In a separate claim of
necessity, a state against whom an action is taken (a "third state") has committed
no wrong against a state that takes action (an "acting state"), and an acting state
does not consider itself the third state's target. In self-defense situations, a target
state seeks to defend against aggression by a country in the position of the third
state, i.e., the aggressor.
State of necessity can be invoked to preclude
wrongfulness of conduct adopted in certain conditions to protect a target state's
essential interest, without the third state's existence being in any way threatened.
There remain cases in which a third state's right can be sacrificed for the sake of a
vital interest of a target state that would otherwise be obligated to respect that
right. Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 40-44 (customary law); Corfu
Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1947 I.C.J. 7, 35 (Dec. 10); M/V Saiga (St. Vincent v. Eq.
Guinea), 38 I.L.M. 1323, 1351-52 (1999 Int'l Tribunal for the Law of the Sea)
(customary law); BOWE'rr, supranote 112, at 10; BROWNLIE, supranote 112, at 4647; INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 119, para. 22;
1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 44, § 126; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112, § 326; Helsinki

Principles,supra note 120, at 501; Higgins, supra note 175, at 216; International
Law Commission, Draft Articles on State Responsibility, art. 33, [1980] 2(2) Y.B.
Intl L. Comm'n 26, 34, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add. 1 (Part 2); Ago, supra
note 175, at 15-18; Astley & Schmitt, supra note 121, at 140; George
Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental Principles of InternationalLaw, 87 RECUEIL
DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 195, 343 (1955). The United
States pleaded necessity during litigation between the former Yugoslavia and
NATO members. Schwabach, supra note 11, at 91. State of necessity can arise
during armed conflict, for example where a belligerent warship remains in neutral
territorial waters and the neutral country is unable or unwilling to expel the vessel
as the LOAC provides. What is a proper invocation of state of necessity in the selfdefense context may not necessarily be a proper use of the principle during armed
conflict and vice versa. See infra notes 279, 342 and accompanying text.
178.
Compare, e.g., BOWETT, supra note 112, at 10 (no such doctrine exists);
BROWNLIE, supra note 112, at 42-44 (no such doctrine exists), with, e.g.,
Gabdiknovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 40-41 (customary norm); M/V
Saiga, supra note 177, at 1351-52 (customary norm); BIN CHENG, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 31, 69 (1983)
(doctrine exists); INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note
119, para. 22; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112, § 326 (doctrine exists); Ago, supra

note 175, at 48-49 (doctrine exists); Helsinki Principles,supra note 120, at 501;
Schwarzenberger, supranote 177, at 343. Cf. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 44, §§ 131
n.15, 354.
179. UNCLOS, supra note 44, art. 221, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 489; Convention
Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, Nov.
29, 1969, art. 1(1), 26 U.S.T. 765, 767, 970 U.N.T.S. 211, 212 [hereinafter
Intervention Convention]. See also MYRON H. NORDQUIST ET AL., UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: A COMMENTARY §§ 221.1-221.2 (1991);

O'CONNELL, supra note 44, at 1006-08.
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territorial integrity or political independence also must be
considered;' 8 0 it has been cited as a reason for the prohibition on
18 1
reprisals involving force.
These
alternatives-self-defense, 8 2
nonforce
reprisals,
retorsions, and necessity-remain as options for neutrals in the
Charter era, but taking such actions could be seen as favoritism
for a belligerent because of the actions taken against its enemy.
In effect, the actor state might have the appearance of being a
non-belligerent by acting in this matter.
Examples from recent conflicts illustrate the point. During
the Falklands/Malvinas War, European states attempted to
isolate Argentina economically, most likely in violation of
international obligations. These reprisals were justified against
the aggressor in that war.
If the United States' and other
countries' supplying economic assistance, intelligence, and other
information to the United Kingdom would be deemed unlawful,
those actions were also appropriate non-force reprisals under the
Rio Treaty mutual security for Argentina's violation of territorial
integrity.' 8 3 Governments' actions to convoy, escort, and offer
protection to neutral ships not carrying warfighting or war84
sustaining goods to belligerent ports during the Tanker War'
were retorsionary in nature. These were unfriendly acts directed
toward a belligerent thought to have violated international law.
In essence, the principles applying to the intermediate status
between belligerency and neutrality need not necessarily depend
on the development of a customary practice recognized as law,
however the trend may seem to have been since 1939 and

180. This prohibition would trump, for example, intervention by necessity
under UNCLOS. U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(4), 103; UNCLOS, supra note 44, art. 221,
1833 U.N.T.S. at 489; Intervention Convention, supra note 179, art. 1(1), 26
U.S.T. at 767, 970 U.N.T.S. at 212. See also THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
A COMMENTARY, supra note 83, at 106-28; GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 83, at 4355; SHARP, supra note 1, at 11; Helsinki Principles 1.4 & cmt., supra note 120, at

500.
181.
See supranote 175 and accompanying text.
182. Helsinki Principles 1.2 & cmt., 1.4 & cmt., supra note 120, at 499, 500
(the latter noting that a belligerent warship transiting neutral waters always has a
right of self-defense).
183.
See supra note 175 and accompanying text. See also Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681, 21 U.N.T.S. 77
[hereinafter Rio Treaty], superseding Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance and
Solidarity, Mar. 8, 1945, 60 Stat. 1831 [hereinafter Act of Chapultepec]. See also
Manuel S. Canyes, The Inter-American System and the Conference of Chapultepec,
39 AM. J. INT'L L. 504 (1945); Josef L. Kunz, The Inter-American System and the
United Nations Organization, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 758 (1945). The Act was a major
factor for including Article 51 in the U.N. Charter. Walker, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J.,
supra note 139, at 351, 360; Walker, in THE LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, supra
note 139, at 382, 387.
184.
See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
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continuing into the Charter era,1 8 5 or upon resolving the
commentators' debate.' 8 6 Charter-governed norms apply to fill
the void to permit neutrals' claims to invoke non-force reprisals,
retorsions, and state of necessity that might have evoked claims
of non-belligerency before 1945. Neutrals also retain the inherent
right of individual and collective self-defense but are subject to
Charter prohibitions on violating other countries' territorial
integrity or political independence by threats of or use of force.
3. The Law of Neutrality in the Context of U.N. Action Under the
Charter
Part III.A. 1 demonstrates that neutrality, primarily as
practiced in the nineteenth century, has been modified in the
Charter era, but the general concept of neutrality remains. Part
III.A.2 shows that concepts of individual and collective selfdefense, including anticipatory self-defense, and reprisals not
involving the use of force, retorsions, and the state of necessity
remain as response options in the Charter era, albeit modified by
8 7
Charter law.1
A further question is the effect U.N. General Assembly or
Security Council actions may have on this corpus of law. Other
international governmental organizations, like the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the International Maritime
Organisation (IMO) (which deals with LOS issues), may also affect
decision-making, but these have been excluded from analysis.
Decision-making options and practice under the Charter
demonstrate that there has been and will be ample room for
claims of neutrality or non-belligerency.
First, although the Council may make legally binding
decisions under Articles 25 and 48 of the Charter and therefore
may obligate U.N. Members under Articles 41 and 42 to take
action that might be inconsistent with traditional neutrality
principles, the Council also may make nonbinding "call[s] upon"
Members under Articles 40 and 41.188
It also may make
nonbinding recommendations under Articles 39 and 40.189 These
recommendations have no more force of law than General
Assembly recommendations under Articles 10, 11, 13, and 14
unless they restate custom, general principles, or treaty-based

185.
See supra notes 131-67 and accompanying text.
186.
See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
187.
One example of Charter law modifications is the treaty trumping
provision of Article 103 of the U.N. Charter. See supra note 124. See also supra
notes 175-81.
188. U.N. CHARTER arts. 40, 41.
189.

Id. arts. 39, 40.
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norms. 9 0 If Council decisions differ from traditional neutrality
principles the latter must give way. 19 1 If Council or Assembly
resolutions vary from traditional neutrality principles, and restate
customary or other binding sources of law, 192 these resolutions
19 3
also will affect the traditional law of neutrality.
Thus, Council decisions may compel a state to behave
inconsistently with traditional neutrality practice by requiring
what otherwise would be belligerent acts or by restricting the
rights neutrals traditionally enjoy. 19 4 For example, U.N. Charter
Article 50, invoked by the Council for states affected by a Councildirected embargo of Iraq during the 1990-91 Gulf War, 195 allows
the Council to consult with states finding themselves with
"special economic problems" arising from carrying out Councildecided preventive or security measures. Thus, even if Jordan
and like-status states would have lost some or all of their rights
and duties as neutrals through initial Council decision-making in
that war, an Article 50 reprieve could have restored some or all
these rights and duties. Council action under Article 50 may
result in greater rights, or lesser duties, than under traditional
neutrality law.
Second, Council decisions when first taken may include
exemptions that would, in effect, allow reversion to traditional
neutrality law. For example, the sea and air embargoes against
Iraq in the 1990-91 war and against the former Yugoslavia

190.
SYDNEY D. BAILEY & SAM DAWS, THE PROCEDURE OF THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL 18-20 (3d ed. 1998); JORGE CASTAt4EDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS
RESOLUTIONS 70-116 (Alba Amoia trans., 1969); CASTREN, supra note 112; THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 83, at 284, 407-18,

605-36, 652; GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 83, at 126, 144, 290-314; Lalive, supra
note 112, at 78-8 1. Nonbinding Assembly or Council resolutions can strengthen a
preexisting norm to evidence its existence and vitality or can contribute to
developing a new norm. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 103(2)(d),
cmt. c & n.2; BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 14-15, 694; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note
44, § 16, at 47-49.
191.
Helsinki Principles 1.2 & cmt., supra note 120, at 499; Dietrich
Schindler, Commentary, in LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: A COLLECTION OF AGREEMENTS
AND DOCUMENTS WITH COMMENTARIES, supranote 12 1, at 211.
192.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 103.

Cf. Helsinki Principles1.2 & cmt., supranote 120, at 499.
193.
194.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2(5); Quincy Wright, The Outlawry of War and the
Law of War, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 365, 371-72 (1953). Permanently neutral countries
have supported U.N. action. See, e.g., GABRIEL, supra note 112, at 132-33 (noting
Swedish and Swiss economic aid and support during the Korean War); Ross,
supranote 112 (noting Swedish and Swiss actions against Rhodesia).
Jordan was the chief applicant, but twenty-one states invoked U.N.
195.
Charter, art. 50. Nico Schrijver, The Use of Economic Sanctions by the UN Security
Council An International Law Perspective, in International Economic Law and
Armed Conflict, supra note 112, at 123, 149-50. See also THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supranote 83, at 659-61; GOODRICH ET AL., supra
note 83, at 340-42; George K. Walker, The Crisis Over Kuwait, August 1990February 1991, 1991 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT, L. 25, 37-38.
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beginning in 1991 had exemptions for medical supplies,
humanitarian supplies, and foodstuffs notified to the Council's
Sanctions Committee, which includes representatives from all
Council members. 19 6
To that extent, and unless otherwise
controlled by other effects of Council decisions, such as the
Collective Measures Committee, the traditional neutrality law
would apply to shipments.
This exception has been most
apparent when the Council has decided to embargo a single
commodity,
such
as petroleum,
weapons,
or military
equipment, 19 7 followed by recommendations on, calls for, or
decisions on, enforcement.
In that situation the law of the
resolution would apply to the selected commodities, while
neutrality rules would be in force as to other goods if armed
conflict is involved. Thus far that situation has not arisen. One
similar case was Rhodesia (1965), which did not involve
international armed conflict, and only selective enforcement as to
one commodity, petroleum.' 9 8 Neutrality principles apply for

196.
Compare S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg., U.N. Doc
S/RES/661 (1990) (Iraq embargo), reprinted in KAREL C. WELLENS, RESOLUTIONS
AND STATEMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (1946-1992):
A
THEMATIC GUIDE 528 (2d ed. 1993), with S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
3082d mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/757 (1992), reprintedin WELLENS, supra, at 59; S.C.
Res. 760, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3086th mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/760 (1992), 31
I.L.M. 1461 (1992) (former Yugoslavia embargo). S.C. Res. 665 (1990) called for
enforcing the Iraq embargo. S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2938th mtg.,
U.N. Doc S/RES/665 (1990), reprintedin WELLENS, Supra, at 530. S.C. Res. 670
(1990) directed an end to civil air commerce with Iraq, except humanitarian
cargoes. S.C. Res. 670, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2943d mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/670
(1990), reprinted in WELLENS, supra, at 534. S.C. Res. 787 (1992) expanded on
S.C. Res. 724 (1991) and called on states to use individual and collective
measures to halt inbound and outbound shipping to or from the former
Yugoslavia.
S.C. Res. 787, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3137th mtg., U.N. Doc
S/RES/787 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 1481 (1992); S.C. Res. 724, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess.,
3023d mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/724 (1991), reprinted in WELLENS, supra, at 51.
Economic sanctions were imposed for the Angola, Haiti, Liberia, Libya, and
Somalia crises. A Sanctions Committee was appointed in all cases except Liberia.
Schrijver, supra note 195, at 132-43, 151-54.
197.
S.C. Res. 724 (1991) decided on a limited embargo. S.C. Res. 724, U.N.
SCOR, 46th Sess., 3023d mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/724 (1991), reprinted in
WELLENS, supra note 196, at 51.
The same procedure was followed for South
Africa. S.C. Res. 418, U.N. SCOR, 32d Sess., 2046th mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/418
(1977), reprinted in WELLENS, supra note 196, at 218; S.C. Res. 569, U.N. SCOR,
40th Sess., 2602d mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/569 (1985), reprintedin WELLENS, supra
note 196, at 228; S.C. Res. 591, U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2723d mtg., U.N. Doc
S/RES/591 (1986), reprintedin WELLENS, supranote 196, at 230. Arms and other
commodity embargoes were also imposed in the Angola, Haiti, and Libya crises.
Schrijver, supra note 195, at 129-32, 146-47.
198.
Rhodesia also illustrates the interplay of General Assembly and
Security Council resolutions. See generally O'CONNELL, supra note 168, at 13738, 174-75; Schrijver, supra note 195, at 129-30; George K. Walker, State Practice
Following World War I, 1945-1990, in THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: TARGETING
ENEMY SHIPPING 121, 142-43 (Richard J. Grunawalt ed., U.S. Naval War Coll. Int'l
Law Studies vol. 65, 1993).
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commodities not listed in a selective Council decision. If Article
42 measures approve the use of force for some circumstances but
not for others, and the use of force is appropriate in those other
19 9
circumstances, neutrality law applies in those circumstances.
For example, if the Council decides on an air-land campaign
against an aggressor, with no decision on maritime aspects of the
crisis, the maritime law of neutrality will apply to the maritime
aspects of the situation to the extent the Council decision's
impact does not overlap into maritime issues. An example of the
overlap might be air flights over the high seas. If an air-land
related resolution is in force, it would apply to ocean overflights to
and from the affected state, except purely maritime-oriented
flights, such as ship-to-ship helicopter resupply.
The third point is the relative infrequency of the application
of mandatory Council decisions. Of the many crises since 1945
involving a potential for armed conflict or actual conflict and that
could be said to risk a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace,
or act of aggression," 20 0 mandatory Council decisions have
governed only a handful. 2 0 ' In terms of the potential for or actual
warfare at sea, six crises have produced Council decisions:
Rhodesia (1965), the Gulf War (1990-91), the disintegration of
Yugoslavia (1991), Angola (1992), Liberia (1992), and Haiti
(1993).202 Even the Korean War evoked only Council calls or
recommendations for action before the USSR vetoes, and
thereafter General Assembly recommendations under the Uniting
for Peace Resolution. 20 3 To be sure, some calls for action and

CASTREN, supra note 112, at 435 (referring to U.N. CHARTER art. 42).
199.
See also THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 83, at
628-36; GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 83, at 314-17. That states are free to act
under traditional neutrality law is supported by continuing vitality of the national
sovereignty principle. See generally U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(1), 103; S.S. Lotus (Fr.
v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 4, 18 (Sept. 7); U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL,
AN AGENDA FOR PEACE:

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE WORK OF THE

ORGANIZATION, U.N. Doc. A/47/277, S/24111 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 956, 959 (1992);
MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 21-23 (Brian

Chapman ed., 3d ed. 1977); BRIERLY, supra note 175, at 45-49; SCHACHTER, supra
note 168, at 9-15; Jonathan Chamey, UniversalInternationalLaw, 87 AM. J. INT'L
L. 529, 530 (1993). But see HENKIN, supranote 168, at 9-10.
200.

U.N. CHARTER art. 39. See also THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

A

COMMENTARY, supra note 83, at 605-16; GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 83, at 293302.
"The unusual situation [contemplated by the Charter for applying the
201.
The originally anticipated interstitial
law of neutrality has] bec[o]me the rule ....
situation in which assumption of a neutral status might be permissible under the
Charter has arisen . . . in every international armed conflict of the last three
decades [1945-75]." Norton, supra note 112, at 252.
Schrijver, supra note 195, at 135-44. See also supra notes 196-97 and
202.
accompanying text.
G.A. Res. 377, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 10, U.N. Doc.
203.
A/ 1481 (1950), reprintedin45 AM. J. INT', L. 1 (Supp. 1951). See also CASTAf4EDA,
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recommendations were well supported, 20 4 but they did not carry
the force of decisional law. When the Council approves measures
other than decisions, the resulting resolutions, although
confessedly highly persuasive and authoritatively stated from
political and policy perspectives, are nonetheless recommendatory
as a matter of law. In the latter case, which is representative of
the overwhelming bulk of resolutions the Council has passed to
date, neutrality law has had and will have a full opportunity to
operate.
Widespread compliance with calls for action or
recommendations could eventually mature into custom, but it is
doubtful whether state practice under them would be of sufficient
duration 20 5 if states accept the action as law. 20 6 In any event,
neutrality principles will exist between a precipitating event, such
20 7
as a breach of the peace, and Council action.
Even if the Council decides on action, the enforcement
mechanisms have not been the Military Staff Committee and
special forces the Charter contemplates. 20 8 Rather, the Council
has often used an agency principle, choosing a state or group of
states to respond to the crisis, with one nation perhaps chosen
for a leadership role - for example, the United States in Korea, the
United Kingdom in Rhodesia, and a coalition in the 1990-91 Gulf
War. 20 9 In these situations, agent state(s) might be involved in
enforcing the law of neutrality, even though overarching Council
resolutions exist. Such was the case for Korea, where the U.S.declared blockade involved observing neutral vessel rights to visit
nearby USSR ports and the right of USSR warships to proceed to
North Korean ports. 2 10 In recently-ordered embargo operations

supra note 190, at 81-103; THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY,
supra note 83, at 235; GOODRICH ETAL., supra note 83, at 122-25. Williams, supra
note 112, may overemphasize the importance of the Resolution process as a lawpromulgating mechanism.
204.
Howard J. Taubenfeld, InternationalActions and Neutrality, 47 AM. J.
INT'L L. 377, 393-94 (1953) (noting the relative success of General Assembly call
for embargo against People's Republic of China).
205.
North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969
I.C.J. 3, 43 (Feb. 20); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102 cmt. b &
n.2; BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 5; 1 OPPENHEIM, supranote 44, § 10, at 30-3 1.
206.
Sanctions practice against Iraq and the former Yugoslavia may be
candidates for congealment into custom.
207.
CASTREN, supra note 112, at 433-34.
208.
U.N. CHARTER arts. 43-47. The Committee was a Cold War casualty;
prospects for revitalizing it are not good. See generallyTHE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 83, at 636-51; GOODRICH ET AL., supra note
83, at 317-33; DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 112-13 (1990);
Michael Mandelbaum, The Bush ForeignPolicy, 70(1) FOREIGN AFF. 5, 11 (1991).
209. Walker, supranote 195, at 48-50. Gioia states that the Council cannot
delegate powers to one state. Gioia, supra note 112, at 14. In practice, however,
its record appears otherwise.
210.
MALCOLM W. CAGLE & FRANK A. MANSON, THE SEA WAR IN KOREA 281-83,
299-300, 304, 353-57, 370-73 (1957); JAMES A. FIELD, HISTORY OF UNITED STATES
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a state or states as
where the Council has not designated
211
leader(s), there has been confusion.
The Security Council's Tanker War resolutions fell into the
first and third categories of exceptions. No state, including the
belligerents, had to obey a Council resolution, except through
calls for action, demands, or recommendations. Thus, neutrality
principles had full potential play for that war. Other conflicts,
particularly the ongoing situation that began with the 1990-91
Gulf War and the former Yugoslavia's disintegration, demonstrate
that gaps in Council decisions and its methodology of taking
action leave copious opportunities for applying neutrality
principles. These principles may not be the same as those before
the Charter era because individual and collective self-defense
actions must be factored in; however, neutrality as a concept
continues to exist.
Moreover, the Council appears to have approved sub silentio
the concepts of neutrality and non-belligerency. International
agreements concluded since 1945, including the 1949 Geneva
Conventions (which are, along with the Charter, the most widely
accepted multilateral treaties) 2 12 have continued to use the terms
"neutral" and, more rarely, "non-belligerent."2 13
The Council

NAVAL OPERATIONS: KOREA 42, 54, 58-59, 61, 126, 158, 349, 395, 444 (1962);
Walker, supranote 198, at 126.
211 E.g., Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Believes Greek Ship is Carrying Serbian
Arms in Somalia, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1993, at A6. The U.N. command center for
peacekeeping operations has been relatively spartan, running on a shoestring
Nevertheless, when
budget from U.N. headquarters but that could change.
compared with modem national command centers, the Organization has a way to
go and is likely to rely on the agency concept in the future. Cf. THE CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 83, at 650-51; Barbara Crosette,
U.S. Ambassador to U.N. Callsfor Changes in Peacekeeping, N.Y. TIMES, June 14,
2000, at A8.
Cf U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supranote 124, at 445-46, 470-71.
212.
Convention for Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
213.
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 8, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 3120, 75
U.N.T.S. 31, 36 [hereinafter First Convention] ("neutral powers"); Convention for
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 8, 11, 16, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 3224, 3226,
3230, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 90, 92, 96 [hereinafter Second Convention] ("neutral
powers" and also "neutral warship or a neutral aircraft"); Third Convention, supra
note 127, arts. 4(B)(2), 8, 10, 6 U.S.T. at 3320-22, 3326, 75 U.N.T.S. at 140, 142,
144 ("neutral or non-belligerent powers" and "neutral power"); Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 4, 9, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 3520, 3524, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 290, 294 [hereinafter Fourth
Convention] ("neutral" and "belligerent'). See also 1 PICTET, supra note 127, at 86103; 2 PIcTET, supra note 127, at 60-65, 68-72, 78-82, 93-103, 111-23; 4 PICTET,
supra note 127, at 45-51, 81-92; Dedk, supra note 112, at 143; Norton, supra
note 112, at 254-56. Protocol I uses the phrases "neutral' and "other State not
party to the conflict.' Protocol I, supra note 41, arts. 2(a), 9(2), 19, 22(2), 30(3),
31(5), 37(1)(3), 39(1), 64(1), 75, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 7, 11, 15, 18, 19, 21, 22, 33, 37.
See also MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS:

1134

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 33:1079

cited these conventions during the Tanker War, and again during
the 1990-91 Gulf War. 2 1 4 The Council referred to "states not
party to the hostilities" in Tanker War Resolution 552.215
Furthermore, nothing in practice under the Charter suggests that
earlier conventions dealing with neutrality are invalid under the
Charter. 2 16 To the extent that earlier treaties have crystallized
into custom, 2 17 they exist in that mode as a valid source of

law.

2 18

COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS

OF 1949 at 55, 105-06, 138-39, 144-45, 162-63, 165, 167, 202-06, 212-14, 40708, 457 (1982); INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 at 57-

59, 138, 140-43, 238-40, 316, 319-21, 326-27, 337, 430-32, 436-37, 439, 46265, 760-61, 863-90 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987). "Neutral" or "neutrality" have
been used in armistices and other settlements since 1945. E.g., Agreement on
Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam, Jan. 27, 1973, art. 20, 24
U.S.T. 115, 130; Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, July 18, 1962, 14 U.S.T.
1105; Agreement Concerning the Military Armistice in Korea, July 27, 1953, arts.
36-50, 4 U.S.T. 234, 248-53; Temporary Agreement Supplementary to the
Armistice Agreement in Korea, July 27, 1953, para. 1, 4 U.S.T. 346.
214.
S.C. Res. 540, U.N. SCOR, 38th Sess., 2493d mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/540 (1983); S.C. Res. 598, U.N. SCOR, 42d Sess., 2750th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/598 (1987); S.C. Res. 666, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2939th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/666 (1990); S.C. Res. 670, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2943d mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/670 (1990); S.C. Res. 674, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2951st mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/674 (1990); S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/678 (1990); S.C. Res. 686, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2978th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/686 (1991). See also Walker, supranote 195, at 36-37. The Council also
cited them during the Yugoslavia crisis. E.g., S.C. Res. 764, U.N. SCOR, 47th
Sess., 3093d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/764 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 1465 (1992); S.C. Res.
780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3119th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/780 (1992), 31 I.L.M.
1476 (1992).
215.
S.C. Res. 552, U.N. SCOR, 39th Sess., 2546th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/552 (1984), reprintedin WELLENS, supra note 196, at 473.
216.
Norton, analyzing Article 103 of the U.N. Charter, points out that the
then-current 1976 Treaties in Force still listed the 1907 Hague Conventions,
replete with citations to neutrality, that the United States had ratified and that
were binding unless expressly superseded by later treaties. Norton, supra note
112, at 256. This is still the case. There have been few accessions since World
War II.
THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE:
A COLLECTION OF AGREEMENTS AND
DOCUMENTS, supra note 121, at 93-95, 111-13, 129-30, 149-50, 173-74, 193-94;
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 124, at 449-50. Treaty succession principles
suggest that the Conventions may have more applicability than the lists in
Treaties in Force and The Law of Naval Warfare: A Collection of Agreements and
Documents suggest. See generally Gab~ikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.),
1997 I.C.J. 7, 66-68 (Sept. 25); Symposium, State Succession in the FormerSoviet
Union and in Eastern Europe, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 253 (1993); George K. Walker,
Integration and Disintegration in Europe: Reordering the Treaty Map of the
Continent, 6 TRANSNATL LAW. 1 (1993).
217.
Vienna Convention, supra note 44, pmbl., art. 38, at 333, 341;
Nicaragua Case (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 31-38, 91-135 (June 27). See also
North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 28-29,
36-45 (Feb. 20); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102(3) & cmt. f;
BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 5; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 44, § 10, at 28; Richard
R. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADPMIE DE DROIT
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4. Sources of International Law; the Law of Treaties
Besides Charter law, another consideration is the impact of
sources of law on principles of neutrality. While part of the law of
neutrality is crystallized in treaties, some of which tre nearly a
2 20
other
century old 2 19 and have been held to reflect custom,
221
These, too, may
principles are restated in secondary sources.
restate custom.

222

The law of treaties may affect the analysis. Although many
treaties may bear on IW issues, during armed conflict they may
be impossible to perform, 2 23 a fundamental change of

INTERNATIONAL 25, 36 (1970). Norton argues that including neutrality rules in
military manuals indicates the continued vitality of the concept. Norton, supra
note 112, at 256-57. See also BROWNLIE, supranote 44, at 5. However, disclaimer
clauses may blunt or eliminate their impact as evidence of custom, although they
are excellent guides to practice. E.g., NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, at
xxxv, xxxvii; Preface to NWP 9A ANNOTATED, supra note 44. See also W. Michael
Reisman & William K. Leitzau, Moving InternationalLaw from Theory to Practice:
The Role of Military Manuals in Effectuating the Law of Armed Conflict, in THE LAW
OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 44, at 1.
Cf. supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text (practice under Lend218.
Lease treaties may support the practice of non-belligerency).
E.g., Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers
219.
and Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310 [hereinafter
Hague V]; Convention Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in
Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415 [hereinafter Hague XIII].
E.g., NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 7.3 n.27 (Hague V
220.
reflects custom as to its rules on neutral territory); id. paras. 7.3 n.22, 7.3.2 n.32
(Hague XIII reflects custom as to its rules on neutral territory); Schindler, supra
note 191, at 215, 221 (with minor exceptions Hague XIII is considered custom).
E.g., Commission of Jurists, Hague Rules of Air Warfare, Dec. 1922221.
Feb. 1923, reprinted in DIETRICH SCHINDLER & JIRI TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICT 207 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter Hague Air Rules].
Many commentators say that the Hague Air Rules, supra note 221,
222.
restate custom. INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note
119, paras. 13(j), cmt. 13.24 n.23 (Hague Air Rules "largely correspond . . . to
customary rules and general principles"), 17 cmt. 17.1 (Hague Air Rules, art. 42,
is a customary norm), 125 cmt. 125.1 (Hague Air Rules restate custom for aircraft
visit and search), 141 cmt. 141.1 (Hague Air Rules restate custom on the capture
of enemy civil aircraft), 158 cmt. 158.1 (Hague Air Rules restate custom on the
safety of passengers and crew of captured aircraft); NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra
note 37, para. 7.3.7 n.82. But see Remigiusz Bierzanek, Commentary, in THE LAW
OF NAVAL WARFARE: A COLLECTION OF AGREEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS WITH
COMMENTARIES, supra note 121, at 396, 402 (Hague Air Rules were influenced by
land, sea warfare rules but are not binding law). The U.S. Navy applied them in
World War II. U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CONDUCT OF
ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS, para. 4-3c (1976) (citing U.S. NAVY,
TENTATIVE INSTRUCTIONS GOVERNING MARITIME AND AERIAL WARFARE (May 1941)).
France, Italy, Japan, Poland, and the United Kingdom also applied them in World
War II. Bierzanek, supra,at 402-03.
223. A country creating a state of impossibility of performance cannot
invoke the principle. Vienna Convention, supra note 44, art. 61, at 346. See also
Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 39 (Sept. 25)
(Vienna Convention art. 61 is a customary norm); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
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circumstances may intervene, 2 24 or there may be a material
breach of a treaty. 2 2 S Jus cogens norms, such as the inherent

right of self-defense, 2 26 may trump treaty law. 22 7 War or armed
228
conflict may end or suspend treaty obligations.

One usage of

RELATIONS § 336 cmt. c & n.3; BROWNLIE, supranote 44, at 623; ELIAS, supra note
166, at 128-30; INT'L LAW COMM'N, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION
ON THE WORK OF ITS EIGHTEENTH SESSION, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1 (1966),

Doc.
U.N.
172,
Comm'n
L.
Int'l
2
Y.B.
[1966]
reprinted in
A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1 [hereinafter ILC REPORT]; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note
44, § 650; Helsinki Principles 1.3 & cmt., supra note 120, at 499; Walker, supra
But see MCNAIR, supra note 44, at 685 (no separate
note 216, at 65-66.
impossibility doctrine).
Fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked to suspend
224.
or terminate humanitarian law treaty obligations, particularly their reprisal
provisions, or by a party causing the problem. Vienna Convention, supranote 44,
art. 62, at 347. See also Gab~ikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 39 (Art. 62
a customary norm); Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1973 I.C.J. 3, 18 (Feb. 2)
(Art. 62 a customary norm); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §§ 336,
339; BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 623-26; ILC REPORT, supra note 223, at 257-59;
MCNAIR, supra note 44, at 685-91; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 44, § 651; SINCLAIR,
supra note 44, at 20; David Bederman, The 1871 London Declaration,Rebus Sic
Stantibus and a Primitivist View of the Law of Nations, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1988);
Gyorgy Harsatzti, Treaties and the Fundamental Change of Circumstances, 146
RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADPMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1, 21 (1975); Harvard
Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 28, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 657, 662-63
(1935); Helsinki Principles 1.3 & cmt., supra note 120, at 499; Walker, supra note
216, at 66-68. Compare ARIE E. DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF TREATY TERMINATION 3-55
(1975); Oliver J. Lissitzyn, Treaties and Changed Circumstances, 61 AM. J. INT'L L.
895 (1967) (criticizing the Vienna Convention approach), with ELIAS, supra note
166, at 119-28 (the traditional rebus sic stantibus approach is no longer
admissible today).
See also
225. Vienna Convention, supra note 44, art. 60, at 346.
Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 39 (Art. 60 as a customary norm);
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 47 (June 21); BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 622-23; ILC
REPORT, supra note 223, at 253-55; McNAIR, supra note 44, 539-86; 1 OPPENHEIM,
supra note 44, § 649; SINCLAIR, supra note 44, at 20, 166, 188-90.
Carin Kahghan, Jus Cogens and the Inherent Right to Self-Defense, 3
226.
See also supra note 166 and
ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 767, 827 (1997).
accompanying text.
Vienna Convention, supra note 44, arts. 53, 64, at 344, 347. See also
227.
supra note 166 and accompanying text.
The Vienna Convention does not provide for the operation of war, or
228.
armed conflict, on international agreements. Other authorities, however, agree
that war may suspend or terminate treaties, depending on the nature of the treaty
and the circumstances of the conflict. E.g., Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 513
(1947); Karnuth v. United States, 79 U.S. 231, 240-42 (1929); Techt v. Hughes,
128 N.E. 185, 191 (N.Y. 1920), cert. denied, 254 U.S. 643 (1920); ILC REPORT,
supra note 223, at 267; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112, §§ 99(4)-99(5); George B.
Davis, The Effects of War Upon International Conventions and Private Contracts,
1927 PROc. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 124-29; G.G. Fitzmaurice, The Judicial Clauses of
the Peace Treaties, 73 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'AcADPMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
255, 307-17 (1948); HarvardDraft Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note
224, art. 35(b), at 664-64; Cecil J.B. Hurst, The Effect of War on Treaties, 2 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 37, 40 (1921); Institut de Droit International, The Effects of Armed
Conflict on Treaties, Aug. 28, 1985, arts. 2, 3, 5, 11, 61(2) ANNUAIRE 278, 280-82

2000]

INFORMATION WARFARE AND NEUTRALITY

1137

the latter principle is in the LOS conventions, which reflect
custom at least as to their high seas navigation articles; 2 2 9 the
conventions' "other rules" clauses, repeated in the navigational
articles, 23 0 have been almost universally said to mean the LOS is

(1986); Institut de Droit International, Regulations Regarding the Effect of War on
Treaties, 1912, arts. 1, 4, 7-10, reprintedin 7 AM. J. INT'L L. 153-55 (1913); James
J. Lenoir, The Effect of War on Bilateral Treaties, with Special Reference to
Reciprocal InheritanceTreaty Provisions,34 GEO. L.J. 129, 173-77 (1946); Schmitt,
Bellum, supra note 36, at 1087; Walker, supra note 216, at 68-71. IW may be a
stressor on these principles. See Schmitt, Bellum, supra note 36, at 1085-87.
Impossibility or fundamental change of circumstances claims may overlap war
suspension or termination claims. Impossibility, fundamental change, etc. are the
only bases for termination or suspension of treaty relations between belligerents
and neutrals.
Herbert W. Briggs, The Attorney General Invokes Rebus Sic
Stantibus, 36 AM. J. INTL L. 89 (1942); Lissitzyn, supra note 224, at 911; Walker,
supranote 216, at 68-69.
229.
Cf. High Seas Convention, supra note 44, pmbl., 13 U.S.T. at 2314,
450 U.N.T.S. at 82. States have recognized that the navigational articles in
UNCLOS, supra note 44, also restate custom. For example, in 1983 the United
States claimed a 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in accordance with
UNCLOS. Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10605 (Mar. 10, 1983). In 1988 it
claimed a 12-mile territorial sea in accordance with UNCLOS. Proclamation No.
5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Dec. 27, 1988). In 1999 it claimed a 24-mile contiguous
zone, also reflecting UNCLOS. Proclamation No. 7219, 64 Fed. Reg. 48701 (Aug.
8, 1999). See also supra note 44 and accompanying text.
230.
Compare, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 44, pmbl. (matters not regulated
by Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of international
law), arts. 2(3) (territorial sea), 19(1), 21(1), 31 (innocent passage), 34(2) (straits
transit passage), 58(1), 58(3) (EEZs), 78(2) (continental shelf; coastal state cannot
infringe or interfere with "navigation and other rights and freedoms of other States
as provided in this Convention"), 87(1) (high seas), 138 (the Area), 303(4)
(archaeological, historical objects found at sea; "other international agreements
and rules of international law regarding the protection of objects of an
archaeological and historical nature"), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 398, 400, 404-05, 408,
410, 419, 431-32, 446, 517, with, e.g., High Seas Convention, supra note 44, art.
2, 13 U.S.T. at 2314, 450 U.N.T.S. at 82; Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, arts. 1(2), 14(4), 17, 22(2), 15 U.S.T. 1606, 1608,
1610, 1611, 1612, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, 206-08, 214, 216, 220 [hereinafter
Territorial Sea Convention]. Although other 1958 conventions do not have other
rules clauses, they say they do not affect the status of waters above that are part
of the high seas, the continental shelf, or other high seas rights, for high seas
fisheries. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, arts. 1, 3, 15
U.S.T. 471, 473, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, 312, 314 [hereinafter Continental Shelf
Convention]; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the
High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, arts. 1-8, 13, 17 U.S.T. 138, 140-43, 559 U.N.T.S. 285,
286-92, 296 [hereinafter Fishery Convention]; Territorial Sea Convention, supra,
art. 24(1), 15 U.S.T. at 1612, 516 U.N.T.S. at 220 (contiguous zone). Thus the
High Seas Convention regime, including its Article 2 other rules provision, is
incorporated by reference into these Conventions, which modify some High Seas
Convention principles but not the Article 2 other rules clause. UNCLOS, supra
note 44, art. 33, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 409 (governing the contiguous zone, which
refers to an ocean belt contiguous to the territorial sea that is part of the high seas
except when declared EEZ, the fishing or continental shelf areas, and those areas
otherwise subject to the high seas regime).
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subject to the LOAC in appropriate
might be said for the human rights
they might apply in IW situations;
clauses may limit their applicability

231.
TREATIES,

situations. 2 3 1
conventions, to
those treaties'
during armed
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The same
the extent
derogation
conflict. 23 2

INT'L LAW COMM'N, COMMENTARY ON VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, U.N. Doc.

A/6309/Rev. 1 (1966), reprinted in 11966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 267-68, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1; 2 GEORGE SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 376-77 (1967); Boleslaw Boczek, Peaceful Purposes Provisions
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 20 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.
359 (1989); Herbert W. Briggs, Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties: The Vienna
Convention and the InternationalCourt of Justice, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 51 (1974); Carl
Q. Christol & C.R. Davis, Maritime Quarantine: The Naval Interdiction of Offensive
Weapons and Associated Material to Cuba, 1962, 56 Am. J. INT'L L. 525, 539-40
(1963); Scott Davidson, Unites States Protectionof Reflagged Kuwaiti Vessels in the
Gulf War: The Legal Implications, 4 INT'L J. ESTUARINE & COASTAL L. 173, 178
(1989); W.J. Fenrick, Legal Aspects of Targeting in the Law of Naval Warfare, 1991
CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 238, 245; Helsinki Principles 1.1, 3.1 & cmts., supra note 120, at
498, 504; Lowe, supra note 44, at 132; Bernard H. Oxman, The Regime of
Warships Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 24 VA. J.
INTL L. 809, 811 (1984); Ronzitti, supra note 121, at 15; Francis V. Russo,
Neutrality at Sea in Transition: State Practice in the Gulf War as Emerging
InternationalCustomary Law, 19 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 381, 384 (1988); A.G.Y.
Thorpe, Mine Warfare at Sea-Some Legal Aspects of the Future, 18 OCEAN DEv. &
INT'L L. 255, 257 (1987); Wolfrum, supra note 153, at 391-92.
Apparent dissenters include the following: 1 E.D. BROWN, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF THE SEA 280 (1994) ("[F]reedom of the high seas must be exercised under
conditions . .. in the Convention and by other unspecified rules of international
law."); 2 O'CONNELL, supranote 44, at 1112-13 (referring to 1 O'CONNELL 747-69 in
the merchantman nationality context); Luan Low & David Hodgldnson,
Compensationfor Wartime EnvironmentalDamage: Challenges to InternationalLaw
After the Gulf War, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 405, 421 (1995) (discussing environmental
protection obligations but saying nothing about the clauses, although elliptically
seeming to recognize the principle); Margaret T. Okorodudu-Fubara, Oil in the
PersianGulf War: Legal Appraisalof an Environmental Disaster,23 ST. MARY'S L.J.
123, 195-97 (1991); Elmer Rauch, The Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions for the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts and the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Repercussions on the Law of
Naval Warfare, Report to the Committee on the Protection of Human Life in Armed
Conflict of the Society for Military Law of War 22-49a (July 1983) (manuscript on
file with author).
232.
E.g., International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, arts. 4, 19(3)(b) (derogation clauses), 17 (forbidding interference with
correspondence), 19 (freedom of expression), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174, 177, 178;
European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, arts. 6(1), 8(2), 10(2) (derogation clauses), 8(l)
(correspondence), 10 (right of free expression regardless of frontiers), 213 U.N.T.S.
221, 228, 230; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art.
13(2)(b), 27 (derogation clauses), 13 (freedom of expression regardless of frontiers),
14 (right of reply), 9 I.L.M. 673, 679-80, 683 (1970). Banjul [African] Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, art. 9 (rights to receive information,
disseminate opinions within the law), 21 I.L.M. 58, 60 (1982) (no derogation
clause; it would be subject, however, to law of treaties principles on impossibility
of performance, etc.). See also SUBRATRA ROY CHOWDHURY, RULE OF LAW IN A STATE
OF EMERGENCY: THE PARIS MINIMUM STANDARDS OF HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS IN A STATE
OF EMERGENCY 12-13, 22-29, 59, 121-25, 210-11(1989) (analyzing International
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Current international agreements governing telecommunications
without similar derogation clauses must be read in light of the
23 3
law of treaties principles governing suspension or termination.
Three further points must be made on war's influence on
treaties. First, treaty suspension or termination because of war
only applies as to parties to the conflict; however, other statesneutrals-may invoke other law of treaties doctrines, such as
impossibility or fundamental change of circumstances, for
suspension or termination claims. Second, armed conflict does
not end or suspend treaties governing the LOAC, such as the
23 4
1907 Hague Conventions, which includes the law of neutrality.

Law Association Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of

Emergency [1984]); MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 813-15 (1980); Joan Fitzpatrick, ProtectionAgainst Abuse of the Concept of
"Emergency," in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NExT CENTURY 203 (Louis
Henkin & John Lawrence Hargrove eds., 1994); Louis Henkin, International
Human Rights as 'Rights", 1 CARDOZO L. REv. 446-47 (1979); Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13,
arts. 12, 19, 27, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), reprinted in DIETRICH RAUSCHNING ET AL.,
KEY RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1946-1996 at 321-22

(1997). The I.C.J. in Nuclear Weapons observed:
[T]hat the protection of the [Civil & Political Rights Convention, supra,
referred to in the opinion as the Covenant] ... does not cease in times of
war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain
provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency.
Respect for the right to life is not ... such a provision ....
[T]he right not
arbitrarily to be deprived of one's life applies also during hostilities ....
[Wjhat is an arbitrary deprivation of life .. . then falls to be determined by
the applicable lex specialis, . . . the [LOAC] . . . designed to regulate the
conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of life, through use
of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation
of life contrary to... the Covenant, can only be decided by ... the [LOAC]
and not.., from the terms of the Covenant ....
Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 239-40 (July 8). To the extent human rights
treaty norms represent custom, law of treaties analysis does not apply.
Derogations from custom like the persistent objector rule, however, do and will
apply to Declaration norms having status as custom. See infra note 238. "The
United States has long denied that any obligation rests upon it when a neutral to
attempt to control expressions of opinion by private persons within its territory
and adverse to the cause of any belligerent," although the U.S. government has
appealed to its citizenry to refrain from partisanship during war. 3 HYDE, supra
note 53, § 874, at 2312.
233.
See, e.g., GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 18-21; OFFICE OF GENERAL
COUNSEL, U.S. DEPT OF DEFENSE, AN ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES IN
INFORMATION OPERATIONS 36-38 (1999); Aldrich, supranote 1, at 254-55 (treaties to

which the United States is party, noting derogation for military uses); Scott, supra
note 41, at 62-64 (interface of U.S. law with telecommunications treaties). These
include the International Telecommunication Convention, Nov. 6, 1982, and its
successor, Constitution and Convention of International Telecommunications
Union, Dec. 12, 1992, to which the United States is party. U.S. DEPT OF STATE,
supra note 124, at 463-64. Bilateral treaties may govern a particular situation.
234. See, e.g., Hague V and Hague XIII, supra note 219; Maritime Neutrality
Convention, supra note 128.
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Third, armed conflict does not end or suspend humanitarian law
treaties applying during war, 23 5 such as the 1949 Geneva
2 36
Conventions.
Besides the treaty matrix applying to an armed conflict
situation, a decision-maker must consider customary law,
perhaps recited in treaties, general principles of law, or secondary
sources, such as judicial decisions and highly qualified publicists'
research. 2 37 These sources, particularly custom, are not subject
to treaty interpretation principles or other features of treaty law,
23 8
for example denunciation.
5. Conclusions
The overwhelming weight of authority is that neutrality
continues in the Charter era. If so, the concept applies in the IW
context as well. Although most countries today do not recognize
an intermediate stage of non-belligerency, that principle, if it is
considered law, would also apply during IW situations.
States also retain an inherent right of individual or collective

self-defense through treaties or by informal arrangement, at least

235.
5 HACKWORTH, supra note 112, § 513, at 383-84; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra
note 112, §§ 99(2), 99(5); Fitzmaurice, supra note 228, at 312; Harvard Draft
Convention on the Law of Treaties, supranote 224, art. 35(a), at 664; Hurst, supra
note 228, at 42; Institut de Droit International, The Effects of Armed Conflict on
Treaties, supra note 228, arts. 3-4, at 280; Institut de Droit International,
Regulations Regardingthe Effect of War on Treaties, supra note 228, art. 5, at 154;
Walker, supra note 216, at 70. A state cannot invoke material breach to suspend
or terminate a humanitarian law treaty, especially its reprisal provisions. Vienna
Convention, supra note 44, art. 60(5), at 346. See also supra note 225 and
accompanying text.
236.
First Convention, supranote 213; Second Convention, supra note 213;
Third Convention, supra note 127; Fourth Convention, supranote 213.
237.
See generally I.C.J. STATUTE arts. 38(1), 59; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS §§ 102-03; BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 1-30; 1 OPPENHEIM,
supranote 44, §§ 8-17.
238.
Cf. THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS
CUSTOMARY LAW 3-10 (1989). Custom may be subject to its own limiting doctrines,
for example the malleability of custom through time and the persistent objector
rule. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102 cmts. b, d; BROWNLIE,
supra note 44, at 10; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 44, § 10, at 29; Michael Akehurst,
Custom As a Source of Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 23-27; C.H.M. Waldock,
GeneralCourse on Public InternationalLaw, 106 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACAD9MIE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1, 49-52 (1962). But see Charney, supranote 199, at 53841 (stating that the existence of the persistent objector rule is open to serious
doubt). Roach and Smith present an exhaustive study of protests to LOS claims
and demonstrate that the persistent objector rule is alive and well, at least for LOS
issues. J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, UNITED STATES RESPONSES TO
EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS (2d ed. 1996). Undoubtedly states file thousands of
protests annually on many issues in the chancelleries, few if any of which are
published. It cannot be assumed that the persistent objector rule is in disuetude.
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until and insofar as the Council acts pursuant to Article 51.239
Self-defense responses in the IW context are always subject to
limiting considerations of necessity and proportionality, and for
anticipatory self-defense, where the situation admits of no other
alternative.
In IW situations, states may also respond with
reprisals not involving use of force, retorsions, or under the
necessity doctrine.
Charter-based commands, like Security Council decisions
pursuant to Articles 25 and 48 of the Charter, may supersede any
international agreement governing neutrality in the IW context, as
in any situation. Neutrality principles, whether published in
treaties or stated in custom, are subject to factorial analysis, like
all sources of international law, and this is true in the IW context
as well.
Principles of the law of treaties-for example,
impossibility
of
performance,
fundamental
change
of
circumstances or armed conflict 24 0-may suspend or terminate
some agreements dealing with Internet communications.
B. Principlesof the Law of Neutrality
Apart from considerations of the possibility of a principle of
non-belligerency (a status most scholars do not recognize
today),24 1 the law of neutrality defines a legal relationship
between countries engaged in war (belligerents) and countries not
taking part in a war (neutrals).24 2 Neutrality ends with the war's
end. 2 43 Some countries, such as Austria, Cambodia, Laos, and
Switzerland,
enjoy
internationally
recognized
permanent
neutrality. 2 44 Others, like Finland, the Holy See, Ireland, and

239.
U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
240. Treaties governing humanitarian law, the LOAC or neutrality are not
ended or suspended, however. See supranotes 225, 235 and accompanying text.
241.
See supra notes 124-67 and accompanying text.
242.
NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supranote 37, para. 7.1.
243.
2 OPPENHEIM, supranote 112, § 312.
244. Austria declared permanent neutrality by parliamentary resolution and
constitutional federal statute after agreeing with the USSR that it would proclaim
and practice neutrality on the Swiss model. See U.S. SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS
COMM., S. EXEC. REP. No. 8, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), reprinted in I
HISTORICAL OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1950-1955:

BASIC DOCUMENTS 682, 687-88 (1957); Recognition of Austrian Neutrality, 33 DEPY"
ST. BULL. 1011 (1955); Alfred Verdross, Austria's Permanent Neutrality and the

United Nations, 50 AM. J. INTL L. 61 (1956).
Treaties neutralized Laos and
Cambodia; Canada, China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and
the former USSR are among treaty parties. Declaration and Protocol on Neutrality
of Laos, July 23, 1962, 14 U.S.T. 1104, 456 U.N.T.S. 301; Agreement on Ending
the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam, Jan. 27, 1973, art. 20(a), 24 U.S.T. 1,
19; Act of International Conference on Viet-Nam, Mar. 2, 1973, art. 8, 24 U.S.T.
485, 489, 935 U.N.T.S. 405, 408. The treaties may apply to more states through
treaty succession principles. See generally Declaration of Vienna, Mar. 20, 1815,
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Sweden, have proclaimed neutrality and are not defensive alliance
members. 24 5 Costa Rica, a Rio Treaty 2 46 and OAS 24 7 member,
2 4a
has proclaimed a policy of "permanent," "unarmed" neutrality.
In effect, these countries have adopted a policy of neutrality for all
future wars. For the overwhelming majority of states, however,

64 Consol. T.S. 5; Act of Accession of the Swiss Cantons, May 27, 1815, 64
Consol. T.S. 11; Act of Congress of Vienna, June 9, 1815, art. 84, 64 Consol. T. S.
453, 483; Definitive Treaty of Peace, Nov. 20, 1815, Consol. T. S. 251 (appending
Public Act for Recognition and Guarantee of the Perpetual Neutrality of
Switzerland and the Inviolability of its Territory, Nov. 20, 1815, 65 Consol. T.S.
299 and Extract of Protocol of Plenipotentiaries, Nov. 3, 1815, 65 Consol. T.S.
300); Symposium, supra note 216; Walker, supra note 216.
Switzerland's
neutrality is a vestige of the Congress of Vienna system that dominated Europe
from Napoleon's defeat in 1815 to the Crimean War in 1854. The Treaty of Peace,
June 28, 1919, art. 435, 225 Consol. T.S. 188, 388 [hereinafter Treaty of
Versailles (recognizing Swiss neutrality). Several nations, for example Belgium,
Independent State of the Congo, and Luxembourg, were once neutralized but are
not neutral today. See 1 HYDE, supra note 53, § 29; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED,
supra note 37, para. 7.2, at 368 n.13; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112, §§ 300, 323,
at 688; Verdross, supra, at 62-64; Walker, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J., supra note 139,
at 324-28; Walker, in THE LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, supranote 139, at 366-68.
245.
See generally SAMUEL ABRAHAMSEN, SWEDEN'S FOREIGN POLICY 10-30
(1957); GORDON BROOK-SHEPHERD, THE AUSTRIANS: A THOUSAND-YEAR ODYSSEY
396-413 (1996); GABRIEL, supra note 112 (Swedish neutrality); ALVIN JACKSON,
IRELAND 1798-1998 at 301-03, 310, 332 (1999); NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra
note 37, para. 7.2, at 368 n.13; L.A. PUNTILA, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF FINLAND
220-33 (1975); Ross, supra note 112 (Swedish neutrality); FRANKLIN D. SCOTT,
SWEDEN: THE NATION'S HISTORY 468-75, 501-13, 544 (1977) (Swedish neutrality).
Treaty of Friendship, Co-Operation and Mutual Assistance, Apr. 6, 1948, Fin.U.S.S.R., 48 U.N.T.S. 149, is the foundation of Finland's neutrality. Wilhelm
Wachtmeister, Neutrality and InternationalOrder, 43 NAVAL WAR C. REV., Spring
1990, at 105 (Austrian, Finnish, Swedish, Swiss neutrality). Nordic Neutrality
Rules, supra note 130, apply to Finland and Sweden and are in effect for other
states such as Denmark, Iceland, and Norway, parties to the North Atlantic
Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, amended by Protocol on
Accession of Greece and Turkey, Oct. 17, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 43, 126 U.N.T.S. 350).
See also Protocol on Accession of Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954, 6
U.S.T. 5707, 243 U.N.T.S. 308; Protocol on Accession of Spain, Dec. 10, 1981,
T.I.A.S. No. 10564. The Rules may condition these countries' responses. Bring,
supra note 129, at 842. However, when it applies, Charter law, for example, the
right of self-defense under U.N. Charter, art. 51, would govern. See supra notes
124, 169-74 and accompanying text.
246.
Rio Treaty, supra note 183; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 124, at
364. See also supra note 183.
247.
Charter of Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T.
2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, amended by Protocol, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607;
Protocol, Dec. 5, 1985, 21 I.L.M. 533 (1985) [hereinafter OAS Charter]. See also
M. MARGARET BALL, THE OAS IN TRANSITION (1969); GORDON CONNELL-SMITH, THE
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM (1966); 0. CARLOS STOETZER, THE ORGANIZATION OF
AMERICAN STATES (2d ed. 1993); ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., THE
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (1963); Charles G. Fenwick, The Inter-American
System: Fifty Years of Progress,50 AM. J. INT'L L. 18 (1956).
248.
Costa Rica has said it will rely on Rio Treaty, supra note 183, and OAS
Charter, supra note 247, assistance if invaded. NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra
note 37, para. 7.2, at 368 n.13; Costa Rica ProclaimsNeutrality, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
18, 1983, at A12.
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neutral status arises when they proclaim neutrality, usually at
the outbreak of hostilities. 2 4 9 This ad hoc form of neutrality
exists for a particular war, although it may be expanded or
reduced as a conflict widens or narrows. Countries may proclaim
neutrality for part of their territory. 2 50
Status as a neutral
remains effective until the neutral abandons neutral status and
enters a war as a belligerent, 2 s 1 or when a belligerent begins war
against a neutral. 2 s 2 All states-permanent neutrals, ad hoc
neutrals or belligerents-have rights of individual or collective
self-defense or other lawful responses, such as nonforce reprisals
25 3
and retorsions, regardless of neutral or belligerent status.
Thus, Switzerland, Sweden or Costa Rica may respond in
254
individual or collective self-defense against aggression.
Neutrals that are U.N. members must obey U.N. laws that are
binding on them, such as Security Council decisions.2 5 5
Under traditional customary law, any country may refrain
from participating in an armed conflict or war by declaring
neutrality or otherwise assuming neutral status.2 S 6 The LOAC

249.
For example, the United States and other countries proclaimed
neutrality for the 1982 Falklands-Malvinas War, although they aided the
aggressor in that conflict. See supra notes 163, 183 and accompanying text. In
some cases there may be a joint proclamation or perhaps reaffirmation of
neutrality, for example General Declaration, supra note 130, para. 1, at 604. The
Nordic Neutrality Rules, supra note 130, pmbl., 188 L.N.T.S. at 695, declared in
advance neutrality principles that the five countries would follow.
250.
2 OPPENHEIM, supranote 112, § 301.
251.
NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 7.2, at 368; 2 OPPENHEIM,
supra note 112, § 295; TUCKER, supranote 112, at 202.
252.
2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112, § 312, at 672. A neutral can exercise
rights of individual or collective self-defense. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. See also
supra notes 125, 159-64 and accompanying text.
253.
See supranotes 124, 159-64, 175-81 and accompanying text.
254. Helsinki Principles1.2 & cmt., supra note 120, at 499.
255.
U.N. CHARTER arts. 25, 48, 103. See also supra notes 124, 190, 194
and accompanying text.
256.
NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 7.2. This principle is
subject to modification if a state is a U.N. Member, and the Security Council
decides on action pursuant to U.N. Charter, arts. 25, 48, 103. See also NWP 114M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 7.2; supra notes 124, 190, 194 and
accompanying text.
U.N. Charter, art. 51 preserves the "inherent right of
individual and collective self-defense," subject to a requirement of reporting to the
U.N. Security Council of self-defense measures Members have taken.
U.N.
CHARTER art. 51. Article 52 authorizes regional arrangements or agencies to deal
with maintaining international peace and security. Id. art. 52. The Council may
authorize regional agency action and must be informed of action the regional
agency takes. Id. arts. 53-54. Members, like all states, may join regional or
collective security arrangements. See generally Walker, 31 CORNELL INTL L.J.,
supra note 139, at 351-70; Walker, in THE LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, supra note
139, at 381-92. The neutrality that a member of a regional or collective security
arrangement may proclaim or exercise depends on what assistance parties to the
arrangement must provide in a regional action or how they must come to the aid
of a target member of a collective self-defense arrangement. "The practical effect
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confers rights and duties on belligerents2 5 7 and neutrals. 25 8 "The
principal right of the neutral... is . .. inviolability; its principal
duties are . . . abstention and impartiality. Conversely, it is the
duty of a belligerent to respect the former and its right to insist on
25 9
the latter."
actions, 2 60
Charter-based
of
considerations
Absent
international law prohibits belligerents'

hostile acts in

neutral

territory, including a neutral's land, internal waters, territorial
sea, and airspace, or using neutral territory as a sanctuary. 26 1 A
neutral has a duty to prevent the use of its territory as a
sanctuary

or

base

of

operations

by

belligerents

and

their

forces. 2 62 The rule for neutral land territory is absolute; a neutral
must not allow transit of troops by any belligerent. 2 63

Under the

law of naval warfare, neutrals must only use means at their
disposal to prevent use of ports and roadsteads as bases of
operations, and the same standard applies to intruding
belligerent military aircraft. 2 64 To the extent the land warfare

of such treaties may be to transform the right of the parties to assist one of their
number under attack into a duty to do so. This duty may . . . rang[e] . . . from
economic assistance to the commitment of armed forces."
NWP 1- 14M
ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 7.2.2.
257.
One duty of a belligerent is to notify neutrals of a state of war.
Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 2, 36 Stat.
2259, 2271. Other duties may include reporting to the Security Council. U.N.
CHARTER arts. 51, 54, 103.
See also THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY, supra note 83, at 753-57; GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 83, at 36869; supra notes 124, 188 and accompanying text.
258.
2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112, § 295.
259.
NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 7.2. See also Hague XIII,
supra note 219, art. 6, 36 Stat. at 2428; Maritime Neutrality Convention, supra
note 128, art. 15, 47 Stat. at 1993; 2 HOWARD S. LEVIE, THE CODE OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 786 (1985); 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112, §§ 29596, 297, 314; John Bassett Moore, The New Isolation, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 607, 625
(1933).
260.
U.N. CHARTER arts. 25, 48, 51-54, 103. See also supra notes 124, 16874, 190, 194 and accompanying text.
261.
Hague V, supra note 219, art. 1, 36 Stat. at 2322; Hague XIII, supra
note 219, art. 2, 36 Stat. at 2427; Maritime Neutrality Convention, supra note
128, art. 3, 47 Stat. at 1991, 135 L.N.T.S. at 196; General Declaration, supra note
130, para. 3(a), at 605; Hague Air Rules, supra note 221, art. 40, at 214; Nordic
Neutrality Rules, supra note 129, arts. 8-10, 11, 188 L.N.T.S. at 301, 308-09, 315,
321, 329. See also 3 HYDE, supra note 53, § 887; INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW,
SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 119, paras. 17-18; 2 LEVIE, supra note 259, at 785;
NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 7.3; U.S. DEPT OF THE AIR FORCE,
supra note 222, para. 2-6c; Helsinki Principles 1.4, supranote 120, at 500. Hague
V and XIII are generally believed to restate custom. See supra note 220. Where
the Maritime Neutrality Convention parallels their terms, it too can be assumed to
restate custom.
The Hague Air Rules are generally regarded as declaring
customary law. See supra note 222.
262.
See infra note 276 and accompanying text.
263.
See infra note 278 and accompanying text.
264.
Hague V, supra note 219, art. 5, 36 Stat. at 2323; Hague XIII, supra
note 219, art. 25, 36 Stat. at 2432; Maritime Neutrality Convention, supra note
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rule is a customary norm, the lesser standards for air and warfare
may be subject to a claim that custom supersedes them. 2 65 A
neutral's use of force to prevent a belligerent from violating its
territory is not a hostile act;2 6 6 however, it may subject the
neutral to a belligerent's claim of a right to proportional selfdefense, 2 67 anticipatory self-defense, 2 68 or that the neutral has
violated the law of neutrality. The neutral also has a right of selfdefense. 2 69 If a neutral is unable or unwilling to effectively
enforce its right of inviolability, an aggrieved belligerent may act
proportionately and as necessary to counter enemy forces'
actions, including actions by enemy warships and military
Today this
aircraft making unlawful use of neutral territory. 2 70

128, arts. 4(a), 26, 47 Stat. at 1991, 1994, 135 L.N.T.S. at 196, 208; General
Declaration, supra note 130, para. 3(c), at 605; Hague Air Rules, supra note 221,
arts. 42, 47, at 214-15; 3 HYDE, supra note 53, §§ 855, 856A, 888; 2 LEVIE, supra
note 259, at 788; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 7.3; 2 OPPENHEIM,
supra note 112, §§ 316, 323, 325; TUCKER, supra note 112, at 260-61; U.S. DEP~r
OF THE AIR FORCE, supra note 222, para. 2-6c (air operations principle; Hague Air
Rules not cited). But see Helsinki Principles2.2, supra note 120, at 502 (neutral
.must" take measures to enforce warship transit, sojourn rules).
265.
I.C.J. STATUTE art. 38(l); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
§§ 102-03. See also supra note 237-38 and accompanying text.
266.
Hague V, supra note 216, art. 10, 36 Stat. at 2324. See also Hague Air
Rules, supra note 221, art. 48, at 215; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37,
para. 7.3 n.24. Hague XIII, supra note 219, art. 26, is less stringent, declaring
that a neutral's exercising Convention rights, for example under Article 25, "can
under no circumstances be considered an unfriendly act by [a] . . . belligerent who
has accepted the articles relating thereto." Hague XIII, supra note 219, art. 26, at
2433.
267.
U.N. CHARTER art. 51. Compare McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note
112, at 406-07; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 7.3; TUCKER, supra
note 112, at 220-26, 256, 261-62; Bruce Harlow, UNCLOS III and Conflict
Management in Straits, 15 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 197, 204 (1985); Horace B.
Robertson, Jr., The 'New' Law of the Sea and the Law of Armed Conflict at Sea, in
READINGS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 262, 304
(John Norton Moore & Robert F. Turner eds., Naval War Coll. Int'l Law Studies vol.
68, 1995), with INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note
119, paras. 22, 30. Since the advent of U.N. Charter, art. 51, and its trumping
clause, art. 103, a right of self-defense asserted under the Charter takes priority
over Hague V. Hague V, supra note 219, art. 10, 36 Stat. at 2324. If a parallel
customary right of self-defense and a customary right for a neutral to prevent a
territorial violation are claimed, issues of balancing sources of international law
arise. See I.C.J. STATUTE arts. 38, 59; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
§§ 102-03. See also supra note 44 and accompanying text. If self-defense is ajus
cogens norm, issues of trumping other sources arise. See Vienna Convention,
supra note 44, arts. 53, 64, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 344, 347. See also supra notes 124,
166, 227 and accompanying text.
268.
See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text.
269.
U.N. CHARTER arts. 51, 103. See also 2 LEVIE, supra note 259, at 78788 (citing JAMES B. SCOTT, REPORTS TO THE HAGUE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907
at 548 (1917)); supranotes 124, 168-74 and accompanying text.
270.
Compare 3 HYDE, supra note 53, § 837A; McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra
note 112, at 406-07; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 7.3; TUCKER,
supra note 112, at 220-26, 256, 261-62; U.S. DEPIr OF THE AIR FORCE, supra note
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right is tempered by the Charter in that an aggrieved belligerent
must be a target of an armed attack, actual or threatened, from
271
neutral waters to exercise this power.
The LOAC treats neutrals' rights and duties differently,
depending on the modality of warfare and the part of the Earth
affected, such as neutral lands, neutral oceanic waters, the high
seas, or neutral airspace. There is overlap among the different
systems. While the law of naval warfare is primarily concerned
with combat at sea, it also interfaces with land warfareregarding radio transmission stations and undersea cable
termini, for example-and air warfare-high seas overflight by
warship-based or land-based aircraft. Today the possibility of
armed conflict in space, particularly involving space-based
communications that can invoke Internet use, cannot be
discounted.
1.

Neutrality and Land Warfare

Belligerents may not move troops or war materials and
supplies across neutral land. 27 2
Neutrals may be required to
mobilize sufficient armed forces to fulfill their responsibility to
prevent belligerent forces and others from crossing neutral
borders; 2 73 belligerents' forces entering neutral territory must be
disarmed and interned until war's end, if it is possible for the

222, para. 2-6c; Harlow, supra note 267, at 204; Helsinki Principles1.4, 2.1, supra
note 120, at 500-01; Robertson, supra note 267, at 304, with INT'L INST. OF
HUMANITARIAN LAw, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 119, paras. 22, 30.

271. Cf.Helsinki Principles 1.4 & cmt., supra note 120, at 500 (citing U.N.
Charter, art. 2(4), inter alia, which would apply to the neutral's territory);
Schindler, supra note 191, at 220. Schindler would limit responses to actual
armed attack; however, if a right of individual or collective anticipatory selfdefense exists in the Charter era, threat of attack may be enough to trigger a
proportional self-defense response. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
Helsinki Principlestake no position in the anticipatory self-defense debate.
272. A neutral is not required to prohibit passage of enemy nationals
intending to join enemy forces, but a neutral must bar passage of officially
organized bodies of combatants and organization of expeditionary forces on its
territory. Hague V, supra note 219, art. 2, 6, 36 Stat. at 2322-22; General
Declaration, supra note 130, para. 3(c), at 605; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra
note 37, para. 7.3.1; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112, §§ 318, 323, 331. Belarus'
and Russia's attempted movement of arms and fuel across NATO member
Hungary technically did not invoke the law of neutrality. See supra note 10 and

accompanying text. Hungary was a NATO member, and NATO was prosecuting
the air campaign against the former Yugoslavia. See supra notes 3-11 and
accompanying text.

273.

Hague V, supra note 219, art. 5, 36 Stat. at 2323; NWP 1-14M

ANNOTATED, supranote 37, para. 7.3. 1.
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neutral to do so. 2 7 4 The same rules apply to war material of land
27s
forces brought into neutral territory.
Neutrals have a correlative obligation, grounded in the
principle of impartiality, not to assist belligerents by supplying
troops, war material, or the means of producing war material, or
by allowing them to occupy or erect forts or to use neutral
territory. 2 76 This obligation is subject to other considerations,
such as lawful assistance to a belligerent that is a target of
aggression. 2 77 Belligerent troop or supply movements across
neutral borders might support claims of violating a neutral's
279
territorial integrity 278 and a neutral's right of self-defense.

274.
Hague V, supra note 219, art. 11, 36 Stat. at 2324; NWP 1-14M
ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 7.3. 1. Neutrals may allow passage of belligerent
forces' sick or wounded at the belligerent's request. Hague V, supra note 219, art.
14, 36 Stat. at 2325; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112, §§ 324, 338-39. Escaped
prisoners of war may be allowed asylum or return to their country. Hague V,
supranote 219, art. 13, 36 Stat. at 2324; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112, § 337.
275.
2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112, § 341.
276.
The rule against supplying a belligerent can be evaded by neutral
nationals' contracting to supply the belligerent. Hague XIII, supra note 219, arts.
6-7, 36 Stat. at 2428; The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 340
(1822); 3 HYDE, supra note 53, § 848; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112, §§ 321, 326,
329, 334.
Neutrals must prevent the outfitting of ships destined for naval
operations to a belligerent's order by means at their disposal. Hague XIII, supra
note 219, art. 8, 36 Stat. at 2428. See also Nordic Neutrality Rules, supra note
130, art. 15(1), 188 L.N.T.S. at 303, 309, 317, 323, 331; Treaty of Washington,
May 8, 1871, art. 6, 17 Stat. 863, 865; COLOMBOS, supra note 44, § 721; 3 HYDE,
supra,§§ 882-83; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112, §§ 334-35a; Schindler, supra note
191, at 218. Similar rules apply to supplying aircraft that can be used for
belligerents' air war. Hague Air Rules, supra note 221, arts. 45-46, at 214; Nordic
Neutrality Rules, supra note 130, art. 15(2), 188 L.N.T.S. at 303, 310, 317, 323,
331. During World War II some states enforced this in neutrality proclamations.
11 WHITEMAN, supranote 112, at 232.
277.
A neutral member of a collective self-defense alliance, permitted by
U.N. Charter, art. 51, may assist an alliance member that is a target of aggression
by joining the self-defense response. If that occurs, whatever neutrality the
assisting state might have claimed is lost; it becomes a co-belligerent against the
aggressor. On the other hand, it is possible for a neutral member to declare
neutrality and confine responses to retorsions and nonforce reprisals. This may
violate the alliance treaty, but that is a matter between the neutral and the target
of aggression. See supra notes 124-86 and accompanying text.
278. U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(4), 103. See also supra notes 116, 124, 180 and
accompanying text.
279. U.N. CHARTER arts. 51, 103. See also supra notes 116, 124, 168-74
and accompanying text. If a belligerent attacks enemy forces taking refuge on
neutral territory, or these forces are there for other purposes, this is not hostilities
against a neutral, "but . . . mere violations of neutrality; and they must be
repulsed, or reparation must be made for them ....
" 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note
112, § 320, at 685. Besides being a neutrality law violation, it is submitted that
an attacking belligerent, unless proceeding under a necessity theory, commits a
U.N. Charter, art. 2(4) violation, rendering it susceptible to an invaded neutral's
self-defense or other responses. Cf. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 44, § 326. See also
supranotes 116, 124, 168-81 and accompanying text.
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Under Hague V, Art. 3, and Hague XIII, Art. 5, the latter
applying to naval warfare, belligerents may not:
(a) Erect on the territory of a neutral Power a wireless telegraphy
station or other apparatus for.. . communicating with belligerent
forces on land or sea; [or]
(b) Use any installation of this kind established by them before the
war on the territory of a neutral Power for purely military purposes,
and which has not been opened for the service of public
2 80
messages.
Hague V imposes an unqualified duty, and Hague XIII, governing
maritime neutrality, requires a neutral to use "such surveillance
28
as the means at its disposal allow" to prevent violations. ' The
difference may lie in the reality (as of 1907 and today) that while
nearly all countries have military or other forces to repel transit of
troops, not every state has naval forces sufficient to drive out
intruding belligerent naval forces. In some instances a neutral
may not even have a navy or one capable of detecting some
belligerent intruders, for example, submarines. Under Hague V,
Articles 8-9:
A neutral Power is not called upon to forbid or restrict the use on
behalf of the belligerents of telegraph or telephone cables or of
wireless telegraphy apparatus belonging to it or to companies or
private individuals .... Every measure of restriction or prohibition
... must be impartially applied ... to both belligerents.
A neutral Power must see to the same obligation being observed
telegraph or telephone
by companies or . . . individuals owning
2 82
cables or wireless telegraphy apparatus.
The 1923 Hague Radio Rules echo these principles, adding that
belligerent mobile radio stations must abstain from using their

280. Hague V, supra note 219, art. 3, 36 Stat. at 2322. Compare id., with
Hague XIII, supra note 219, art. 5, 36 Stat. at 2427. See also Maritime Neutrality
Convention, supra note 128, art. 4(b), 47 Stat. at 1991, 135 L.N.T.S. at 196 (same
as Hague XIII); Nordic Neutrality Rules, supra note 130, arts. 12-13, 188 L.N.T.S.
at 301-02, 309-10, 315, 323, 329.
Compare Hague V, supra note 219, art. 5, 36 Stat. at 2323-24, with
281.
Hague XIII, supra note 219, art. 25, 36 Stat. at 2432. See also Maritime
Neutrality Convention, supra note 128, art. 26, 47 Stat. at 1994, 135 L.N.T.S. at
208; General Declaration, supra note 130, para. 3(c), at 605; Draft Convention on
Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War, art. 6, 33 AM. J. INT'L
L. 175, 245 (Supp. 1939) [hereinafter Harvard Draft Neutrality Convention]; 3
HYDE, supranote 53, § 856B; 2 LEVIE, supra note 259, at 791; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra
note 112, § 363.
282. Hague V, supra note 219, arts. 8-9, 36 Stat. at 2323-24. See also
COLOMBOS, supra note 44, §§ 579, 716; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112, § 363
(neutrals' emissions control practice during World Wars I and II). But see
GREENBERG ET AL., supranote 1, at 28; LEVIE, supranote 259, at 123 (World War II
belligerents took advantage of Portugal's neutrality and perhaps the neutrality of
Switzerland and Turkey).
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apparatus. 28 3
Many neutrals issued regulations supervising
activities of radio stations, etc. As one treatise analyzes the
problem:
Since ... everything is left to the discretion of the neutral ... it will
have to take the merits and needs of every case into consideration,
and act accordingly ....
[A] belligerent has no right to insist that
neutral States should forbid or restrict such employments of their
...
wires, etc., on the part of his adversary. On the other hand,
their duty of impartiality must compel neutralls] ... to prevent the
dispatch from their territory of wireless messages sent to enable
belligerent cruisers outside the neutral territorial waters to watch
for and capture... vessels which have been within those waters, or
any other wireless messages through the sending of which their
neutral territory becomes a base of naval or military operations for
2 84
[a] ... belligerent.

If a belligerent intends to arrange transmission of messages
through a cable laid for military communications over neutral
territory, or through telegraph or telephone lines for that purpose
on neutral territory, "[tihis would seem to be an abuse of neutral
territory, and the neutral is under a duty to prevent it." 28 5 If a
belligerent establishes a military communication station on
neutral territory before war begins, that station cannot be used
during the subsequent war.2 8 6 Similarly, a neutral cannot allow
28 7
belligerents to establish intelligence offices within its territory.
Hague V also provides that belligerents may not requisition
railway rolling stock of companies chartered by a neutral state
except if absolutely necessary. 28 8 If a private company chartered

283.
Compare Commission of Jurists to Consider and Report Upon Revision
of the Rules of Warfare, Rules Concerning the Control of Radio in Time of War and
Air Warfare, Feb. 19, 1923, arts. 2-4 [hereinafter Hague Radio Rules], reprinted in
THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: A COLLECTION OF AGREEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS WITH
COMMENTARIES, supra note 121, at 367, 368, with Hague V, supra note 219, arts.
3, 8-9, 36 Stat. at 2323; Hague XIII, supra note 219, arts. 3, 5, 25, 36 Stat. at
2427; General Declaration, supra note 130, para. 3(c), at 605. See also 2 LEVIE,
supra note 259, at 828-30; Philippe Eberlin, Commentary, in THE LAW OF NAVAL
WARFARE: A COLLECTION OF AGREEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS WITH COMMENTARIES,
supra note 121, at 371, 373, 375 (where Hague Radio Rules have the same
meaning as ratified convention provisions, they should be considered part of
current international law). Hague XIII, supra note 219, art. 9, 36 Stat. at 2428,
requires impartial treatment of belligerents for admission to neutral ports,
roadsteads or territorial waters. The Hague V, supra note 219, art. 9, 36 Stat. at
2323, impartiality rule deals only with restricting belligerents' use of wireless
telegraphy.
284.
2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112, § 356, at 748.
285.
Id. at 749.
286.
Id. at 750.
287. Id. See also 11 WHITEMAN, supranote 112, at 220.
288.
Hague V, supra note 219, art. 19, 36 Stat. at 2326. Compare id., with
Convention with Respect to Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899,
Regulations, art. 54, 32 Stat. 1803, 1823. See also 2 LEVIE, supra note 259, at
832. Hague V, art. 19, is a special case of the right of angary or requisition by
which belligerents may destroy or use neutral property on their territory, enemy
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by a neutral consents to the stock's use for warlike purposes,
seized
however, the stock acquires enemy character and may be
28 9
property.
state
enemy
were
it
though
as
and appropriated
Humanitarian law allows neutrals to authorize passage of
wounded and sick from belligerent forces through their territory2 90if
vehicles transporting them carry no combat or war materials.
If a neutral allows passage, the neutral is responsible for these
persons' control and safety. 2 9 1 Escaped prisoners of war making
their way to neutral territory may be repatriated home or left at
liberty in the neutral state, but they may not take part in
belligerent activities while there.
2.

292

Maritime Neutrality and Naval Warfare

The law of maritime neutrality is similar to that for land
warfare in principle, but in some instances it reflects concepts
from the LOS or different rules for the law of naval warfare. It is
therefore necessary to examine certain LOS principles before

analyzing principles of maritime neutrality law.
a.

Law of the Sea Principles
Freedom of the seas, including overflight and navigation, is

still the rule for high seas areas,2 9 3 subject to qualifications, such
as coastal state contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone (EEZ),

territory or the high seas in case of military attack, subject to compensating
owners. The right of angary does not derive from the law of neutrality; it is
distinguished from belligerents' buying equipment or ships. In the latter case,
both title and flag change to the belligerent upon purchase. See generally 6
HACKWORTH, supra note 235, § 609; 7 HAcKWORTH, supra note 235, § 677; 3 HYDE,
supra note 53, §§ 632-35; 2 OPPENHEIM, supranote 112, §§ 364-67; TUCKER, supra
note 112, at 349 n.41; 10 WHITEMAN, supra note 112, § 21; 11 WHITEMAN, supra
note 112, § 25; Hersch Lauterpacht, Angary and Requisition of Neutral Property,
27 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 455 (1950).
289.
2 OPPENHEIM, supranote 112, § 355, at 747.
Hague V, supra note 219, art. 14, 36 Stat. at 2325.
290.
291.
Id.
292.
Hague V, supranote 219, arts. 13-14, 36 Stat. at 2324-25; NWP 1-14M
ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 7.3.1. These provisions did not apply to Belarus
and Russian shipments of relief supplies through Hungary to the former
Yugoslavia during the Kosovo bombing campaign. Hungary was a NATO member,
and NATO conducted the bombing campaign. Therefore, Hungary was not a
neutral in the conflict. See supra notes 3-11, 272 and accompanying text.
UNCLOS, supranote 44, art. 87(1), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 432-33; High Seas
293.
Convention, supra note 44, art. 2, 13 U.S.T. at 2314, 450 U.N.T.S. at 82-4.
Although UNCLOS is in force for many countries, including U.S. allies, it is not in
force for the United States. The United States has stated that the navigational
provisions of UNCLOS reflect customary law, and many agree with this position.
See supra note 44.
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The
high seas fishing, and continental shelf interests. 2 9 4
territorial sea is subject to coastal state sovereignty, 295 but this
the right of innocent
regime is subject to qualifications, including
296
aircraft.
for
not
but
ships
all
for
passage
As with all treaties, the LOS conventions are subject to the
U.N. Charter. 2 97 Although the U.N. Charter Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) declares, in language similar to the Antarctic and other
treaties, that the high seas shall be reserved for peaceful
purposes, 2 98 but that provision does not preclude military forces'
use of the high seas. UNCLOS, Article 88 only forbids use for
aggressive purposes in violation of U.N. Charter Article 2(4).299
UNCLOS only requires parties operating under the LOS to refrain
from a threat or use of force in violation of the Charter.3 0 0 Article

294.
See generally UNCLOS, supra note 44, arts. 33, 55-85, 116-20, 1833
U.N.T.S. at 409, 418-32, 441-42; Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 230;
Fishery Convention, supra note 230, arts. 1-8, 13, 17 U.S.T. at 471, 473, 499,
Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 230, art. 24, 15 U.S.T. at 1612, 516
U.N.T.S. at 220. See also supranote 230 and accompanying text.
295.
UNCLOS, supra note 44, art. 2, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 400; Territorial Sea
Convention, supra note 230, art. 2, 15 U.S.T. at 1608, 516 U.N.T.S. at 208.
296.
UNCLOS, supra note 44, arts. 18-19, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 404; Territorial
Sea Convention, supra note 230, art. 14, 15 U.S.T. at 1610, 516 U.N.T.S. at 214;
Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, arts. 1, 3, 61 Stat. 1180,
1181, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, 298 [hereinafter Chicago Convention]; NWP 1-14M
ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 2.3.2.1, at 2-9; 1 O'CONNELL, supra note 44, at
118.
297.
U.N. CHARTER art. 103. See also UNCLOS, supra note 44, art. 301,
1833 U.N.T.S. at 516; supranote 124 and accompanying text.
298.
Compare UNCLOS, supra note 44, arts. 88, 301, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 433,
516, with Agreement Governing Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979, art. 3(1), 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, 22-3 [hereinafter Moon
Treaty] (providing that the Moon "shall be used by all ...
Parties exclusively for
peaceful purposes"); Convention on the International Maritime Satellite
Organization, Sept. 3, 1976, art. 3(3), 31 U.S.T. 1, 4, 1143 U.N.T.S. 105
[INMARSAT Organization shall act exclusively for peaceful purposes); Convention
on Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
Techniques, May 18, 1977, art. 3(1), 31 U.S.T. at 333, 336, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151,
153 [hereinafter ENMOD] (Convention shall not hinder the use of environmental
modification techniques for peaceful purposes); Treaty on Principles Governing
Activities in Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, art. 4, 18 U.S.T. at 2410, 2413-14, 610 U.N.T.S.
205, 208 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty] (the Moon and other celestial bodies are
to be used by treaty parties "exclusively for peaceful purposes); Antarctic Treaty,
Dec. 1, 1959, art. 1(1), 12 U.S.T. at 794, 795, 402 U.N.T.S. 71, 72 ("Antarctica
shall be used for peaceful purposes only.').
299.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 521 & cmt. b; Helsinki
Principles3.1 & cmt., supranote 120, at 504.
300.
UNCLOS, supra note 44, art. 301, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 516 (obviously
referring to U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4)). See also NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note
37, para. 2.9.2 n. 114 (noting some states' argument that UNCLOS, art. 88,
excludes military activity and the U.S. view that Article 88 only excludes
aggression); 3 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982:
A
COMMENTARY, supra note 44, paras. 87.9(i), 88.1-88.7(d); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS § 521 & cmt. b; Boczek, supra note 231, at 359; Helsinki
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to 'the inherent right of individual or
2(4) is, however, "subject
301
collective self-defense."Y
The LOS conventions also declare that their terms are subject
to "other rules of international law."3 0 2 Most commentators say
these "other rules" clauses refer to the LOAC.3 0 3 In addition, to
the extent LOS treaties-particularly their provisions related to
high seas navigation-have been incorporated into customary
law,30 4 the "other rules" clauses apply as custom for states that
30 5
are not convention parties.
The LOS conventions also promote a due regard principle for
shared ocean uses; one user must observe due regard for other
users' rights, including the right to lay cables that might carry

Principles 1.2, supra note 120, at 499; Oxman, supra note 231, at 814; John E.
Parkerson, Jr., InternationalLegal Implications of the Strategic Defense Initiative,
116 MILITARY L. REV. 67, 79-85 (1987); Francis V. Russo, Targeting Theory in the
Law of Naval Warfare, 30 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 8 (1992); Schmitt, Bellum, supra note
36, at 1087 (also noting differing views on UNCLOS, art. 88); supra note 116 and
accompanying text. UNCLOS, art. 301, is consonant with U.N. Charter, art. 103,
which declares that the Charter trumps all treaties. See supra note 124 and
accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 905 & cmt. g (quoting
301.
U.N. CHARTER art. 51). See also U.N. CHARTER art. 103; Nuclear Weapons, 1996
I.C.J. 226, 244 (July 8); supra notes 124, 168-74 and accompanying text. Cf.
Helsinki Principles 1.2, supranote 120, at 499.
UNCLOS, supra note 44, pmbl. (matters not regulated by Convention
302.
continue to be governed by rules, principles of general international law), arts. 2(3)
(territorial sea), 19(1), 21(1), 31 (innocent passage) 34(2) (straits transit passage),
58(1), 58(3) (EEZs), 78(2) (continental shelf; coastal state cannot infringe or
interfere with "navigation and other rights and freedoms of other States as
provided for in this Convention"), 87(1) (high seas), 138 (Area), 303(4)
(archaeological, historical objects found at sea; "other international agreements
and rules of international law regarding the protection of objects of an
archaeological and historical nature"), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 398, 400, 404-05, 409,
410, 419, 430, 432, 446, 517. See also supranote 230 and accompanying text.
See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
303.
See supra notes 44, 237-38 and accompanying text.
304.
Vienna Convention, supra note 44, pmbl., art. 38, 1155 U.N.T.S. at
305.
333, 341; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102(3) & cmt. f.; BROWNLIE,
supra note 44, at 5; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 44, §§ 10, at 28, 11, at 32-36. An
example in an IW context is the UNCLOS, art. 109, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 438,
requirement of cooperation to suppress unauthorized high seas broadcasting,
reflecting an earlier European regional treaty. See generally COLOMBOS, supra
note 44, §§ 156A-56B; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 3.7; 2
O'CONNELL, supra note 44, at 814-19; OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, supra note
233, at 41; 3 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A
COMMENTARY, supra note 44, paras. 109.1-109.8(f), 110.1-110.11; Aldrich, supra
note 1, at 254-55; Horace B. Robertson, Jr., The Suppression of Pirate
Broadcasting: A Test Case of the International System for Control of Activities
While this
Outside National Territory, 45 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71 (1982).
obligation remains in effect among neutrals during war unless it is unenforceable
because of, for example, impossibility or fundamental change of circumstances,
see supranotes 222-23 and accompanying text, the other rules clauses would say
that the Article 109 obligation is subject to the LOAC that might govern
belligerent-neutral relations in some situations.
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Internet messages.3 0 6 To the extent the treaty-based LOS on this
point has been absorbed into customary law,3 0 7 the due regard
principle binds nonparties to the conventions as a customary
norm.3 0 8 Recent commentaries advocate a due regard standard
for belligerents during war; for example, they must pay due
regard to neutrals' high seas, continental shelf, and EEZ3 0 rights
9
and duties, in addition to observation of other LOAC rules.
Under the LOS, any country can use the high seas for
conducting naval maneuvers, including dangerous activities,
such as air operations and gunnery practice, as distinguished

Compare UNCLOS, supra note 44, arts. 87-88, 112-15, 1833 U.N.T.S.
306.
at 433, 440, with High Seas Convention, supra note 44, arts. 2, 26-29, 13 U.S.T.
at 2314, 2319-20, 450 U.N.T.S. at 82, 96-98; Convention for Protection of
Submarine Cables, Mar. 14, 1884, 24 Stat. 989; Declaration Respecting
See also
Interpretation of Articles II & IV, Dec. 1, 1886, 25 Stat. 1424.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 521(3); COLOMBOS, supra note 44,
§§ 399-400; MYRES S. McDOUGAL & WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE
OCEANS 51-52 (1962); NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 2.4.3; 2
O'CONNELL, supra note 44, 796-99, 819-24; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 44, §§ 285,
310-11;

3

UNITED

NATIONS

CONVENTION

ON THE

LAW OF THE SEA

1982:

A

supra note 44, para. 87.9(k); Oxman, supra note 231, at 837-88;
Robertson, supranote 267, at 273-74, 286; Schindler, supra note 191, at 219-20.
Due regard clauses apply to other sea areas. See, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 44,
arts. 27(4) (territorial sea), 39(3)(a) (straits transit passage), 56(2), 58(3), 60(3)
(EEZ), 79(5) (cables, pipelines), 142(1), 148 (Area), 234 (ice-covered areas), 1833
U.N.T.S. at 407-08, 411-12, 418-20,430, 448, 450, 493; Continental Shelf
Convention, supra note 230, arts. 1, 3-5(1), 15 U.S.T. at 473, 499 U.N.T.S. at 312,
314 ("reasonable measures for the exploration . . . [and] exploitation" of
continental shelf balanced against right to lay, maintain submarine cables,
pipelines; continental shelf exploration, exploitation must not result in
"unjustifiable interference with" navigation, high seas fishing, oceanographic
research); Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 230, art. 19(4), 15 U.S.T. at
See also
1611, 516 U.N.T.S. at 216-18 (due regard for navigation interests).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §§ 511(b)-51 1(d), 514-15. UNCLOS,
supra note 44, art. 311(1), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 519, declares it supersedes the
Continental Shelf, High Seas and Territorial Sea Conventions among UNCLOS
parties. Air law follows a similar principle. For example, when U.S. military
aircraft do not follow ICAO flight procedures, they must navigate with "due regard"
for civil aviation safety. NWP 1- 14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 2.5.2.2. See
also infra note 328 and accompanying text.
307.
See supranotes 44, 237-38 and accompanying text.
308. Vienna Convention, supra note 44, pmbl., art. 38, 1155 U.N.T.S. at
333, 341; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102(3) & cmt. f; BROWNLIE,
supra note 44, at 5; 1 OPPENHEIM, supranote 44, §§ 10, at 28; 11, at 32-36.
INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 119,
309.
paras. 34-36; Helsinki Principles3.1, 4 & cmts., supra note 120, at 503, 505; J.
Ashley Roach, The Law of Naval Warfare at the Tum of Two Centuries, 94 AM. J.
INT'L L. 64, 69 (2000) (due regard chosen instead of humanitarian law principle of
"respect" for protected persons or objects); Robertson, supra note 267, at 303.
Helsinki Principles 1.4 & cmt., supra note 120, at 500-01, recites a due regard
standard in a context of requiring proportional attacks under the LOAC where
neutral territory, waters or airspace might be involved.
COMMENTARY,
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from belligerent operations. 3 10 This is considered part of the
freedoms of the seas. A military force user must give due notice
of operations, however. 3 1 1 Unlike the LOAC rule allowing a
commander to exclude shipping from an immediate area of
belligerent naval operations, 3 12 the LOS allows ships flagged
under other states to use this area; naval forces and other high
seas users must have due regard for the other's freedom of the
seas rights.3 13 Neutrals and belligerents alike can use the high
seas for this purpose during war. In this case the LOAC may
impact through the LOS "other rules" principle. 3 14 If a state
responds in self-defense, Charter primacy rules will come into
315
play.
States also may declare moving high seas defense zones
around naval or air forces, provided these zones are
geographically and temporally limited to an extent necessary for
defense. 3 16
There is no requirement for publishing these
warnings, because naval and air units on the high seas have a
right of individual and collective self-defense at all times if
attacked or threatened with attack.3 17 These zones, however,
cannot be areas for free-fire attacks or reprisals involving use of

310.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 521 & cmt. b; McDOUGAL

& BURKE, supra note 306, 753-63; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para.
2.4.3.1; U.S. DELEGATION PAPER, U.N. CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, LEGALITY
OF USING THE HIGH SEAS IN CONNECTION WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS IN THE PACIFIC

OCEAN, Doc. No. US/CLS/Pos/48 (2)-(3), Annex II (Feb. 20, 1958), reprinted in 4
WHITEMAN, supra note 112, § 2, at 546, 549; John H. Pender, Jurisdictional
Approaches to Maritime Environments: A Space Age Perspective, 15 J.A.G. J. 15558 (1960).
311.
See supranote 310 and accompanying text.
312.
See infra notes 369, 409 and accompanying text.
313.
See supranotes 306-09 and accompanying text.
314.
See supranotes 230-31, 302-05 and accompanying text.
315.
Cf. U.N. CHARTER arts. 51, 103. See also supra notes 124, 170-76,
297-301 and accompanying text.
316.
The Nyon Arrangement appears to be the first announced high seas
defense zone. Nyon Arrangement, Sept. 14, 1937, §§ 1-4, 181 L.N.T.S. 135, 13738, amended by Agreement Supplementary to Nyon Arrangement, Sept. 17, 1937,
paras. 1-3, 181 L.N.T.S. 149, 151. The belligerents declared them in the 1982
Falklands-Malvinas War; the United States announced them in the 1980-88
Tanker War. See O'CONNELL, supra note 168, at 80, 168, 172; WALKER, THE
TANKER WAR, supra note 108, Part V.F. 1.b; L.F.E. Goldie, Commentary, in THE LAW
OF NAVAL WARFARE: A COLLECTION OF AGREEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS, supra note
121, at 489, 493-95; L.F.E. Goldie, Maritime War Zones and Exclusion Zones, in
THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 44, at 156, 192; D.P. O'Connell,
InternationalLaw and ContemporaryNaval Operations,44 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 54-56
(1970).
317.
U.N. CHARTER arts. 51, 103. See also supra notes 124, 168-74, 297301 and accompanying text. The wisdom of publishing these zones from a naval
operations perspective has been questioned. See generally Stanley F. Gilchrist,
The Cordon Sanitaire-IsIt Useful? Is It Practical?,NAVAL WAR C. REV., May-June
1982, at 60.
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force. 3 18 Declaring states must observe certain principles, such
as necessity and proportionality, in self-defense situations, other
principles in other circumstances like retorsions, and LOAC
principles when that law applies.3 19 States may not declare,
however, high seas areas permanently barred to high seas
navigation or their territorial seas permanently barred to innocent
passage through security zone proclamations similar to the one
issued by North Korea.3 2 0 High seas defense zones are different
in principle and function from declared areas of naval and air
operations, 3 2 1 wartime warnings for belligerents' immediate area
3 23
or war zones.3 2 4
of naval operations,3 2 2 blockade areas,
Belligerents and neutrals have a customary right to establish
air defense identification zones (ADIZs) in international airspace
over the high seas, anchored to their territorial sea airspace, to
establish reasonable rules of entry into national airspace. The
ADIZ legal basis is a nation's right to establish reasonable
conditions for entry into its territory.3 25 An ADIZ cannot be a

318.
Ronzitti, supra note 121, at 39.
319.
See supra notes 124, 168-74, 230-31, 297-305 and accompanying text.
320.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 511 & cmt. k; INT'L INST.
OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 119, paras. 19, 26, 29, 31,
33; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 1.5.4; ROACH & SMITH, supra
note 238, para. 6.2; James R. Boma, Troubled Waters Off the Land of the Morning
Calm: A Job for the Fleet, NAVAL WAR C. REV., Spring 1989, at 33, 39-40, 42-43;
Helsinki Principles2.3, supra note 120, at 503; Choon-Ho Park, Comment, The 50Mile Military Boundary Zone of North Korea, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 866, 873-75 (1978);
Schindler, supra note 191, at 220. About twenty states have declared security
zones. Astley & Schmitt, supra note 121, at 137. If the Nordic Neutrality Rules
are construed to permanently bar warships from high seas passage, or to
permanently bar innocent passage under LOS principles, they should be deemed
to have been superseded by LOS principles. Compare Nordic Neutrality Rules,
supra note 130, art. 2, 188 L.N.T.S. at 297, 304, 311, 317, 325, with, e.g.,
UNCLOS, supra note 44, arts. 18-20, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 404-05; Territorial Sea
Convention, supra note 230, arts. 14-16, 15 U.S.T. at 1610-11, 516 U.N.T.S. at
214-16. The same might be said for the General Declaration, supra note 130,
para. 3(k), at 606 (exclusion of submarines from 'waters adjacent to [signatories]
territories") and for the actions of World War I neutrals in excluding belligerent
warships from their territorial waters except in distress cases.
See, e.g., 7
HACKWORTH, § 668, at 437-39. See also General Declaration, supra note 130,
para. 3(d), at 605; HarvardDraft Neutrality Convention, supra note 281, art. 26, at
525. By contrast to the General Declaration the companion Declaration of
Panama, supra note 130, paras. 1, 3-4, 3 Bevans 609-10, only undertook to
endeavor to get World War II belligerents to comply with a 200-mile zone
established off the Americas, except off waters of colonies or possessions of
European states, and to patrol the area. The Declaration thus did not go as far as
the Nyon Arrangement and Agreement Supplementary to the Nyon Arrangement.
See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
321.
See supranotes 311-15 and accompanying text.
322.
See infra note 369 and accompanying text.
323.
See infra notes 366-68 and accompanying text.
324.
See infra note 372 and accompanying text.
325.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 521 & n.2; MYRES S.
McDOUGAL ET AL., LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 307-09 (1963); NWP 1-14M
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sovereignty claim over high seas airspace, since navigation and
overflight are among high seas freedoms. 3 2 6 An ADIZ cannot
stand in the way of these high seas freedoms. 3 2 7 ADIZs are
different from flight information regions or aircraft warning zones
which are legitimate; which may be declared incident to military
exercises on, under, and over the high seas; and which purport to
warn but not to exclude. 328 ADIZs also differ from high seas
defense zones, 3 2 9 wartime warnings concerning belligerents'
immediate area of naval operations, 3 3 0 blockade areas,3 3 1 and
war zones.332

b. Neutrality Law in the Maritime Warfare Context
The traditional law of maritime neutrality offers principles
relevant to IW issues; these principles are different in some
33 3
respects from land warfare rules.
Belligerents may not use neutral ports and waters as a base of
naval operations against adversaries, "in particular to erect wireless
telegraphy stations or any apparatus for... communicating with
the belligerent forces on land or sea."3 34 Although custom and

ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 2.5.2.3; U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, supra note
222, para. 2-1g; U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAVY, LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, NWIP 10-2 (BASIC
THROUGH CHANGE 6) para. 422b (1974); Note, Air Defense Identification Zones:
Creeping Jurisdictionin the Airspace, 18 VA. J. INTL L. 485 (1978). U.S. ADIZs are
published in 14 C.F.R. pt. 99 (1999). Cf.Chicago Convention, supra note 296,
arts. 3, 8, 11 (nonmilitary aircraft required to submit to rules for entering another
state's territory unless there has been a prior agreement).
326.
UNCLOS, supra note 44, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, supra note
44, art. 2; U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, supranote 222, para. 2-1g.
327.
2 O'CONNELL, supranote 44, at 797.
328.
U.S. DEPT OF THE AIR FORCE, supra note 222, para. 2-lg & n. 13. See
also supra notes 311-15 and accompanying text. They also differ from Flight
Information Regions (FIRs) for control of civil aircraft. State aircraft need not
comply with these but often do so for safety reasons or as a matter of policy.
When U.S. military aircraft do not follow ICAO flight procedures, they must
navigate with "due regard" for civil aviation safety. In a handful of cases, the
United States has protested a foreign state's requirement for U.S. military aircraft
to comply with their FIR rules. NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para.
2.5.2.2; ROACH & SMITH, supra note 238, at 369-75; supra note 309 and
accompanying text.
329.
See NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 2.5.2.3 (referring to
NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED para. 2.4.4 n.68); supra notes 316-24 and accompanying
text.
330.
See infra note 369 and accompanying text.
331.
See infra note 366-68 and accompanying text.
332.
See infra note 372 and accompanying text.
333.
Cf. 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112, § 342 (discussing the effect of
entering neutral waters in varying circumstances). For a general analysis of
maritime neutrality issues, see generally Astley & Schmitt, supra note 121, at
138-47.
334.
Hague XIII, supra note 219, art. 5; Hague V, supra note 219, art. 3.
See also Maritime Neutrality Convention, supra note 128, arts. 4(b), 26; Nordic
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Hague XIII allow neutrals to permit belligerent warship passage
through their territorial seas, this is subject to an overriding
principle that a neutral's territorial sea cannot be used as a base of
operations.3 3 5
Both conventions require impartiality for other
matters,3 3 6 but no requirement attaches to this rule in either treaty.
Neutrals must, however, "exercise such surveillance as the means at
its disposal allow to prevent any violation" of this rule and a rule
that belligerent naval forces may not use neutral ports or waters as
a base of operations against adversaries; this is a less stringent
requirement than land warfare requirements.3 3 7 Similarly, Hague
XIII says a neutral is "entitled," not required, to take measures it
considers necessary to render a warship incapable of leaving port
when that warship should have departed the port because it is not
entitled to remain there.3 3 8 A probable reason for this less onerous

Neutrality Rules, supranote 130, art. 12(1), 301, 309, 315, 323, 329; INT'L INST. OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 119, para 16(b); 2 O'CONNELL,
supra note 44, 1126; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112, §§ 325-25a, 333; Helsinki
Principles 1.4, supra note 120, at 500; supra notes 280-87 and accompanying
text.
335.
2 OPPENHEIM, supranote 112, §§ 325-25a (referring inter alia to Hague
XIII, supra note 219, art. 10, 36 Stat. at 2324). See also Maritime Neutrality
Convention, supra note 128, art. 4(a); UNCLOS, supra note 44, arts. 18-19 (right
of innocent passage, subject to other rules of international law, Le., the LOAC);
Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 230, arts. 1(2), 14; INT'L INST. OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 119; Robertson, supra note 267,
at 303.
336.
Hague V, supra note 219, art. 9, 36 Stat. 2323 (impartial treatment for
restrictions on exporting goods to belligerents, belligerent wireless telegraphy use);
Hague XIII, supra note 219, art. 9, 36 Stat. at 2428 (impartial treatment for
admitting belligerent warships, naval auxiliaries to ports, roadsteads, and
territorial waters). The rule does not apply to belligerent-flag merchantmen not
otherwise assimilated to a belligerent's service, i.e., in ordinary trade.
2
OPPENHEIM, supra note 112, § 333a. See also Helsinki Principles 2.2, supra note
120, at 502 (impartiality in imposing other than the 24-hour rule on belligerent
warship passage and sojourn).
337.
Compare Hague XIII, supra note 219, art. 25 (neutral power must use
"such surveillance as the at its disposal allows."), with Hague V, supra note 219,
art. 5 (neutral "must not" allow such acts "to occur on its territory"). See also
Maritime Neutrality Convention, supra note 128, art. 26; INT'L INST. OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 119, para. 16(b); 2 OPPENHEIM,
supra note 112, § 333; HarvardDraft Neutrality Convention, supra note 281, art. 6.
This is a less stringent standard than Treaty of Washington, supra note 276, art.
6, would impose. See 3 HYDE, supra note 53, §§ 853-54; 2 LEVIE, supra note 259,
at 817; SCOTT, supranote 269, at 866. When the Treaty was negotiated, there was
debate over the standard that a state should observe for vessels being built on its
territory; the United States advocated a due diligence principle. See generally 7
JOHN BASSETr MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 1330, at 1065-68 (1906).
Hague XIII, supra note 219, adopted a different standard.
338. This includes interning crew. If an enemy prize is brought to a neutral
port under distress or similar conditions and does not leave when directed, its
crew must be interned. Hague XIII, supra note 219, arts. 21, 22, 24. See also
Maritime Neutrality Convention, supra note 128, art. 17; Nordic Neutrality Rules,
supra note 130, art. 4(1). Hague XIII, art. 23, gives an exception to this rule-
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standard for neutrals facing naval incursions or compelling a
warship in a neutral port to leave is that some countries did not
have a navy or other forces sufficient to drive out intruding
belligerent naval forces. Furthermore, these countries may not
possess the means to detect intruders. 3 3 9 On the other hand, if
belligerent war material, as distinguished from belligerent warships,
comes into neutral territoiy-for example, aboard3 4 ° neutral
merchantmen, it must be sequestered until the war's end.

The Radio Rules opt for the more stringent standard for
transmissions concerning military forces or operations destined
for a belligerent. 3 4 1 If a neutral cannot or will not enforce its duty
to clear its waters of belligerent forces, however, an aggrieved
belligerent may act against those belligerent forces present in
3 42
neutral waters.
The Radio Rules, interpreting the unratified Declaration of
London (1909), also say that neutral vessels or aircraft
transmitting messages on the high seas for a belligerent's
immediate use are deemed to have committed a "hostile act,"
rendering the vessel liable to be fired on or captured.3 43 The

entry of prizes under other than distress conditions-but several nations,
including the United States ratified but reserved with respect to Article 23. See
Hague XIII, supra note 219. Hague XIII, arts. 21-22 are customary law; art. 23 is
not because of U.S. and U.K. reservations now applying to more states through
treaty succession principles. The S.S. Appam, 243 U.S. 124, 150-51 (1917); 3
HYDE, supra note 53, §§ 862, 864; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112, §§ 328a, 333,
345. See also Symposium, supranote 216, at 253; Walker, supra note 216, at 1.
Neutrals must allow belligerent warships entry for asylum, distress, or other
purposes if they comply with innocent passage rules. UNCLOS, supra note 44,
arts. 18-19 (innocent passage in distress, but subject to other rules of
international law, .e., LOAC); Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 230, arts.
1(2), 14; INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 119, para.
21; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 3.2.2.1; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note
112, §§ 343-46; Helsinki Principles2.2, supranote 120, at 502.
339. See supra note 281 and accompanying text. Helsinki Principleswould
require a neutral to "take measures to terminate [a] . . . violation" of rules for
passage and sojourn of warships in neutral territorial waters. Helsinki Principles
2.2, supra note 120, at 502.
This seems to be beyond the Hague law
requirements.
340.

2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112, § 348b.

341.
Hague Radio Rules, supra note 283, art. 5, at 368.
342. Helsinki Principles2.1, supra note 120, at 501; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED,
supra note 37, para. 7.3; 2 O'CONNELL, supranote 44, at 1118-19 (discussing the
Dresden and Altmark incidents); 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112, § 325-25a
(discussing the Altmark incident). See also supra notes 177-81 and accompanying
text (necessity principle as part of the law of self-defense). What is permitted as
lawful intervention into neutral territory pursuant to the LOAC under a state of
necessity theory and what the law of self-defense would allow as legitimate
application of state of necessity are subject to different criteria, even as selfdefense and LOAC proportionality principles may be different in different
situations. See supranotes 175-81 and accompanying text.
343.
Compare Hague Radio Rules, supra note 283, arts. 6(1)-6(2), at 368-69
(transmission of military intelligence for use by a belligerent is deemed a hostile
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Declaration says that neutral vessels receive the same treatment
as if carrying contraband if they are on a voyage for transmitting
intelligence to the enemy, take direct part in hostilities, are under
orders or control of an agent of the enemy government, are in the
enemy government's exclusive employ, or are exclusively engaged
344
in transmitting intelligence in the interest of the enemy.
Nothing in the Radio Rules relieves a belligerent from its
obligation to transmit or prohibit distress signals, messages, or
messages indispensable for navigational safety. 3 45 During the
world wars, neutrals prevented belligerent-flag merchantmen and
warships from transmitting by radio while in their neutral
346
waters.
Hague IV declares that submarine cables, which might carry
Internet messages
as well as telephone
or telegraph
communications, connecting occupied territory with neutral
territory may not be seized or destroyed except in case of absolute
necessity. 3 47 This is limited to land warfare when a belligerent
occupies enemy territory and seizes or destroys landing ends of
cables connecting that territory with a neutral state. 3 48 The 1884
cable convention and later LOS provisions on cables do not apply
during war. 34 9 Although analogies to bridges or mail ships have
been rejected,35 ° and undersea cables are no longer a primary
means of international communications, rules for them may bear
on IW issues:

act), with Final Protocol of Naval Conference, Feb. 26, 1909, arts. 45-46, 208
Consol. T.S. 338, 348, translatedand reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note
221, at 843, 851-52 [hereinafter Declaration of London]. See also 2 LEVIE, supra
note 259, at 821-23, 831-32; Eberlin, supra note 283, at 374. Although reprinted
in the ConsolidatedTreaty Series, the U.K. House of Lords rejected the Declaration
and its signatories never ratified it. SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 221, at 843.
344.
Declaration of London, supra note 343, arts. 45(1), 46, at 851-52. See
also INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 119, paras.
67-69; 2 LEVIE, supranote 259, at 823-24; NWP 1- 14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37,
para. 7.10; 2 O'CONNELL, supra note 44, at 1148-49; TUCKER, supra note 112, at
295, 325-40, 345.
345.
Hague Radio Rules, supra note 283, art. 9. See also Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules of Law with Respect to Assistance and Salvage at Sea,
Sept. 23, 1910, 37 Stat. 1658 (Article 14 declares that it does not apply to
warships); Nordic Neutrality Rules, supra note 130, art. 12(2); Eberlin, supra note
283, at 324.
346. 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112, § 356.
347.
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, art. 54, 36 Stat. 2277, 2308, 205 Consol. T.S. 277.
348.
COLOMBOS, supra note 44, § 569.
349.
UNCLOS, supranote 44, arts. 2(3), 87(1); High Seas Convention, supra
note 44, art. 2; Convention for Protection of Submarine Cables, supra note 306,
art. 15; COLOMBOS, supra note 44, §§ 400, 569; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 44,
§ 311; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112, § 214. See also supra note 306 and
accompanying text.
350.
COLOMBOS, supranote 44, § 575.
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Submarine ...
cables between points in an enemy's territory,
between points in the territories of enemies, between points in the
territory of an enemy and neutral territory or between points in
occupied territory and neutral territory are subject to such
treatment as the necessities of war may require. Submarine ...
cables between two neutral territories should be held inviolable and
as
free from interference.
Attacks are subject to the principles of the military objective,
necessity, proportionality, due regard for other ocean users, and
3
due regard for the environment.

52

If a neutral lays mines off its coasts for self-defense purposes,
it
must observe
the same
rules
and precautions
as
belligerents.3 5 3 Neutrals must notify mariners where mines have
been laid.3 5 4
Mines cannot be laid with the sole object of
intercepting commercial shipping.3 s s Neutrals may remove mines

351.

Id. § 576.

See also INST. OF INT'L LAW, THE LAWS OF NAVAL WAR

GOVERNING THE RELATIONS BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS art. 54 (1913), reprinted in

SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 221, at 857, 867 [hereinafter INST. OF INT'L LAW,
OXFORD NAVAL MANUAL]; U.S. DEP'I OF THE NAVY, supra note 325, para. 520b.

Modem manuals do not analyze the issue thoroughly, probably because of disuse
of cables. INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 119,
para 37; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 1.6, at 24 (discussing
cables in an LOS context). See also supra notes 306, 348-49 and accompanying
text.
352.
Protocol I, supra note 41, arts. 35, 48, 51(1)-51(2), 51(5), 52(2), 57(l)57(4); BOTHE ET AL., supra note 213, at 194, 299, 309-11, 350-57, 359-67; INT'L
INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 119, paras. 34-42, 44,
46; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, paras. 8.1-8.1.3; Helsinki Principles
1.4, 3.1, 4, supra note 120, at 500, 503, 505; supra notes 306-09 and
accompanying text.
LOAC proportionality standards are not necessarily the
standards under the law of self-defense. For example, what is a proportional
response in an anticipatory self-defense situation might not be the same as
proportionality in an attack on the same object during armed conflict.
353.
Cf. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. See also COLOMBOS, supra note 44, § 568;
Thorpe, supra note 231, at 267; supra notes 124, 168-74, 297-301 and
accompanying text.
354.
See supra notes 124, 168-74, 297-301 and accompanying text.
355.
Convention Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact
Mines, Oct. 18, 1907, arts. 2, 4, 36 Stat. 2332, 2343 [hereinafter Hague VIII];
UNCLOS, supra note 44, art. 25(3) (LOS forbids more than temporary suspension
of innocent passage and also requires notice); 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112,
§§ 182a, 363a. See also Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 230, art. 16(3)
(temporary suspension of innocent passage must be published); Corfu Channel
(U.K. v. Alb.), 1947 I.C.J. 7, 22 (Dec. 10); INTL INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN
REMO MANUAL, supra note 119, para. 86 & cmt. 86.2; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED,
supra note 37, paras. 2.3.2.3, 9.2.2. The LOS suspension cannot be permanent.
McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 306, at 593. Hague VIII, supra,generally remains
valid as a restatement of custom applied to all kinds of sea mines. Some states
might dispute applying it to more than automatic contact mines. 2 O'CONNELL,
supra note 44, at 1138; O'CONNELL, supra note 168, at 93 (U.K. admiralty
questioned in 1939 whether Hague Convention VIII of 1907 applied to magnetic
mines); STONE, supra note 112, at 584 (acoustic, magnetic mines literally not
within 1907 Hague Convention's coverage); H.S. Levie, Commentary, in THE LAW OF
NAVAL WARFARE:
A COLLECTION OF AGREEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS WITH
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laid in violation of international law on the high seas-especially if
they hamper shipping, in an EEZ, above the continental shelf, in
areas subject to transit, or in an archipelagic sea lanes
passage.3 5 6 They may not remove them from a belligerent's
territorial waters except to secure free straits transit or
357
archipelagic sea lanes passage.
The Declaration of London tried to define absolute and
conditional contraband, "free goods"-"material not susceptible of
use in war," and items used exclusively for aiding the sick and
wounded. 3 5 8 Commentators and military manuals since then
have tried to carry these principles forward, noting that practice
in the twentieth century led to longer and longer lists of absolute
contraband and recognizing that it has been almost impossible to
make absolute categorizations.3 5 9 The trend has been toward
publishing a list of exempt goods.3 60
The treaty law of
permissible weapons has followed a similar pattern; for example,
with certain exceptions,3 6 1 trends are toward statements of
general principles because treaties prohibiting certain weapons or
methods of warfare have become obsolete before the ink is dry on
the treaty.3 62
Nevertheless, some states have declared

supranote 121, at 140-46 (discussing the "basic defects" of Hague
VIII). U.S. DEP' OF THE NAVY, supra note 325, para. 611 n.3, however, states that
Hague VIII must be extrapolated to include acoustic, magnetic and other new
devices to achieve the goal of protecting peaceful shipping. Levie reports that no
World War I or II belligerent raised the point. H.S. Levie, Mine Warfare and
InternationalLaw, NAVAL WAR C. REV., Apr. 1972, at 27, 29. Whether Hague VIII
applies as treaty law to other mines, its terms can be used as a general principle
with other LOAC general principles like proportionality and necessity to achieve
the same result.
I.C.J. STATUTE art. 38(1); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS §§ 102-03. Cf. U.S. DEPT OF THE NAVY, supra note 325, para. 611 n.3.
An implication from Hague VIII, art. 4, is that the lawful laying of mines by
neutrals cannot be deemed a hostile act. 2 LEVIE, supra note 259, at 794.
356.
See supra notes 293-96 and accompanying text.
COMMENTARIES,

357.

U.N. CHARTER art. 51; INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN

LAW, SAN REMO

MANUAL, supra note 119, para. 92; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para.
9.2.3, at 446; Helsinki Principles6.2, supra note 120, at 515. See also supra notes
124, 168-74, 297-301 and accompanying text.
358.
Declaration of London, supra note 343, arts. 22-29, at 847-49. See
also NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 7.4.1.2 (contraband exemptions
list).
359.

E.g., INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note

119, paras. 147-50; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, paras. 7.4.1, 7.4.1.2;
Helsinki Principles5.2.3-5.2.5, 5.3, supranote 120, at 510-12.
360.
See supra note 359 and accompanying text.
361.
E.g., Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17,
1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65 (exceptions include gas and bacteriological

warfare).
362.
Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Modem Technology and the Law of Armed
Conflict at Sea, in THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 44, at 362, 370
[hereinafter Robertson, Modem Technology].
Cf. Horace B. Robertson, New
Technologies and Armed Conflicts at Sea, 14 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 699, 704
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contraband lists based on the Declaration.3 63 Another trend has
been declaring all imports directly or indirectly sustaining a war
effort as contraband without distinguishing between absolute and
conditional contraband.3 64 This trend follows the Declaration's
Article 46, which says vessels taking a direct3 65part in hostilities
are liable to treatment as carrying contraband.
Besides being subject to high seas visit and search or
diversion,3 6 6 neutral merchantmen must observe duly established
blockades that are notified and are effective and impartial.3 6 7 The
blockade option illustrates a possible operation of overriding U.N.
Charter norms; the Charter provides for an option of "complete or
partial interruption of... sea, ... telegraphic, radio, and
other
3 68
means of communication" among its Article 41 sanctions.

(1988) [hereinafter Robertson, New Technologies]. This may mean that trying to
define IW methods or means that are per se unlawful will fail, particularly when
technology is developing exponentially.
363.
See, e.g., Walker, supra note 198, at 143-44 & n.216 (discussing
Pakistan in 1965).
364.
Declaration of London, supranote 343, at 852.
365.
Compare NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 7.4.1, at 382,
and INTL INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 119, para.
148, at 215-16, with Declaration of London, supra note 343, art. 46, at 852. See
also Helsinki Principles 5.2.5, supra note 120, at 511 (noting that goods for a
neutral destination coming from a belligerent port are not contraband).
366.
See generally INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra
note 119, paras. 116, 118-24, at 192-93; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37,
paras. 7.6-7.6.2; Helsinki Principles5.2.1, 5.2.7, supra note 120, at 509, 511.
367.
INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 119,
paras. 93-104, at 177-81; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, paras. 7.7.17.7.5; Helsinki Principles5.2.10, 5.3, supranote 120, at 513.
368.
U.N. CHARTER art. 41. Article 41 has never been invoked for a
blockade. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 25, 41, 48, 103; THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supranote 83, at 628-36 (using Article 41 proposed only
once); GOODRICH ET AL., supranote 83, at 314-17; GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1,
at 21 (suggesting Article 41's use for cyber blockade); INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN
LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 119, paras. 7-9, at 79-80; Helsinki Principles
1.2, supra note 120, at 499; Scott, supra note 41, at 61. See also NWP 1-14M
ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 7.7.2 & n.131; supra notes 125, 159-64, 190,
194 and accompanying text.
Pacific blockades declared by a state are not lawful in the Charter era as a
threat against the target state. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4); 2 O'CONNELL, supra note
44, at 1157-58 (referring to UN Charter, art. 2(4), and noting that even under
traditional law, a pacific blockade, i.e., a blockade during time of peace, may not
have enough practice to be customary law). See also COLOMBOS, supra note 44,
§§ 484-88B, at 464-70 (hinting at the legality of a pacific blockade); 2 OPPENHEIM,
supra note 112, §§ 44-49, 52b-52e, 521, at 144-50, 159-63, 196-201 (hinting at
the legality of a pacific blockade); U.S. DEP"T OF THE NAVY, supra note 325, para.
632a & n.26. A related method, naval demonstration, i.e., sending warships into
neutral coastal waters to threaten that state, violates Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter, LOS principles governing innocent passage in the territorial sea, and the
LOAC regarding belligerent conduct toward neutrals. UNCLOS, supra note 44,
art. 19, at 404; Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 230, art. 14(4), 15 U.S.T. at
1610, 516 U.N.T.S. at 214; Hague XIII, supra note 219, arts. 1, 5, at 2427;
COLOMBOS, supra note 44, § 489, at 471-72. The Security Council, however, could
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Merchantmen on the high seas also must obey belligerents'
orders to leave an immediate area of naval operations and may
prohibit neutral ships and aircraft from the area of actual
operations.3 6 9 War zones may be declared on the high seas for
neutral ships, provided that they are limited in duration and are
proportional in area to their purpose and that belligerents observe
due regard for neutrals' use of the seas.3 70 Notice of zones must
be given. 3 7 1 A belligerent's establishment of a zone does not
relieve it of other LOAC obligations, such as the prohibition on a
3 72
declarant converting a war zone into a free-fire area.

order a communications interruption, pacific blockade, or naval demonstration as
part of its Articles 25 and 48 decision authority. 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112,
§ 44-49, 52b-52e, 521, at 144-59, 159-63, 196-201. Reprisals involving use of
force, for example firing on a neutral coast or other territory to signal a
belligerent's displeasure with a neutral's conduct, is equally invalid under Article
2(4). See also COLOMBOS, supra note 44, § 491, at 473; supra note 116 and
accompanying text. Displeased belligerents may undertake nonforce reprisals or
retorsions to influence neutral behavior, for example embargo in violation of a
trade treaty or withdrawing diplomatic relations, an unfriendly but lawful act. See
COLOMBOS, supra note 44, §§ 481-83, at 464-65; supra notes 175-76 and
accompanying text. Belligerents may also exclude merchantmen and civil aircraft
from the immediate area of naval operations and may declare war zones in high
seas areas off any nation's coast. See infra notes 369-72 and accompanying text.
There is also nothing wrong with a state's using high seas off a country's coasts
for freedom of navigation and overflight or using high seas areas for naval
exercises, provided due regard is given for other high seas users' rights. See supra
notes 293-96, 306-15, 328 and accompanying text.
369.

INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 119,

para. 108 & cmt. 108.1, at 183; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, paras.
7.8-7.8. 1; Astley & Schmitt, supranote 121, at 154; Helsinki Principles3.3 & cmt.,
supra note 120, at 505. The Helsinki Principlesdeclare: "Neutral ships should be
aware of the risk and peril of operating in areas where active naval hostilities take
place. Belligerents engaged in naval hostilities must, however, take reasonable
precautions including appropriate warnings, if circumstances permit, to avoid
damage to neutral ships." Helsinki Principles 3.2, supra note 120, at 504. This
does not authorize converting a naval operations area into a free-fire zone and
does not change the customary rule that belligerents must warn away neutral
shipping from operational areas. The Helsinki rule might come into play if there is
a chance encounter of belligerent forces.
370.
See supranotes 306-15 and accompanying text.
371.
See supranote 311 and accompanying text.
372.
INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 119,
paras. 105-08, at 181-84; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 7.9;
WALKER, THE TANKER WAR, supra note 108, Part V.F.2; Astley & Schmitt, supra
note 121, at 154; W.J. Fenrick, The Exclusion Zone Device in the Law of Naval
Warfare, 1986 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 91, 124-25 (1986); Helsinki Principles3.3 & cmt.,
supranote 120, at 504; Ross Leckow, The Iran-Iraq Conflict in the Gulf. The Law of
War Zones, 37 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 629 (1988); Vaughan Lowe, The Impact of the
Law of the Sea on Naval Warfare, 14 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 657, 673 (1988);
Roach, supra note 309, at 72. The Helsinki Principles declare: "Neutral ships
should be aware of the risk and peril of operating in areas where active naval
hostilities take place. Belligerents engaged in naval hostilities must, however,
take reasonable precautions including appropriate warnings, if circumstances
permit, to avoid damage to neutral ships." Helsinki Principles3.2, supra note 120,
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Neutral ships acquire enemy character and may be treated as
enemy merchant vessels if they operate directly under enemy
Enemy
control, orders, charter, employment, or direction. 3 73
merchant ships incorporated into or assisting the enemy's
intelligence system in any way, acting as a military or naval
auxiliary, or integrated into the enemy war-fighting or war3 74
-subject
sustaining effort, are liable to attack and destruction

to principles of necessity and proportionality3 7 5 and subject to
3 76
If a neutral merchant ship has
special rules in certain cases.
acquired enemy character, it is subject to these principles,
including capture and perhaps destruction, instead of visit and
search or diversion, a method of determining whether a
3 77

merchantman has enemy character.

While contraband deals

3 78

these rules apply to imports

only with imports for a belligerent,
and exports alike.

Certain enemy-and therefore neutral-vessels

are immune

from capture or possible destruction if they do not lose exempt
status by aiding an enemy. In some instances-for example,
passenger liners, the prohibition may be absolute unless they lose

protected status by acting in a proscribed manner, such as aiding
the enemy.3 7 9 Mail ships may be among these vessels. Hague XI

provides:

at 504. This does not authorize converting these zones into free-fire areas and
does not change the customary rule that belligerents must announce the area and
time of war zones. The Helsinki rule might come into play if there is a chance
encounter of belligerent forces and has no effect on war zone declarations.
INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 119,
373.
paras. 112-17, at 187-95; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supranote 37, para. 7.5.2.
INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 119,
374.
para. 67, at 21-22; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 8.2.2.2; Helsinki
Principles5.1.2(4), supranote 120, at 507.
375.
See supra note 352 and accompanying text.
376.
For example, requirements for placing passengers and crew in safety
before destroying an enemy merchantman. Proc~s-Verbal Relating to the Rules of
Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of the Treaty of London of April 22nd,
1930, Nov. 6, 1936, 3 Bevans 298, 173 L.N.T.S. 353; International Treaty for the
Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armaments, Apr. 22, 1930, art. 22(2), 46 Stat.
2858, 2881, 112 L.N.T.S. 65, 88. See also INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN
REMO MANUAL, supra note 119, para. 151, at 218; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra
note 37, paras. 8.2.2.2, 8.3, 8.4.
INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 119,
377.
paras. 118-24, at 195-201; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, paras. 7.67.6.2.
See supranote 365 and accompanying text.
378.
See generally INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra
379.
note 119, paras. 47-52, 136-40, 146, 151-52, at 16-18, 34-38 (citing treaties and
custom regarding hospital ships; small coastal rescue craft; vessels granted safe
conduct; vessels carrying cultural property; liners carrying only passengers; ships
on religious, nonmilitary scientific or philanthropic missions; small coastal fishing
boats, coastal traders; vessels that have surrendered; life rafts, life boats); NWP 114M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 8.2.3; Helsinki Principles 5.1.2(5)-5.1.2(6),
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[P]ostal correspondence of neutrals or belligerents, whatever its
official or private character may be, found on the high seas on
board a neutral or enemy ship, is inviolable. If the ship is detained,
the correspondence is forwarded by the captor with the least
possible delay.
The[se] provisions . . . do not apply, in case of violation of
blockade, to correspondence destined for or proceeding from a
blockaded port.

[I]nviolability of postal correspondence does not exempt a
mall-ship from the laws and customs of maritime war as to
merchant-ships in general.
The ship, however, may
searched except when absolutely necessary, and then only
38 0
much consideration and expedition as possible.

neutral
neutral
not be
with as

Commentators divide on whether a mail ship exemption reflects
today's law.3 8 ' Even the Hague XI correspondence exemption is
subject to question and limitation because of practice during the
world wars.3 8 2 The Hague Air Rules adopt the naval warfare
rules, whatever they are, for air mail.38 3

If a neutral mail ship

exemption exists in today's law, such a vessel is subject to the
enemy character rules and the consequences those entail. Hague
XI and the general law of naval warfare make that clear. 38 4 The
"consideration and expedition" language of Hague XI, 3 8 5 however,
if it would be considered law today,3 8 6 might be considered an
38 7
early statement of principles of necessity and proportionality.

supra note 120, at 507; infra note 388 and accompanying text. Neutral aircraft
carrying passengers or serving as medical or cartel aircraft are also protected
unless they are serving the enemy. See INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO
MANUAL, supra note 119, paras. 140-45, 153-58, at 36, 38-39; NWP 1-14M
ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 8.2.3; infra note 388 and accompanying text.
380.
Convention Between the United States and Other Powers Relative to
Certain Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval
War, Oct. 18, 1907, arts. 1-2, 36 Stat. 2396 [hereinafter Hague XI].
381.
Compare INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra
note 119, para. 136-136.2, at 206-07 (citing 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112, § 191,
at 341-42), with INST. OF INT'L LAW, OXFORD NAVAL MANUAL, supra note 351, art. 53,
at 866; 2 O'CONNELL, supra note 44, at 1123-24; I.A. Shearer, Commentary, in THE
LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: A COLLECTION OF AGREEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS WITH
COMMENTARIES, supra note 121, at 183, 189; Pietro Verri, Commentary, in THE LAW
OF NAVAL WARFARE: A COLLECTION OF AGREEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS WITH
COMMENTARIES, supra note 121, at 329, 335.
382.
2 OPPENHEIM, supranote 112, § 191, at 480-81.
383.
Hague Air Rules, supra note 221, art. 56, at 216. The Hague Air Rules
are considered customary norms. See supra note 222. This does not answer the
question, however, of what the naval warfare rule is; the Rules may have
incorporated nothing by reference when it comes to neutral mail.
384.
Hague XI, supra note 380, art. 2, 36 Stat. at 2408. See also supra
notes 259-66 and accompanying text.
385.
Hague XI, supranote 380, art. 2, 36 Stat. at 2408.
386.
See supranotes 268-69 and accompanying text.
387.
See supranote 352 and accompanying text.
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Internet-based messages coming to or from exempt vessels or
aircraft, such as hospital ships or medical aircraft, are another
8
problem unless they are in the enemy's service. 38 While hospital
ships, including those of neutrals, may carry and use
communications equipment necessary for movement and
cryptographic
on
restrictions
are
there
navigation,
38 9
communications.
While much of the preceding analysis discusses the rights of
belligerents, it implies correlative duties of neutrals, including the
duty not to sail merchant ships that carry war-fighting or warsustaining goods or to otherwise aid the enemy. The problem for
many neutral ships-government-controlled vessels like hospital
ships aside-is the entrepreneurial nature of worldwide merchant
3 90
however,
shipping. Registration is primarily up to the owner;
and
subcharterers,
charterers,
there are many others, including
the
by
character
enemy
vessel
a
shippers, that can act to give
and
or
owners
to
governments
contracts they sign unbeknownst
charterers further up the line of contracting. 3 9 ' Containerization
offers opportunities,3 92 through false or misleading labeling of
bills of lading,3 93 for "bootstrapping" a vessel into characterization
as an enemy merchantman without the carrier's or owner's (or
the carrier's or owner's government's) being aware of the true
nature of the cargo. The same is true with respect to direction of
merchant shipping; private companies, except in command
economies, control merchant ship destinations once vessels have
been registered. 3 94 Thus the state of registry has very little

See generally, e.g., Second Convention, supra note 213, arts. 22, 29,
388.
39, 6 U.S.T. at 3234, 3236, 3242, 75 U.N.T.S. at 100, 102, 108; INT'L INST. OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 119, paras. 47(a), 48-51, 53(a),
54, 57-58, at 125, 136-43, 145-46; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, paras.
8.2.3, at 413-16, 418; 2 PICTET, supranote 213, at 155-62, 177-78, 215-22.
Second Convention, supra note 213, arts. 34, 35(2), 6 U.S.T. at 3238,
389.
3240, 75 U.N.T.S. at 104, 106; INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL,
supra note 119, para. 171, at 236-37; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37,
para. 8.2.3 & n.67; 2 PICTET, supranote 213, at 189-96; Roach, supranote 309, at
75-76 (criticizing the Manual's analysis).
Cf. UNCLOS, supra note 44, arts. 91-92, at 433; High Seas Convention,
390.
supra note 44, arts. 5-6, 13 U.S.T. at 2315, 450 U.N.T.S. at 84-86; U.N.
Convention on Registration of Ships, Feb. 7, 1986, arts. 1-14, 26 I.L.M. 1229,
1237-43 (1987).
See generally THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW
391.
§§ 8-1 to 8-5, 9-1 to 9-7 (2d ed. 1994).
See generally id. § 8-33.
392.
See generally id. § 8-12 (misleading, inaccurate bills of lading in
393.
commercial context; carrier not required to open sealed containers or boxes to
check internal condition).
See, e.g., Dominant Navigation Ltd. v. Alpine Shipping Co., 1982
394.
American Maritime Cases 1241 (Bauer, Arnold & Berg, Arbs.), LEXIS, Area of
Law-By Topic Library, Amc File (describing how worldwide communications route
and reroute merchant ships). The same is true for naval vessels. Aircraft have
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positive control-apart from blanket directives forbidding certain
carriage or destinations for vessels registered in the state-over
The
where vessels cannot go or what they may not carry.
in
the
highways
of
public
use
like
is
system
shipping
merchant
of
system
the
like
passports
internal
no
are
there
States;
United
the former USSR, and people may travel where they please, carry
what they please (perhaps subject to regulation for freight rates),
and are subject to speed limits and occasional police regulation,
for example, near the scene of an accident.
3. Neutrality and Aerial Warfare
Rights and duties of neutrals during air warfare follow the
same principles for land and naval warfare in some respects.
Aircraft, like ground personnel, are subject to the rule of
inviolability of neutral territory, which includes airspace above
the land and territorial sea.3 9 5 Belligerent aircraft must respect a
neutral's rights and abstain, within a neutral's jurisdiction, from
3 96
committing an act that is a neutral's duty to prevent.
Belligerent military and auxiliary aircraft may not enter neutral
airspace.3 97 Like the rules of naval warfare, neutrals must use
the means at their disposal to prevent belligerent military aircraft
from entering neutral jurisdiction and compelling the aircraft to
land if they have entered. 3 98 A neutral must use means at its
disposal to intern a belligerent military aircraft that has landed,

radio communications and can be rerouted, but there are usually fewer options
because of fuel constraints.
See supra notes 295-96 and accompanying text.
395.
Hague Air Rules, supra note 221, art. 39, at 214. See also Nordic
396.
Neutrality Rules, supra note 130, art. 9(1), 188 L.N.T.S. at 301, 309, 315, 321,
329; U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, supranote 26 1, para. 2-6c.
Maritime Neutrality Convention, supra note 128, art. 14, 47 Stat. at
397.
1993; General Declaration, supra note 130, paras. 3(a), 3(), at 605; Hague AiRules, supra note 221, art. 40, at 214; Nordic Neutrality Rules, supra note 130,
art. 8, 188 L.N.T.S. at 301, 309, 315, 321, 329 (air ambulances excepted); INT'L
INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 119, para. 18, at 97;
NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 7.3.7; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112,
§ 341a, at 341-42; U.S. DEPI OF THE AIR FORCE, supra note 261, para. 2-6c.
During World War II neutrals prohibited belligerent military aircraft entry. 11
WHITEMAN, supra note 112, at 357-58.
Compare Hague Air Rules, supra note 221, art. 42, at 214, with Hague
398.
XIII, supra note 219, art. 25, 36 Stat. at 2432; INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW,
SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 119, para. 18; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note
37, para. 7.3.7.1 (neutrals "have an affirmative duty to prevent violation of neutral
airspace by belligerent military aircraft, to compel offending aircraft to land, and
to intem... aircraft and crew"); 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112, § 341a. See also
Hague V, supranote 219, art. 5, 36 Stat. at 2323 (land warfare; neutral "must not
allow" belligerents' troop movements across its territory); LEVIE, supra note 259, at
825. General Declaration, supra note 130, at 605, seems to impose an absolute
duty ("shall prevent").
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together with passengers and crew, and to prevent its and the
crew's departure in a condition to make a hostile attack against
the belligerent's enemy.3 9 9 If a belligerent orders an aircraft from
a company or person in neutral territory, the neutral must
prescribe a route for the aircraft away from the neighborhood of
military operations of the belligerent's opponent and "must exact
whatever guarantees may be required to ensure that the aircraft
follows the route prescribed," 4 0° a distinction from land warfare
40

rules. 1
A neutral also must "take such steps as the means at its
disposal permit to prevent within its jurisdiction aerial
observation of the movements, operations or defenses of one
belligerent, with the intention of informing the other
4 °2
belligerent."
As in the case of war on land, a neutral's actions in using
force or other means at its disposal to exercise its rights or duties
cannot be regarded as a hostile act. 4 ° 3 Furthermore, as in the
case of naval force intrusions into neutral territory under Hague
XIII, the Hague Air Rules drafters of 1923 probably recognized
that not all countries had means to drive off intruding belligerent
military aircraft or to intern aircraft and occupants. Perhaps
some states did not have the means to detect intruding aircraft.
As in the case of land and sea incursions, commentators say that
if a neutral is unable or unwilling to prevent unlawful belligerent
military aircraft entry or use of its airspace, opposing belligerent
forces may take enforcement measures as circumstances
4 04
require.

General Declaration, supra note 130, para. 3(Q, at 606; Hague Air
399.
Rules, supra note 221, arts. 42, 46, at 214. Cf. Hague XIII, supra note 219, art.
24, 36 Stat. at 2432 (stating "[i]f, notwithstanding the notification of the neutral
Power, a belligerent ship of war does not leave a port where it is not entitled to
remain, the neutral Power is entitled to take such measures as it considers
necessary to render the ship incapable of taking the sea during the war. ... ").
See also 2 LEVIE, supra note 259, at 826; U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, supra note
261, para. 2-6c (mandating detaining the aircraft and crew); supra notes 281, 398
and accompanying text.
General Declaration, supra note 130, para. 3(f), at 605; Hague Air
400.
Rules, supranote 221, art. 46, at 214.
OPPENHEIM, supra note 112, § 335a, at 717.
401.
Hague Air Rules, supra note 221, art. 47, at 215. See also Nordic
402.
Neutrality Rules, supranote 130, art. 13, 188 L.N.T.S. at 303; 2 LEVIE, supra note
259, at 827; HarvardDraft Neutrality Convention, supranote 281, art. 6, at 245.
Compare Hague Air Rules, supra note 221, art. 48, at 215, with Hague
403.
V, supra note 219, art. 10, 36 Stat. at 2324, and Hague XIII, supra note 219, art.
26, 36 Stat. at 2433 ("unfriendly act"). See also supra notes 281, 398 and
accompanying text.
INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 119,
404.
para. 18; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 7.3.7.1; TUCKER, supra
note 112, at 251; U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, supra note 261, para. 2-6c; U.S.
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Belligerent aircraft may conduct visit and search and
diversion operations involving neutral shipping, perhaps in
cooperation with warships. 40 5 Neutral aircraft are subject to visit
and search and diversion, and possible destruction, by
belligerents. 40 6 Perhaps reflecting the futility and controversy of
the Great War in publishing advance lists of absolute contraband
as the prewar Declaration of London commanded, the 1923 Air
40 7
Rules just say it is liable to destruction.
Like naval warfare principles, the Air Rules allow a
belligerent's force commander to prohibit neutral aircraft from
passing in immediate vicinity of the commander's forces or to
make the aircraft follow a particular route, if the commander
considers the aircraft is likely to prejudice success of military
operations. 40 8
If a notified aircraft refuses to comply, the
belligerent may fire on it.40 9 If a neutral aircraft flies over a
belligerent's territory and is warned of an opposing belligerent's
military aircraft approaching, the neutral plane must make the
4 10
nearest available landing or risk being fired on.
Although it is not part of the law of naval warfare, the LOS
provides that any country can declare a zone of the high seas for

DEPt OF THE NAVY, supra note 325, para. 444b. See also supra notes 177-82, 280
and accompanying text.
405.
See generally INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra
note 119, paras. 118-19; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 7.6.2. See
also supra notes 366, 377 and accompanying text. These operations cannot be
conducted over neutral territory. Nordic Neutrality Rules, supra note 130, art.
9(2), 188 L.N.T.S. at 301, 309, 315, 321, 329. See also supra notes 261, 334-39,
397 and accompanying text.
406.
Hague Air Rules, supra note 221, arts. 49-60, at 215-17; INT'L INST. OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 119, paras. 125-34. See also
supra notes 366, 377 and accompanying text.
407.
Compare Hague Air Rules, supra note 221, art. 60, at 216-17, uith
Declaration of London, supra note 343, art. 22, at 847-48. See also supra notes
358-65, 378 and accompanying text.
408.
Hague Air Rules, supranote 221, art. 30, at 212.
409.
Compare id. (aircraft entering area of immediate air operations subject
to "damages" from hostilities), with INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO
MANUAL, supra note 119, para. 108 & cmt. 108.1; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra
note 37, paras. 7.8-7.8. 1; U.S. DEPr OF THE AIR FORCE, supra note 261, para. 2-6b
(belligerents cannot deny neutral aircraft access to international airspace even if
bound for enemy territory). See also supra note 369 and accompanying text. The
Helsinki Principlesdeclare: "Neutral ships should be aware of the risk and peril of
operating in areas where active naval hostilities take place. Belligerents engaged
in naval hostilities must, however, take reasonable precautions including
appropriate warnings, if circumstances permit, to avoid damage to neutral ships."
Helsinki Principles3.2, supra note 120, at 504. This does not authorize converting
an area of naval operations, and by extension air operations, into a free-fire area
and does not change the customary rule that belligerents must warn away neutral
aircraft from operational areas. Id. The Helsinki standard might come into play if
there is a chance encounter of belligerent forces with neutral platforms.
410.
Hague Air Rules, supra note 221, art. 35, at 213. See also 2 LEvIE,
supra note 259, at 827.
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conducting naval maneuvers, including dangerous activities such
as air operations and gunnery practice, as distinguished from
belligerent operations. 4 1 1 This is part of countries' freedoms of
the seas. The military force user must give due notice of the
operations. 4 12 Unlike the LOAC rule allowing a belligerent's
commander to exclude shipping from an immediate area of
belligerent naval operations, 4 13 the LOS allows ships flagged
under other states to use this area, and naval forces and other
high seas users must have due regard for others' freedom of the
seas rights. 4 14 Neutrals and belligerents alike can use the high
the
seas for this purpose during war as well. In the latter case
4 15
LOAC may impact through the LOS "other rules" principle.
War zones may be declared on the high seas for neutral
aircraft as well as for neutral ships, provided they are limited in
duration, are proportional in area to their purpose, and
belligerents observe due regard for neutrals' use of the seas.
Notice of them must be given. A belligerent's establishing a zone
does not relieve it of other LOAC obligations. A war zone cannot
be used as a free-fire area. Neutrals or belligerents may declare
affecting aircraft; these also cannot be
high seas defense zones
416
used as free-fire areas.
4. The Law of Neutrality is Not Lost in Space
Internet communications may implicate satellite or other
space vehicle links, and therefore IW may have a space
component. 4 17 However, the space conventions declare that

411. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 2.4.3.1. See also supra
412.
note 311 and accompanying text.
See supra note 369 and accompanying text.
413.
414. See supra notes 293, 306-09, 328 and accompanying text.
415.
See supranotes 230-31, 302-05 and accompanying text.
416. See supranotes 316-24, 328, 372 and accompanying text.
417. OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, supra note 233, at 30-33, lists these
treaties with information systems or IW ramifications: Treaty Banning Nuclear
Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, Aug. 5,
1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 298, 18
U.S.T. at 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. at 205; Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the
Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr.
22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue & Return
Agreement]; Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter
Liability Convention]; Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer
Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration
Convention]; ENMOD, supra note 298, 31 U.S.T. at 333, 1108 U.N.T.S. at 151;
Moon Treaty, supranote 298, 1363 U.N.T.S. at 3; Treaty on the Limitation of AntiBallistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.S.R.-U.S., 23 U.S.T. 3435. See also
Aldrich, supra note 1, at 254-55; supra notes 50, 54 and accompanying text.
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outer space must be used for peaceful purposes, and
furthermore,
outer space is the common heritage
of
humankind. 4 18
To the extent that the proposition that the
peaceful purposes principle does not preclude military operations
in space, 4 19 outer space treaty law offers little guidance on the
law of neutrality.
In common with all treaties, the space
conventions may be trumped by the U.N. Charter and its
provisions in Article 2(4), by the right of self-defense, by Security
Council decisions, 420 and by jus cogens norms, which may
include self-defense. 4 2 1 Principles from the law of treaties may
apply including fundamental breach, impossibility, fundamental
change of circumstances, and war's termination or suspension of
treaties. 4 2 2 One feature of space law common with the LOS, and
perhaps air law, is a requirement that outer space users must
have due regard for others' rights; extending this principle during
war in space to the LOAC should follow the maritime warfare
423
model.

418.
Moon Treaty, supra note 298, art. 3, 1363 U.N.T.S. at 23; Outer Space
Treaty, supra note 298, art. 4, 18 U.S.T. at 2413-14, 610 U.N.T.S. at 208. The
concept began with the Antarctic Treaty. See generally Antarctic Treaty, supra
note 298, 12 U.S.T. at 794, 402 U.N.T.S. at 71. See also supra notes 298, 417
and accompanying text.
419.
J.E.S. FAWCETT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USES OF OUTER SPACE 34-36
(1968). Cheng, while arguing that the view of the U.S. and other States that the
space treaties' peaceful purposes language means only a prohibition on aggression
in space is wrong and that the peaceful purposes clauses mean no military use of
space or space objects, concedes that the clauses are not clear and need
definition, perhaps in a future agreement. BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL
SPACE LAW 368, 413, 513-22, 528, 533, 650-52 (1997). Nowhere, however, does
Cheng consider the impact of Article 103 of the U.N. Charter and the right of selfdefense under Article 105 of the U.N. Charter. See id. See also supra notes 18384 and accompanying text.
420.
U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(4), 25, 48, 51, 103. See also FAWCETT, supra note
419, 3, 34-35, 37-40; MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 325, at 295-97, 403; supra
notes 124, 168-74, 297-301 and accompanying text.
421.
Vienna Convention, supra note 44, arts. 53, 64, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 344,
347. See also supra notes 166, 227 and accompanying text.
422.
Vienna Convention, supra note 44, arts. 60-62, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 34647. See also supra notes 223-36 and accompanying text (noting that war cannot
suspend obligations under the LOAC, neutrality law or humanitarian law). The
same caveat applies in the space arena. Vienna Convention, supra note 44, art.
62, 1155 U.N.S.T. at 347.
423.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 298, art. 9, 610 U.N.T.S. at 209-10.
See also supra notes 306-09, 328 and accompanying text.
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Perhaps the chief value of space law is the models
commentators advocated when there was a near-vacuum in
black-letter law. For example, commentators suggested that the
LOS, 4 2 4

air law,4 2 5

the LOAC, 4 2 6

and perhaps

admiralty

and

427

maritime law
may be analogized to space law issues when
there were no treaties, custom, or principles dealing specifically
with space law. 42 8 Since these commentators wrote, treaties have
entered the field to supply standards and rules. 4 29 The concept
of looking to other areas of international law, however, such as

the LOS or the law of naval and air warfare, remains for filling
1
43
gaps. 43 0 The process for cyberspace may have already begun.

424.
E.g., CHENG, supranote 419, at 31-51; FAWCETT, supra note 419, at 20,
61, 66 (discussing Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 230, 499 U.N.T.S. at
311; Fishery Convention, supra note 230, 17 U.S.T. at 138, 559 U.N.T.S. at 285;
High Seas Convention, supra note 44, 13 U.S.T. at 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. at 82);
McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 325, at 230, 295, 298-99, 300, 302, 657, 669
(discussing Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 230, 499 U.N.T.S. at 311;
High Seas Convention, supra note 44, 13 U.S.T. at 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. at 82;
Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 230, 15 U.S.T. at 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. at
205; temporary closure of high seas area for military maneuvers or weapon
testing; and the 'floating territory" concept, jurisdiction, and immunities); IRVIN L.
WHITE, DECISION-MAKING FOR SPACE: LAW AND POLITICS IN AIR, SEA AND OUTER SPACE
61-100 (1970). But see Oscar Schachter, Remarks, 1986 PROC. AM. SOCY' INT'L L.
368, 375-76 (commenting on Outer Space Treaty, supra note 298, 18 U.S.T. at
2410, 610 U.N.T.S. at 205).
425.
E.g., FAWCETT, supra note 419, at 31 (discussing Chicago Convention,
supra note 296); MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 325, at 307-10, 578-79, 584-85,
590, 592, 594-95, 606-20, 622-24, 657, 684, 694, 713-14, 716-17, 725-27
(discussing ADIZs; aircraft in distress principles; Chicago Convention; Convention
on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface; draft aerial
collision convention); WHITE, supra note 424, at 10 1-120.
426.
E.g., McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 325, at 299 (discussing neutralproclaimed defense zones).
427.
E.g., id. at 610-13, 620-23 629-31, 705-06, 708-24 (nuclear-powered
merchant ship accident liability; use of nautical rules of the road; collision,
pollution, personal injury principles (citing Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571
[1953]); jurisdiction and immunity).
428.
Registration Convention, supranote 418, at 16-19.
429.
E.g., id.; Liability Convention, supra note 417, 24 U.S.T. at 2389, 961
U.N.T.S. at 187; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 298, arts. 6-8, 18 U.S.T. at 2410,
610 U.N.T.S. at 205.
430.
E.g., CHENG, supra note 419, at 640-50; Paul G. Dembling, Some
Thoughts About Sovereign Rights Arising from Space Activities, 1994 PROC. AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. 259, 260, 262-64; Stephen Gorove, Remarks, 1987 PRoc. AM. Socly
INT'L L. 505, 506; N. Jasentuliyana, Remarks, 1986 PROC. AM. Soc'y INT'L L. 368,
369, 373.

See also J.N. SINGH,

OUTER SPACE, OUTER SEA, OUTER LAND, AND

INTERNATIONAL LAW 103-05, 238-39 (1987) (proposing an Outer Space Organization
to manage these issues).
431.
See Dunne, supra note 6, at 12-15 (discussing contract theory to
combat computer intrusions).
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5. Conclusions: The Current State of the Law of Neutrality
The current state of the law of neutrality, as it applies in any
context, raises issues of degrees of neutrality-permanent
neutrality, distinguished from ad hoc neutrality, circumstances of
neutrality for countries proclaiming neutrality on an ad hoc basis,
and different responses for states, depending on the modality of
warfare-land, sea, air, or space-and geographic location for the
situation-high seas or territorial waters. Neutrals retain rights
of self-defense and other lawful responses, including reprisals not
involving use of force or retorsions. As incidents of the right of
self-defense, they may establish temporary self-defense zones
around their naval and air forces on the high seas, join defensive
alliances if their national neutrality policies allow it, and
otherwise protect their territorial integrity through self-defense
measures. They may claim state of necessity against other states
as an incident of self-defense.
Neutrals, like all states, are
subject to the law of the sea, including the right of intervention to
prevent high seas pollution. They may proclaim ADIZs. Like all
states, neutrals may not violate the territorial integrity or political
independence of other countries, however.
Neutrals, like all states, are subject to the LOAC and
humanitarian law as it applies to them. In LOS situations, they
are subject to the other rules and due regard principles. Law of
treaties doctrines, such as rules for treaties during war, also
apply to them.
The general rule is that belligerents may not commit hostile
acts in neutral territory or above neutral territory in air war;
neutral territory includes neutrals' territorial seas and the
airspace above them. A neutral must prevent belligerents' use of
its land territory and must use means at its disposal to prevent
belligerents' use of its territorial sea, airspace, or land for
maritime or aerial warfare. There are specific rules for telephonic
or telegraph communications and facilities, including undersea
cables; belligerents' warships in neutral territorial waters; high
seas mining; neutrals' and belligerents' rights and duties
concerning blockade, high seas visit and search, and contraband;
and immunity of certain classes of vessels from capture or
destruction while fulfilling their mission.
Belligerents may
exclude neutral ships from an immediate area of naval and air
operations on the high seas, and they may proclaim war zones to
warn all shipping of danger in a high seas area. They must have
due regard for neutral interests in sea areas like the EEZ and
must have due regard for the maritime environment. The law of
air warfare has correlative rules for visit and search of aircraft,
and a belligerent force commander may prohibit neutral aircraft
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from passing in the immediate vicinity of the commander's forces
on land or sea. Although space law has developed few rules for
neutrality situations, war in space should follow norms of these
older modes in analogous situations. Given the fluidity of the
space medium, and the same characteristic of IW using the
Internet, should not the same principle of derivation by analogy
be employed?
IV. APPLYING PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DEFENSE, CHARTER

LAW, AND THE LAW OF NEUTRALITY TO INFORMATION
WARFARE (IW) SITUATIONS

The law of warfare has little, if any, direct reference to
problems of armed conflict involving IW. The Charter applies
across the board to all treaties and perhaps customary law,
too. 43 2 Jus cogens principles apply to treaties and perhaps to
customary norms. 4 33 Although there are a few treaties with some
bearing on transmitting of information, such as Hague V and XIII,
in most cases analysis must proceed from general custom,
general principles, and analysis by analogy. General principles of
law occupy an anomalous position among sources of
international law. Although the Statute of the International Court
of Justice lists them among primary sources that may be cited in
cases before the Court,43 4 and some commentators include them
among primary sources for deriving rules of law,43 S others accord
them secondary status, perhaps as gap-filers. 43 6 Whichever view
one might take, in a new and fast-moving area of the law where
there are few guideposts, the only available sources may be
general principles of law and commentators' discussions of
them. 4 37 Resort to these latter sources is suggested.
What then should be the method of analysis for IW issues?

432.

U.N. CHARTER art. 103, para. 10.

See also supra notes 124, 166 and

accompanying text.
433.
Vienna Convention, supra note 44, arts. 53, 64, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 344,
347. See also supra note 166.
434.
I.C.J. STATUTE art. 38(1).
435.
E.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 1-25; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 112,
§§ 9-14; U.S. DEP'r OF THE AIR FORCE, supra note 261, para. 1-3.a.
436.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102(4); GERHARD VON
GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS:

AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 20-21

(6th ed. 1992); SCHACHTER, supra note 168, at 50-55. Cf. NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED,
supra note 37, paras. 5.4-5.4.2 (recognition of custom and treaties).
437.
Nearly all sources agree that qualified scholars are only a secondary
source, or are evidence of rules of law. I.C.J. STATUTE art. 38(1)(d); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 103(2)(c); BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 24; 1
OPPENHEIM, supra note 44, § 14; VON GLAHN, supra note 436, at 21. But see, e.g.,
NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supranote 37, paras. 5.4-5.4.2 (only custom and treaties
recognized).
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The first and primary rule should be application of U.N.
Security Council decisions 4 38 and mandatory Charter norms,
such as the right of self-defense, with its limitations of necessity,
proportionality for reaction in self-defense, and admitting of no
other alternative in anticipatory self-defense situations. 43 9 The
next level of analysis should be application of jus cogens norms,
to the extent that they exist and apply in analogous IW
The third level should employ the mixture of
situations. 440
treaties, custom, etc. that must apply in specific neutrality
situations. For example, if Hague V and XIII principles applicable
to telecommunications are customary law, they should be
applied, perhaps alongside general LOAC principles such as
necessity and proportionality in a given situation, except where
there is a prohibitory rule, such as the prohibition on first use of
poison gas, for which there can be no proportionality or necessity
qualifications. 4 4 1 In applying these principles to transmitting
Internet messages, states will indirectly affect Internet use, as
well as the use of other messages sent through the Internet. The
fact that cables may be used for Internet-based messages, as well
as traditional telephone or telegraph messages, 4 4 2 can be factors
for necessity and proportionality, for example.
Where there is no "hard law"-black-letter rules governing
conduct, resort must be had to general customary LOAC
and
objective,
necessity
military
including
principles,
proportionality, which may be different from similar principles to
be observed in self-defense responses. 4 43 The content of the law
for these situations might be informed by analogies from custom,
treaties, and principles applied in the law of land, sea, air and
space law. As will be seen, the LOS, the law of naval warfare, and
the law of aerial warfare may offer the most and best analogies for
neutrals in IW situations.
A. Problems Related to CharterLaw, Self-Defense,
and Related Issues in 1W Situations
Because of the nature of the Internet, with its potential for
messages silently crossing neutrals' national borders and into

438.
U.N. CHARTER arts. 25, 48, 103 (Council decisions). Nonmandatory
U.N. resolutions should carry the same weight they do in other circumstances.
See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
439.
U.N. CHARTER arts. 51, 103. This is particularly true if the right to selfdefense is a jus cogens norm. See also supra notes 124, 166, 168-74 and
accompanying text.
See supranote 166 and accompanying text.
440.
See supranotes 352, 441 and accompanying text.
441.
442.
See supranotes 347-52 and accompanying text.
443.
See supra notes 168-74, 352 and accompanying text.
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4
space and back again, (perhaps through the sender's country), "5
the possibly ambiguous identity of those who would use it4
against sovereign countries, 4 4 6 and methods of attack and

responses to them, 44 7 there may be more questions than firm
answers in analysis of the law of the U.N. Charter, self-defense,
and related issues.
Is an Internet message carrying a computer attack against a
neutral's territorial integrity, including facilities that would be
considered part of its territory, a violation of territorial
It has been argued that prior encroachments on
integrity? 4 48
another state's territory "have been physical intrusions by troops,
ships, or planes. Attacking a neutral's networks, satellites, or
computers might not violate the [neutral] state's neutrality
because it might involve no physical encroachment (and might
not even constitute an 'attack' in the first place.)" 4 49 Are facilities
that are attacked within the meaning of "territory" in the
Charter? 45 0 Is an Internet-propelled message carrying an attack
against a neutral's political independence, such as its election
45 2
i
process, 4 5 a violation of that neutral's political independence?
What is "attack" or "aggression" that might trigger a selfdefense or Security Council response? 45 3 How can an attack or

aggressive action meriting response under international law be
or frivolous
blundering, accidental
distinguished from a
intrusion? 4 5 4 What about hackers who camouflage their attacks

444.
445.

See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 53-54, 69 and accompanying text.

446.

U.N. CHARTER art. 2(1).

See also supra note 199 and accompanying

text.
447. See supra notes 53-54, 69-79 and accompanying text.
448. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(4), 103. See also GREENBERG ET AL., supra
note 1, at 26; Aldrich, supra note 1, at 242-43; supra notes 116, 124, 166, 180
and accompanying text.
449.
GREENBERG ET AL., supranote 1, at 27.
450. For example, banking and stock markets are not considered legitimate
LOAC targets. See Scott, supra note 41, at 59 (distinguishing between private
bank accounts and state accounts). But see Molander et al., supra note 22, at
254, 257, 262-63; supra note 22 and accompanying text; infra note 492 and
accompanying text. Might they be considered part of territory for U.N. Charter,
art. 2(4), purposes? See supranotes 116, 180 and accompanying text. If Charter
law may differ from customary or treaty-based LOAC principles, or if the law of
U.N. resolutions (for example Security Council decisions under U.N. Charter, arts.
25, 48, 103) may impose conditions different from the LOAC for the same
situation, might a different definition of territory for Internet-based attacks be
applied?
451.
See supranotes 22-23, 166, 180 and accompanying text.
452.
See U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(4), 103. See also GREENBERG ET AL., supra
note 1, at 64; supra notes 116, 124, 166, 180 and accompanying text.
See U.N. CHARTER arts. 25, 39-40, 48, 51, 103. See also GREENBERG ET
453.
AL., supra note 1, at 27, 83-84; Aldrich, supra note 1, at 225-26, 231, 236-37;
supra notes 116, 124, 166, 168-74, 180 and accompanying text.
454. See Khalilzad, supra note 13, at 424.
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as blunders? 45 5 How can attackers be identified? 45 6 Are non4s 7
state attackers comprehended within the self-defense rubric?
Economic coercion is not aggression within the meaning of the
Charter; is attacking a neutral's central banking system or
securities markets an attack or aggression within the meaning of
the Charter? 45 8 Put more generally, what is use of force? What
45 9
are illegal uses of force, acts of aggression, or acts of war?
What are standards for necessity; proportionality; and, in the
case of anticipatory self defense, a situation admitting of no other

455.
See id. at 426.
456.
See Aldrich, supra note 1, at 235-36.
457.
See, e.g., SHARP, supra note 1, at 219, 225-26 (identifying inter alia
individual or group terrorists as potentially proper objects of U.S. proportionate
response if they display hostile intent or commit hostile acts); U.S. CHAIRMAN OF
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, INSTRUCTION 3121.01: STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

FOR U.S. FORCES, Encl. A, paras. 5e, 5f (1994), reprinted in NWP 1-14M
ANNOTATED, supra note 37, at 277, 281-82 [hereinafter CJCS, INSTRUCTION
3121.01]; Aldrich, supra note 1, at 236; supra notes 175-81 and accompanying
text.
See GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 27, 84-85; Scott, supra note 41,
458.
at 59. Molander et al. state that strategic IW "tools and techniques present a twopronged threat to U.S. security":
1.

2.

A Threat to U.S. National Economic Security: the holding at risk
to massive disruption of infrastructure targets critical to the U.S.
A successful SIW attack on one or more
economy.
infrastructures could produce a strategically significant result,
including public loss of confidence in the delivery of services
from those infrastructures with a resulting loss of confidence in
the government.
the
A Threat against the U.S. National Military Strategy:
possibility that a regional adversary might use SIW threats or
attacks to deter or disrupt U.S. power-projection plans in a
regional crisis. Targets of concern include infrastructures in the
United States . . . vital to overseas force deployment and
comparable targets in allied countries. A key ally or coalition
member under such attack might refuse to join a coalition-or
worse, quit one in the middle of a war.

Molander et al., supra note 22, at 254. This view would, therefore, seem to differ
with Scott to say that attacks on central banks or securities markets would be an
attack like those on military components that traditionally have been held to allow
response in self-defense. See Scott, supra note 41, at 57. Sharp is even more
straightforward: "Any computer network attack that intentionally causes any
destructive effect within the sovereign territory of another state is an unlawful use
of force within the meaning of [U.N. Charter,] Article 2(4) that may produce the
effects of an armed attack prompting the right of self-defense." SHARP, supra note
1, at 133. See also id. at 82, 88-92 (economic coercion within parameters of U.N.
Charter, art. 2[41). The U.S. peacetime rules of engagement ROE seem to make
the same claim. See CJCS, INSTRUCTION 3121.01, supra note 457, Encl. A, paras.
5e, 5f, reprintedin NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, at 277, 281-82; SHARP,
supra note 1, at 219, 225-26. For an analysis of ROE, see infra notes 462-70 and
accompanying text.
Aldrich, supranote 1, at 225-26, 231, 235-36.
459.
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Does anticipatory self-defense include an
alternative? 46 0
"automatic," pre-programmed response decided in advance and
Countries may
sent automatically when a hack arrives?
legitimately plan for self-defense responses 4 6 1 and may establish
rules of engagement (ROE),4 62 including methods of self-defense
responses. For example, consistent with U.S. policy that includes
a possibility of anticipatory self-defense response, 4 63 U.S.
peacetime ROE 4 6 4 contemplate responses to other states' actions
in hostile intent situations, 4 65 in addition to hostile act cases,

See U.N. CHARTER arts. 51, 103; GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 87460.
89; supra notes 124, 166, 168-74 and accompanying text.
461.
See Walker, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J., supra note 139, at 369; Walker, in
THE LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, supra note 139, at 392.

Rules of engagement (ROE) state options for, and possibly limits on,
462.
actions a commander or other decision-maker may take in armed conflict or other
situations, for example in self-defense circumstances. They are a mix of policy,
law, diplomacy, and operational needs but cannot exceed the limits of the law. In
U.S. practice commanders are strongly reminded of their duty to defend their
ship, unit, force, etc., and other U.S. forces in the vicinity, Le., to exercise selfdefense, including anticipatory self-defense, pursuant to U.S. policy. See CJCS,
INSTRUCTION 3121.01, supra note 457, Encl. A, para. 2a, reprinted in NWP 1-14M
ANNOTATED, supra note 37, at 279; BRADD C. HAYES, NAVAL RULES OF ENGAGEMENT:
MANAGEMENT TOOLS FOR CRISIS (1989); NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, at

xxxvi-xxxvii, paras. 3.11.5.1, 4.3.2.2, 5.5; SHARP, supra note 1, at 222; Richard J.
Grunawalt, The JCS StandingRules of Engagement: A JudgeAdvocate's Primer,42
AIR FORCE L. REV. 245 (1997); J. Ashley Roach, Rules of Engagement, NAVAL WAR
C. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1983, at 46, reprinted in 14 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 865

(1988); Ivan Shearer, Rules of Engagement and the Implementation of the Law of
Naval Warfare, 14 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 767 (1988).

463. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
464. The United States has separate war ROE. These are not published, for
security reasons, but "reaffirm the right and responsibility of the operational
commander generally to seek out, engage, and destroy enemy forces consistent
with national objectives, strategy, and the law of armed conflict." NWP 1-14M
ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 5.5. See also Christopher Craig, Fighting by the
Rules, NAVAL WAR C. REV., May-June, 1984, at 23 (U.K. ROE during 1982
Falklands-Malvinas War); Grunawalt, supra note 462, at 245; Roach, supra note
462, NAVAL WAR C. REV. at 49, SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. at 869.

States may

also have peacekeeping or peacemaking operations ROE. See generally Stephen
A. Rose, Crafting the Rules of Engagement for Haiti, in THE LAW OF MILITARY
OPERATIONS: LIBER AMICORUM PROFESSOR JACK GRUNAWALT, supranote 139, at 225.
CJCS, INSTRUCTION 3121.01, supra note 457, Encl. A, para. Sf,
465.

reprinted in NWP 1-14M
intent as:

ANNOTATED,

supranote 37, at 282. Sharp defines hostile

[T]he threat of imminent use of force by a foreign force or terrorist unit
(organization or individual) against the United States, U.S. forces, and in
certain circumstances, U.S. citizens, their property, U.S. commercial
assets, or other designated non-U.S. forces, foreign nationals and their
When hostile intent is present, the right exists to use
property.
proportional force, including armed force, in self-defense by all necessary
means available to deter or neutralize the potential attacker or, if
necessary, to destroy the threat ....
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such as actual attack or other use of force. 4 66 Can planning and
ROE include rapid, automatic responses, given the speed that
Internet attacks can debilitate vital national systems? 4 6 7 Today
commercial Internet service providers offer screeners to dump
unwanted e-mails automatically; 468 if so, can governments use
similar screeners, among other defenses like firewalls, 4 6 9 to
automatically respond to hackers? 470 Will this kind of procedure
increase risk of mistakes like the Airbus tragedy during the
Tanker War 4 7 1 with worldwide
consequences,
including
diplomatic, national political-recall Vietnam War protests within
the United States, legal, economic, and other consequences? 47 2

supra note 1, at 94-95, 226. Sharp and Instruction 3121.01 remind
commanders of an overriding obligation to defend their ship(s), unit(s), etc., and
other U.S. forces in the vicinity. CJCS, INSTRUCTION 3121.01, supra note 457,
Encl. A, para. 2a, reprinted in NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, at 279;
SHARP, supranote 1, at 222. See also supranotes 175-81, 457 and accompanying
text.
466.
CJCS, INSTRUCTION 3121.01, supra note 457, Encl. A, para. 5e,
reprinted in NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supranote 37, at 281. "Hostile act" has been
defined as:
SHARP,

[A]n attack or other use of force by a foreign force or terrorist unit
(organization or individual) against the United States, U.S. forces, and in
certain circumstances, US citizens, their property, U.S. commercial assets,
and other designated U.S. forces, foreign nationals and their property. It is
also force used directly to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of
U.S. forces, including the recovery of U.S. personnel and vital U.S.
Government property. When a hostile act is in progress, the right exists to
use proportional force, including armed force, in self-defense, by all
necessary means available to deter or neutralize the potential attacker or,
if necessary, to destroy the threat....
SHARP, supranote 1, at 94, 226. See also supra note 465 and accompanying text.
467.
See supranotes 22-24, 77 and accompanying text.
468.
For example, my service provider does so. It declared through its email system that it had stopped the "I love you" virus. See supra note 20 and
accompanying text.
469.
See supra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
470.
Khalilzad suggests:
[Oince one suspects that a particular machine might have been used for an
attack ....
one might be able to insert a code into the suspect group's
machine to perform intelligence gathering on line. Such a code, for
example, could make a special record of outgoing connections to systems
... and periodically send them to a[n] . . . intelligence officer. This officer
then compares them to tactical warnings of break-ins.
Khalilzad, supra note 13, at 431.
Such warning measures would require
supplementation by traditional intelligence gathering. See id.
471.
See David K. Linnan, Iran Air Flight 655 and Beyond: Free Passage,
Mistaken Self-Defense, and State Responsibility, 16 YALE INTIL L.J. 245 (1991).
472.
Id. at 252-57 (citing U.S. DEPT? OF DEFENSE, INVESTIGATION REPORT:
FORMAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DOWNING OF IRAN
AIR FLIGHT 655 ON 3 JULY 1988 (1988), in INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., FAT-FINDING
INVESTIGATION: DESTINATION OF IRAN AIRBUS A300 IN THE VICINITY OF QESHM ISLAND,

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN ON 3 JULY 1988 app. E (1988) [hereinafter U.S. DEPT OF
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An Internet attacker can, of course, have international opinion
turned against it,4 73 particularly if a targeted neutral state can
claim international law violations. Are there warning systems to
increase time for response and to consider an appropriate
response, and thereby decrease chances of a mistake? 47 4 If a
state responds to a computer-based attack by other means, such
as a bombing that would be considered necessary, proportional,
and admitting of no other alternative if a more traditional attack
on it had occurred, would this be characterized as a reprisal
using force or an initial armed attack, entitling the kinetic
attacker to claim a right of self-defense? 4 75 Does an Internetbased response to a kinetic attack that promotes political
instability in the attacking state 4 76 risk a claim of violating the
attacking state's political independence, if the initial Internet
attack does not rise to the level of aggression or attack within the

For other accounts, see generally 2
DEFENSE, IRAN AIR FLIGHT 655 REPORT]).
CORDESMAN & WAGNER, supra note 153, at 573-84; DILIP HIRO, THE LONGEST WAR:
THE IRAN-IRAQ MILITARY CONFLICT 210-12 (1991); Louise Doswald-Beck, Vessels,
Aircraft and Persons Entitled to Protection During Armed Conflict at Sea, 65 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 211, 271-74 (1994); Norman Friedman, The Vincennes Incident, U.S.
NAVAL INST. PROC., May 1989, at 72; Bud Langston & Don Bringle, The Air View:
OperationPrayingMantis, U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC., May 1989, at 54; Menefee, supra
note 153, at 110, 129-30; J.B. Perkins III, The Surface View: Operation Praying
Mantis, U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC., May 1989, at 66, 70; The Vincennes Incident, U.S.
NAVAL INST. PROC., Apr. 1990, at 19. Iran claimed the United States was guilty of
aggression. Djamchid Momtaz, Commentary, in THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR (1980-1988)
AND THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 153, at 19, 32-33 (citing a statement
of the Iran Foreign Affairs Minister before the UN Security Council). The United
Kingdom supported the U.S. self-defense claim. Answer by U.K. Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, July 6, 1988, 136 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th
ser.) (1988) 1046. See also A.V. Lowe, supra note 154, at 241, 252. Soviet media
claimed the United States was trying to "kindle" the war. Robert S. Litwak, The
Soviet Union and the Iran-IraqWar, in THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR: IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS
200, 210 (Efraim Karsh ed., 1989). Gamlen and Rogers offer a partial factual
summary in criticizing the attack. Gamlen & Rogers, supra note 153, at 142-43.
The tragedy may have helped promote an end to the war. WELLENS, supra note
196, at 443, 445. Iran's suit against the United States in the International Court
See
of Justice was settled in 1996 without any admission of U.S. liability.
Settlement Agreement on the Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of July 3, 1988
Before the International Court of Justice, Feb. 9, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 572 (1996). See
also Nichiporuk, supranote 52, at 190.
473.
See Nichiporuk, supranote 52, at 194-96.
474.
See Khalilzad, supranote 13, at 428-30.
475.
See GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 85-86. See also U.N. CHARTER
arts. 51, 103; supra notes 124, 166, 168-74 and accompanying text. Although
discussing proportionality in an LOAC context, Arquilla says it may be seen as an
While
Arquilla, supra note 106, at 382-83.
element of just" warfighting.
proportionality in self-defense may be different from proportionality in LOAC
cases, the "justness" of a response may be a factor in both, at least insofar as the
public sees the issue.
476.
See Nichiporuk, supranote 52, at 197.

2000i

INFORMATION WARFARE AND NEUTRALITY

1181

meaning of the Charter? 4 77 Does the route of an otherwise valid
response to an Internet attack raise neutrality violation issues if
responsive action travels across neutral states' borders on its way
to the source of the attack? 4 78 Is there the possibility of a
runaway series of Internet-based actions, responses (whether
anticipatory or reactive), counter-responses (whether anticipatory
or reactive), perhaps involving other modalities of response or
counter-response that deepens a crisis until it gets out of control
and leads to war? 4 7 9 The author has advocated the principle,
derived from the LOAC, that decision-makers in self-defense
situations are liable for what they know, or should know, when
they authorize self-defense responses. 4 80 How does this principle
fit into the "automatic response" situation?
When may nonforce reprisals be applied, and what are proper
reprisals? 48 ' When may retorsions be applied, and what are
proper retorsions? 4 2 When does a state of necessity arise, and
what are circumstances in the Internet context that the situation
arises? 48 3 Do these possible responses raise the same kinds of
risks that self-defense responses, whether anticipating or reacting
4 84
to a hack attack, raise?
Who are persons, entities, or facilities that are proper
subjects for a self-defense, reprisal, retorsionary, or state of
necessity response? How may they be identified?4 8 5 Responding
to a root cause of the problem-for example, foreign country's
computer and its operators that start a message on its way-may
be permissible, but what about computers, personnel, and situs

477. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(4), 51, 103; supra notes 116, 124, 166, 16874, 180 and accompanying text.
478. See GREENBERG ET AL., supranote 1, at 89. See also U.N. CHARTER arts.
2(4), 103; supra notes 116, 124, 180 and accompanying text.
479. Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities could not seem to halt
the slide into World War I. See Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2259 (1907). See also ALAN PALMER, THE CHANCELLERIES OF
EUROPE 226-30 (1983); A.J.P. TAYLOR, THE STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY IN EUROPE:
1848-1918 at 520-30 (1954); BARBARA TUCHMAN, THE GUNS OF AUGUST 91-157

(1962). Prewar communications and other actions before the Coalition invasion of
Iraq and Kuwait in the 1990-91 Gulf War echoed this kind of frantic maneuvering.
E.g., Walker, supra note 195, at 27-40. A big problem with an Internet-related
crisis is the time factor. See supra notes 22-24, 77, 426, 464 and accompanying
text.
480. Walker, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J., supra note 139, at 370-74; Walker, in
THE LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, supra note 139, at 393.

481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
53-54, 69

See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 177-81 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 177-8 1, 342 and accompanying text.
See Khalilzad, supra note 13, at 420-22, 427-28. See also supra notes
and accompanying text.
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countries that are intermediate way stations? 48 6 Might responses
trigger self-defense or other responses, such as nonforce reprisals
or retorsions, that exacerbate a crisis?
There are no black-letter, clear-cut rules for responses to any
of these questions, any more than in prior confrontations like the
Airbus tragedy, where U.S. claims of self-defense were met by
Iran's claim of aggression. 48 7
The only thing that can be
predicted with fair confidence is that Internet confrontations will
They will be met with claims of right,
arise in the future.
including aggression versus self-defense and violation of law
versus legitimate reprisal or retorsion. They will be resolved by
resort to general principles of law, some grounded in the Charter,
perhaps in a highly charged political, economic, or diplomatic
arena, and probably applied by analogy. 48 8 It is therefore very
likely, at least in the foreseeable future, that resort to principles
flowing from the Charter, and analogies to prior situations and
Charter law's response to them, will supply the substance of law
applying to Internet-generated crises, incursions, and attacks.
Security Council decisions and other, nonbinding resolutions may
apply, however. 48 9 The same rules apply to other international
organizations, the ITU or IMO, for example, and their resolutions
or other actions.
Issues in the Internet and IW contexts abound once a war
transitions from jus ad bellum and application of Charter law to
jus in bellum, where the LOAC governs, the subject of Parts. IV.BIV.E.
B.

Neutrality, Land Warfare, and Information Warfare

Implications for IW from the law of neutrality relating to
neutral land territory 4 90 are several. As noted above, Charter law
may affect the law of neutrality; treaty suspension or termination
principles may apply for agreements other than those dealing
with warfare. 4 9 1 Belligerent attack must be conditioned on LOAC
military objective, necessity, and proportionality principles,

486.
See GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 89. See also supranotes 53-54
and accompanying text.
487. See supra notes 471-72 and accompanying text.
488. Cf. I.C.J. STATUTE 38(1)(c).
See also, e.g., supra note 472 and
accompanying text.
489. U.N. CHARTER arts. 25, 48, 103. See also supra note 166 and
accompanying text.
490.
See supranotes 272-92 and accompanying text.
491.
See supranotes 187-218, 223-36 and accompanying text.
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unless a specific rule applies, such as prohibition on the first use
4 92
of gas attacks.
A neutral has a duty to prevent the use of its territory for a
belligerent's operations base or as a sanctuary. 4 93 The activity,
depending on personnel involved, may violate the neutral's
territorial integrity or political independence
under the
Charter. 4 94 If a neutral knows or has reason to know of activity
within its territory involving Internet use that is unneutral in
nature, the neutral must act to end that activity under the LOAC,
and it may invoke the Charter if the activity involves a violation of
the neutral's territorial integrity. If a neutral may be required to
mobilize forces to ensure fulfilling its responsibility to prevent
belligerent forces from crossing into its territory, and thus act in
self-defense, 4 9 s by analogy it may be argued that a neutral may
mobilize or order its forces to counter an Internet attack
conducted from its territory, even if belligerent forces are not
involved. If Internet attacks involve war materials and supplies; if
they belong to the belligerent, either as a matter of title or use;
and they are within a neutral's borders, the neutral can act
against the materials and supplies. If belligerent forces operate
the computers, etc., a case for neutral action is stronger.
If a neutral does not or cannot effectively enforce compliance,
an aggrieved belligerent may take proportional action, either
under the law of self-defense or the LOAC, to counter these
Internet activities. 49 6 Of course, there is a risk a neutral may
assert a violation of its territorial integrity by the aggrieved
belligerent and resort to self-defense measures. 4 9 7
In these
situations, an aggrieved belligerent's prior notice to the neutral
may be prudent, unless the neutral is seen as cooperating with
an offending belligerent.

492.
Schmitt, Bellum, supra note 36, at 1075-81. See also supra notes 352,
361, 441 and accompanying text.
Schmitt states that attacks on national
securities markets or financial systems are not proper military objectives today.
Schmitt, supra note 12, at 156-57. Scott would distinguish between attacks on
private citizen's bank accounts and attacks on state accounts. Scott, supra note
41, at 59. Beyond these tentative examinations of the law of neutrality in an
LOAC context, the commentators' principal thrust has been the relationship of
Internet attacks and defenses in self-defense situations. See supra notes 444-89
and accompanying text.
493.
See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
494.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4, art. 103. See also supra notes 124, 159,
166 and accompanying text.
495.
U.N. CHARTER arts. 51, 103. See also supra notes 69-76, 124, 166,
168-74 and accompanying text.
496.
See supra notes 177-81, 342 and accompanying text.
497.
U.N. CHARTER arts. 51, 103. See also supra notes 124, 166, 168-74,
279 and accompanying text.
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If belligerents may not build radio stations on neutral
in
territory, by analogy they cannot use Internet "stations"
4 98
If
neutral territory; therefore, a neutral must shut them down.
a neutral does not have means or willingness to do so, an
4 99
It seems,
aggrieved belligerent may take proportional action.
however, that if neutrals need not control their own stations, or
500
there is no obligation
their nationals acting in private capacity,
to do the same for Internet information thus passed to a
Query whether patterns of
belligerent under the Hague law.
50
neutrals' controlling radio stations in two world wars ' give some
support to establishing a customary norm obliging neutrals to do
so in future conflicts involving IW.
Land warfare railway rolling stock rules offer interesting
parallels. If a belligerent may not use neutral-owned stock unless
absolutely necessary but may seize stock a belligerent uses to
carry war goods, 50 2 could it not be argued by analogy that
belligerents may not "seize" neutrals' Internet transmissions
except in emergency, but that if a neutral allows Internet use for
messages harmful to a belligerent, those parts of the Internet are
fair game?
If neutrals have discretion to authorize passage for
belligerents' sick and wounded armed forces personnel while
S0 3
could it be
assuming responsibility for their control and safety,
argued that a neutral may, but is not required to, allow Internet
messages regarding belligerent sick and wounded, if the neutral
can be sure that no information affecting the war is passed
home?5 0 4 Similarly, a prisoner of war staying in neutral
territory5 0 5 may not be allowed Internet access to send
information home that amounts to belligerent activity, any more
than the prisoner of war should be allowed to mail, telephone,
televise, etc., information.

498. See supra notes 280-87 and accompanying text.
See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
499.
See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
500.
501. The record of practice is less than clear. See supra note 282 and
accompanying text.
502. See supra notes 288-89 and accompanying text.
503. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
504. This is by analogy from rules that vehicles transporting sick and
wounded carry no combatants or war materials and from rules for belligerent
See supra notes 280-87, 292 and
radio stations on neutral territory.
accompanying text.
505. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
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C. Neutrality at Sea, Naval Warfare, and Information Warfare
The same Charter principles applicable to land warfare apply
506
Ocean users,
to war at sea, including any IW component.
50 7
to other
whether neutral or belligerent, must pay due regard
neutral ocean users' rights and freedoms, in addition to the rules
of naval warfare, which apply in armed conflict situations through
the LOS conventions' "other rules" clauses. 50 8 Treaty suspension
or termination principles also may apply.50 9 General military
objective, necessity, and5 10proportionality principles in attack
govern as in land warfare.
Hague XIII, governing maritime neutrality, imposes virtually
the same rules as Hague V, governing land warfare, in forbidding
belligerent use of neutral ports and waters for building wireless
telegraphy stations or any apparatus for communicating with
belligerent forces. Belligerents cannot use neutral ports or waters
The same considerations and
as a base of operations. 5 1 '
applications of these principles in land warfare should apply to
IW issues in maritime warfare situations.5 12 Moreover, because
these principles are included in two major multilateral treaties
and the regional Maritime Neutrality Convention, their common
5 13
principles are strengthened
There is an important difference between neutrals' duties
with respect to movement of belligerent troops across neutral
land territory and movement of belligerent naval forces into
neutral ports and waters. The duty to repel troop movements is
absolute, while the duty to detect and oust belligerent naval
forces is subject to the neutral's having the means to do so.5 14 A
neutral is only "entitled," not required, to intern a belligerent
5 1s
warship when that ship should have departed its waters.

See also supra notes 124, 166 and
506.
See U.N. CHARTER art. 103.
accompanying text.
507.
See supra notes 306-09 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 127-28, 302-05 and accompanying text.
508.
See supra notes 223-36 and accompanying text.
509.
What is necessary or proportional in a self-defense situation may not
510.
be necessary or proportional in an LOAC-govemed case or vice versa. See supra
notes 352, 441 and accompanying text.
511.
See supra notes 334-37 and accompanying text.
512.
See supra notes 498-501 and accompanying text.
Hague V, supra note 219; Hague XIII, supra note 219; Maritime
513.
Neutrality Convention, supra note 128, 47 Stat. at 1989, 135 L.N.T.S. at 187;
I.C.J. STATUTE 38(1); Vienna Convention, supranote 44, at 333, 341; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102(3) & cmt. f, BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 5; 1
OPPENHEIM, supranote 44, at 28, 11, 32-36.
514.
See supra notes 264-65, 275, 322 and accompanying text.
See supra note 338 and accompanying text.
515.
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When the Hague Conventions were signed in 1907, many
countries did not have navies, forces, or detection capability
sufficient to oust a belligerent naval force or to intern it. There
must have been a presumption that any state could use its
military or other forces, perhaps its police, to repel a belligerent
troop movement, but that might not have been the case for naval
incursions. The same is true today. For IW neutrality principles,
one might argue that a neutral's duty to act to prevent belligerent
IW warfare from within its territory is not absolute; rather, it is
conditional on the neutral's ability to detect IW activity and its
capacity to act to counter this activity. Not every country has
computer and related systems as sophisticated as the United
States, for example; they should not be held to an absolute
If that is the case, computer-sophisticated nations like
duty.5 16
the United States must be held to the same duty, i.e., use of
means at the United States' disposal, which might be
considerable.
cables
of undersea
destruction
governing
Principles
strengthen a view that belligerents can operate to seize or destroy
Internet connections in enemy territory and in areas subject to no
state's sovereignty, such as the high seas, when a belligerent
controls that area, perhaps during a blockade. Belligerents can
seize or destroy cables connecting enemy territory with neutral
5 17
These cables
territory, but only a terminus in enemy territory.
may be seized or destroyed only "in cases of absolute necessity;"
s1 8
must be
general principles of necessity and proportionality
5 19
No distinction is made between publicly and
observed.
privately owned cables.5 20 Neutrals' control of radio broadcasting
within their territorial waters during two world wars is another
example of proper control of electronic emissions by neutrals
within their territories. If neutrals had this obligation for radio,
the "Internet" of the day, 1is it not also true for today's Internet52
based communications?
Issues related to contraband, visit and search or diversion,
destruction of neutral merchant ships that have acquired enemy
character, s2 2 or ships or aircraft believed to be aiding the enemy

516. Schmitt, Bellum, supra note 36, at 1088-89; supra note 49 and
accompanying text.
See supra note 351 and accompanying text.
517.
See supranotes 282-88, 352, 441 and accompanying text.
518.
519. Id.
See supranote 351 and accompanying text.
520.
521. There may not have been consistent practice on this point, even by the
same country. See supranotes 278-87 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 358-68, 373-77 and accompanying text.
522.
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although otherwise exempt, 5 23 might seem to have little to do
with IW. Certain general principles, however, might be derived
and used in IW contexts.
Given Internet technology's exponential growth, it would
seem extraordinarily useless to go through a lengthy treaty
negotiation process to draft an agreement listing prohibited
Internet behaviors or actions that would be as out of date as the
computers that began to produce the treaty at the start of the
drafting and negotiation process. This was the experience of
trying to define contraband. The lesson from contraband law is
that in a fast-developing or ever-changing scenario, trying to go
beyond general principles is rarely wise, except in the obvious
situation where everyone agrees on rules.
Examples of this
include "hospital ship" provisions when they are not used to
further an enemy war effort and poison gas usage if there is no
5 24
first use.
If we analogize dealing with Internet messages to neutral
merchantmen on the high seas, could an electronic "visit and
search," followed by appropriate proportional and necessary
action, perhaps electronic diversion, be devised for belligerents to
5 25
use with neutrals?
If an Internet message or "hack" contributes to an enemy
war-fighting or war-sustaining effort, assists an enemy's armed
forces intelligence system, or acts as an auxiliary military or naval
channel of communication or information, is not the attack and
destruction
option available,
subject to necessity and
proportionality principles? 5 2 6 To be sure, special principles might
be devised analogous to the passenger and crew safety rule when
a merchantman must be destroyed. s 2 7 For example, if messages
relating to safety of civilians are involved, can they be
electronically isolated and allowed through?
Might an electronic "firewall" analogous to blockade
principles in the law of naval warfare5 28 be devised to let
appropriate messages get through? The Internet might be used
for traditional blockades and other interdictions, besides Notices
to Airmen (NOTAMs) and Notices to Mariners (NOTMARs)
published by radio, for example.

523. For example, hospital ships and medical aircraft. See supra note 37987 and accompanying text.
524. Cf. Robertson, Modem Technology, supra note 362, Robertson, New
Technologies, supranote 362. See also supranotes 358-65, 379-87, 492, 523 and
accompanying text.
525. See supranote 366 and accompanying text.
526. See supranotes 352, 374-75, 441 and accompanying text.
527.
See supranote 376 and accompanying text.
528.
See supranotes 367-68 and accompanying text.
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Is it useful -to think in terms of specific exemptions for
neutral Internet usage? Hague XI lists enemy vessels exempt
from capture and possible destruction because of their nature,
among them a debatable exemption for mails as distinguished
from mail ships.5 29 Is it helpful to develop exempted computer
systems, exempted kinds of messages, or Internet systems
exempt from "capture" and possible destruction unless aiding an
enemy? What about generally exempt ships, such as hospital
ships not aiding an enemy, that send Internet-based messages
that might be construed by a belligerent to be encrypted
messages?
Would this raise suspicions, however unfounded,
such that neutral exempt vessel use of Internet-based messages
should be banned or restricted? Can system segregation be done
with today's technology?5 30
Is it too early for this? Can the
Internet itself be used to advise of exemptions, if a case by case
basis is appropriate?
Might military commanders consider declaring control of
immediate areas of military operations on the Internet, analogous
to the immediate area of naval operations? 5 3 1 To be sure, this
kind of declaration may invite more trouble than it is worth-it
could tell adversaries where to go. The Internet can, of course, be
used to send these notices, besides NOTAMs and NOTMARs sent
by more traditional means for addressees lacking Internet
capability, or to assure transmission and receipt where it is
possible an Internet-based message does not go through.
Although it is not part of the law of neutrality, any country
can declare temporary use of the high seas for naval maneuvers,
including air operations.5 3 2
These can be conducted during
armed conflict. Is there a correlative right to declare temporary
use of part of the Internet for "IW maneuvers"? Might notice of IW
maneuvers be posted on the Internet besides more traditional
means, such as, NOTAMs or NOTMARs?
Like warning of
immediate area of naval operations during war, such a notice,
whether by NOTAM or NOTMAR through traditional media or the
Internet, invites attention.
5 33
Could or should an "Internet war zone" be declared,
warning neutrals of higher risk if they "surf in the area or
otherwise use the "zone"? Like notices for immediate areas of
naval operations, these warnings could be posted on the Internet
and by more traditional means, such as NOTAMs and NOTMARs.

529. See supra notes 379-87 and accompanying text.
530. If this can be done today for GPS, might it also be accomplished for
these situations? See supranote 69 and accompanying text.
531. See supra notes 369, 409 and accompanying text.
532. See supra notes 311-15 and accompanying text.
533. See supra note 374 and accompanying text.
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Notices of blockade, immediate area of naval operations, or war
zones, must be effective. 5 3 4 While the Internet is a valuable
communication medium, it cannot replace more traditional and
widely available methods until it is as universal as more
traditional means. This may be a problem for vessels or aircraft
registered in countries that are not as advanced in Internet
535
technology as the United States, for example.
Could states declare temporary "defense zones" for parts of
the Internet spectrum, analogous to a high seas defense zone or
cordon sanitaire for an area of naval and air operations, to warn
other countries of risks of self-defense responses? This is not a
feature of naval warfare but an incident of self-defense. 53 6 If they
proclaim such a zone, must they allow Internet access, on
analogy of mine warfare law, which allows countries to lay mines
off their coasts, if location of them is noticed and the sole purpose
is not to stop neutral shipping S3 7 And because the technology is
still emerging, and a treaty now might be premature, s3 8 could
agreements involving incidents on and over the high seas
(INCSEA agreements) S3 9 be models to minimize confrontation
down the road when and if the problem settles down?
Longstanding treaties promoting safety at sea offer another
5 40
model.
Might states proclaim an "Internet Identification Zone" (IIZ)
for parts of the Internet spectrum, analogous to an ADIZ over

534.
See supra notes 368-70 and accompanying text.
535.
See, e.g., supra note 69 and accompanying text.
536.
See supra notes 316-22 and accompanying text.
537.
See supranotes 353-57 and accompanying text.
538.
See supranotes 358-65, 379-87, 523-24 and accompanying text.
539.
E.g., Agreement on Prevention of Incidents on and Over the High Seas,
May 25, 1972, U.S.S.R.-U.S., 23 U.S.T. 1168, 852 U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinafter
INCSEA]; Protocol to Agreement on Prevention of Incidents on and Over the High
Seas, May 22, 1973, U.S.S.R.-U.S., 24 U.S.T. 1063, 12 I.L.M. 1108 (1973). See
also Agreement on Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, June 12, 1989,
U.S.S.R.-U.S., 28 I.L.M. 879 (1989). Other states had INCSEA treaties with the
former USSR. NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 2.8 n.110. Today
these may be subject to treaty succession principles. See generally Symposium,
supra note 216; Walker, supra note 216. See also 1 BROWN, supra note 231, at
285; NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37, para. 2.8; Marion Nash Leich,
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law:
Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 917 (1989); Timothy
J. Nagle, Note, The DangerousMilitary Activities Agreement Minimum Order and
Superpower Relations on the World's Oceans, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 125 (1990).
540.
E.g., Convention on International Regulations for Preventing Collisions
at Sea, Oct. 20, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 3459; International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47 (in force for most states but with many
amendments). See generally U.S. DEPT OF STATE, supra note 124, at 413-15.
Precisely as law involving the Internet is proceeding on a national basis, the first
collision and safety rules have appeared in major seafaring nations' legislation.
See generally COLOMBOS, supra note 44, at 363-67, 387-391; 2 O'CONNELL, supra
note 44, at 770-73, 831-34, 882-85; SCHOENBAUM, supra note 391, § 12-2, at 716.
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high seas areas and anchored to the territorial sea?5 4 1 The IIZ
would be a warning, perhaps published on the Internet and in
other sources to assure notice, of a possibility of interception if
Internet users approach too close to a neutral's vital interests
(analogous to its territory, including the territorial sea, the anchor
for an ADIZ), including defense and central economic
communications systems, for example. The ADIZ is not an air
warfare feature; it serves as an identification method. An IIZ
might have a similar function.
The Internet is like a merchant shipping system or the U.S.
public highway system. There is no regulation like systems for
radio and television broadcasting. It is up to the individual or
government as to the nature of vehicles used (the computers) and,
beyond a small access charge paid to Internet access providers,
the user is largely on its own as to content and destination.
Therefore, although there may be belligerent and neutral rights,
perhaps by analogy to those for the naval warfare, there are
relatively few positive duties, apart from a requirement to respect
belligerents' and neutrals' rights however those may be stated.
As a final point, the due regard principle, derived from the
LOS and the law of naval warfare, 5 42 might be part of the
analysis; belligerents must pay due regard to rights of Internet
users that are neutral, even as Internet users must have due
regard for others on the Net in the absence of war. Even as
belligerents must have due regard for the maritime environment
in today's wars at sea, might they be required to pay due regard
to the general Internet environment?
D. Neutrality, Aerial Warfare, and Information Warfare

As in the cases of land and sea warfare, Charter principles
may apply in given situations.5 43
Treaty suspension or
termination principles may apply.5 4 4 Besides air warfare rules,
belligerents must observe LOAC principles of military objective,S
54
necessity, and proportionality, which apply to all modes of war.
Like neutrality law for land and sea warfare, air warfare rules
require respect for neutral airspace, which includes airspace over
neutrals' territorial seas; belligerent military aircraft cannot enter

541.
542.
543.

See supra notes 325-32 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 306-09 and accompanying text.
U.N. CHARTER art. 103.
See also supra notes 124,

166 and

accompanying text.

544. See supra notes 223-36 and accompanying text.
545. What is necessary or proportional under the LOAC may not be
necessary or proportional in self-defense situations or vice versa. See supranotes
352, 441.
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it. 5 4 6 When coupled with identical treaty-based neutrality rules
applying to land and sea war, this principle is strengthened.5 4 7
The Hague Air Rules principle, the same as those for land warfare
but differing from naval warfare requirements for neutrals, is that
actions neutrals take to enforce neutral rights cannot be
construed as hostile acts.5 48 Because two branches of the law of
neutrality protect a neutral in its actions to enforce neutrality,
because Internet activity necessarily ultimately involves land in
terms of sending and reception of messages, and because Internet
messages' "flight" through lines might be analogized to aircraft
flight, should not the rule be that a neutral's Internet actions
should not be deemed hostile acts, and not unfriendly ones, as
the law of naval warfare has it? A neutral might enforce its rights
by an unfriendly act, such as a retorsion,5 4 9 a lesser action that
does not involve propprtional reprisals, such as unlawful acts
55 0
designed to compel compliance.
There is an important difference between neutrals' duties
with -respect to movement of belligerent troops across neutral
land territory, movement of belligerent naval forces into neutral
ports and waters, and movement of belligerent military aircraft
into neutral airspace. The duty to repel troop movements is
absolute, while the duty to detect and oust belligerent naval or air
forces is subject to a neutral's having means to do so.5s l When
the Hague Conventions were signed, many countries may not
have had navies, military forces, or detection capability sufficient
to oust a belligerent naval force. The same assumption may
underlie the 1923 Hague Air Rules regarding intruding belligerent
military aircraft and their internment. There must have been a
presumption that any state could use its military or other forces,
perhaps police, to repel belligerent troop movements, but that
might not be the case for every country for naval or military
aircraft incursions. The same is true today. For IW neutrality
rules, it could be argued that a neutral's duty to act to prevent
belligerent IW from within its territory is not absolute, but

546.
See supranote 261 and accompanying text.
547. I.C.J. STATUTE art. 38(1); Vienna Convention, supra note 44, pmbl., art.
38, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 333, 341. See also supra note 513 and accompanying text.
Self-defense and state of necessity claims by belligerents and neutrals
548.
may be implicated as well. See supra notes 266, 269 and accompanying text.
See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
549.
550.
Today most commentators suggest that states cannot invoke reprisals
involving the use of force except when there is a violation of international law,
while a state is a belligerent and that state wishes to respond with proportional
reprisals against an enemy in armed conflict situations after having asked the
offender to comply with the law. Even in such cases, however, there are limits.
Responses cannot include breaches of humanitarian law. See supra note 175 and
accompanying text.
551.
See supra notes 264-65, 274, 337-38, 514-15 and accompanying text.
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conditional on a neutral's ability to detect IW activity and to act to
counter it. Not every nation has computer and related systems as
sophisticated as, e.g., the United States,5 5 2 and these countries
should not be held to an absolute duty. Such being the case,
computer-sophisticated nations like the United States must be
held to the same duty, ie., use of means at the disposal of the
United States, which might be quite considerable.
A neutral's duty to prescribe a route away from belligerents'
military operations for aircraft ordered by a belligerent5 5 3 might
be seen, by analogous precedent for IW, to say a neutral must
prescribe Internet "routes" not to interfere with military
operations.
The Hague Air Rules' qualifying phrase, that a
neutral must exact guarantees, indicates a possible weakness of
the prescription, however. For IW, if a neutral prescribes a
"route," can the neutral enforce the prescription, given the
Internet's decentralized nature?
The Hague Air Rules principle
that neutrals must, commensurate with means at disposal,
prevent aerial observation of belligerent operations,5 5 4 is in the
same vein.
Should neutrality law for IW require neutrals,
commensurate with means at disposal, to prevent IW observation,
through reading Internet traffic, of belligerent military operations?
Many of these will undoubtedly be encrypted. s s In both cases
the emerging principle should be that a neutral must employ
means at its disposal; for encrypted traffic, this may mean that a
neutral can do little or nothing. Hacking into an encrypted
55 6
system may promote belligerents' self-defense claims.
The Hague Air Rules, like those for naval warfare, allow a
belligerent's force commander to prohibit neutral aircraft from
passing in an immediate vicinity of a commander's forces, or to
make aircraft follow a particular route, if the commander
considers the aircraft is likely to prejudice success of military
operations. If an aircraft, once notified, refuses to comply, a
belligerent may fire on it.5 5 7 In the IW context, might belligerents
assert a similar right to prohibit Internet activity in an immediate
electronic or physical vicinity of military operations, or direct that
Internet traffic follow routes? Can the belligerent "shoot down"
noncomplying Internet traffic that comes close to military Internet
operations, following notice and using proportional means?
Might notice of these areas of operations be posted on the

552. See, e.g., supra notes 49, 516 and accompanying text.
553. See supra notes 400-01 and accompanying text.
554. See supra note 402 and accompanying text.
555. See supra notes 57, 69, 72 and accompanying text.
556. U.N. CHARTER arts. 51, 103. See also supra notes 124, 166, 168-74,
279 and accompanying text.
557.
See supranotes 409-10 and accompanying text.
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Internet besides more traditional means? A correlative problem is
that any radio or Internet message invites attention to location of
belligerent forces.
Although it is not part of the law of neutrality, any country
can declare temporary use of the high seas for naval maneuvers,
including air operations.5 5 8 These maneuvers can be conducted
during armed conflict. Is there a correlative right of declaring
temporary use of part of the Internet for "IW maneuvers"? Might
notice of these "maneuvers" be posted on the Internet? Like the
warning of the immediate area of naval operations during war,
such a notice, whether by NOTAM or NOTMAR through
traditional media or the Internet, invites attention.
War zones for neutral aircraft and ships, reasonable in scope
and duration and which are properly noticed, are a valid method
of warfare at sea today. They are not free-fire areas but are
designed to warn neutral aircraft or other platforms of heightened
danger if they enter a zone. s s 9 Might an "IW war zone" with
similar qualifications be declared to warn Internet users of a
heightened risk of being "fired on" if they venture into certain
Internet "areas"? Might notice of these zones by NOTAMs and
NOTMARs be posted on the Internet besides traditional means?
Could states declare temporary "defense zones" for certain
parts of the Internet spectrum, analogous to a high seas defense
zone or cordon sanitaire that may be announced for an area of air
operations, to warn other countries of a risk of self-defense
responses? This is not a feature of air warfare but an incident of
self-defense. Here, too, INCSEA and safety of life at sea treaties
S 60
could be models for advance agreements for these situations.
Might states proclaim an "Internet Identification Zone" (IIZ)
for parts of the Internet spectrum, analogous to an ADIZ? 5 6 l The
IIZ would be a warning, perhaps published on the Internet and in
other sources to assure notice, of a possibility of interception if
Internet users approach too close to a neutral state's vital
interests (analogous to its territory including its territorial sea, an
ADIZ's anchor), including, e.g., its defense and central economic
or communications systems. The ADIZ is not a feature of air
warfare, serving as an identification method. The IIZ might have a
similar function.
Thus preexisting norms for air warfare, like those for naval
warfare, offer many options for analogous treatment of IW issues.

558.
559.
560.
text.
561.

See supra notes 412-15 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 368-72, 374, 533-34 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 316-22, 353-65, 379-87, 536-40 and accompanying
See supra notes 325-32, 541 and accompanying text.
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E. Neutrality and Information Warfare in Space
There is little new "hard law" in norms applicable to conflict
in outer space,5 62 other than applying Charter law;5 63 the law for
suspending or terminating treaties;5 6 4 and general principles of
military objective, necessity, and proportionality, and perhaps
due regard in some cases.5 6 5 There is no special neutrality law
like that applying to land, sea, or air warfare. Any neutrality law
applying to IW in space must be derived by analogy from other
sources, as before agreements like the Outer Space Treaty, the
Liability Convention, and the Registration Convention were
negotiated.566
It is this general methodology that may be the most useful. If
law for outer space could be derived by analogy from other
systems before formal treaties appeared, cannot the same be said
for IW? Which legal system(s) should supply the model(s)? The
LOS, the law of naval warfare, and the law of aerial warfare seem
to suggest many norms that might be cited by analogy, as Parts
IV.C and IV.D suggest.
F. Conclusionson Applying TraditionalPrinciplesto IW
The author does not have technical competence to respond to
the questions posed in Parts IV.A-IV.E, but they should be
addressed. Some inquiries may be far-fetched, impractical, or
shrouded for national security reasons, but given the exponential
growth of technology, this Article has asked them.
As the manned space flight era became a reality,
commentators recommended applying other, well-established law
to space age situations by analogy. U.N. Charter law applies to
situations in space, as it does for interactions on land, at sea and
in the air. Today treaties, and practice pursuant to them, govern
many other aspects of space interactions, but not all of them.
These agreements are subject to Charter law primacy and to law
Beyond the
of treaties rules for suspension or termination.
treaties, some space law issues remain unresolved, and applying
other systems of law by analogy seems to be the norm.
Internet warfare issues involving neutrals, and the law to be
applied to them, seem close to the situation for warfare in space.
Charter-based norms must be applied, such as the prohibition

See supranotes 397-400 and accompanying text.
562.
563.
U.N. CHARTER art. 103. See also supra notes 124, 166, 432, 506, 543
and accompanying text.
564.
See supranotes 223-36, 491, 509, 544 and accompanying text.
565.
See supranotes 306-09, 328, 352 and accompanying text.
566.
See supranotes 424-30 and accompanying text.
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against violating states' territorial integrity or political
independence, the right of self-defense, and the primacy of
Security Council decisions.
There are telecommunications
treaties to which Charter norms and law of treaties rules for
suspension and termination are subject. Some LOAC principles,
such as those related to telegraphy, will apply to Internet
messages and more conventional communications, although
these are also subject to Charter norms, including self-defense.
Beyond these relatively well-established norms, there are many
principles-primarily in the law of naval warfare but also some
from the law of land and air warfare-that may be cited by
analogy in 1W situations involving neutrals.

V. APPRAISAL OF NEUTRALITY IN THE CHARTER ERA IN
THE INFORMATION WARFARE CONTEXT

Twenty years ago, Toffler wrote that "[a]n information bomb is
exploding in our midst, showering us with a shrapnel of images
and drastically changing the way each of us perceives and acts
upon our private lives. "5 6 7 More recently, the Tofflers stated:
By definition, both force and wealth are the property of the strong
and the rich.
It is the truly revolutionary characteristic of
knowledge that it can be grasped by the weak and poor as well.
Knowledge is the most democratic source of power.
It may also be the most dangerous. Like the six-shooter in the
56 8
wild West, it could prove to be the Great Equalizer.

Whether we are at High Noon,5 6 9 or close to it, in IW is less than
clear, but it is certain that Internet use and misuse have been
factors in recent conflicts, in national arenas, and within
570
organizations, including the military.
The methodology of warfare may change during the
Information Age that appears to be upon us. Responses to
Internet-based attack may involve more than applying new
strategies and tactics to threats and attacks5 7 1 and a beginning of
major reductions in defense systems and infrastructure;5 7 2 a new

567.
568.

TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE, supra note 2, at 172.
TOFFLER & TOFFLER, supra note 12, at 189

(quoting TOFFLER,

POWERSHIFT, supra note 2, at 20). See also supra notes 31-34 and accompanying
text.
569. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
570. See supranotes 1-38, 69-106 and accompanying text.
571. John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt, Looking Ahead: Preparingfor Informationage Conflict, in IN ATHENA'S CAMP:

PREPARING FOR CONFLICT IN THE INFORMATION AGE,

supra note 2, at 493, 465-77 (calling for doctrinal changes to meet the swarming
threat). See also supranotes 69-79 and accompanying text.
572. Gompert, supranote 6, at 29.
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way of organization within armed forces may occur. 5 7 3 The same
may occur in diplomatic circles, a "revolution in diplomatic
affairs."5 7 4 The result may be far less bloodletting in human
casualties, although the result of an Information War may be just
575
as catastrophic for the losers.
Whether an "information dividend" will prevent outbreak of
war, as some predict,5 7 6 is less than clear. The Congress of
Vienna (1815),5 77 the Hague ultimatum system (1907),578 the
League of Nations (1919),5 7 9 the Pact of Paris (1928),580 and the
U.N. system all failed to end war.5 8 1 Even with the Cold War's
end, which could usher in an era of managed peace,5 8 2 the U.N.

573.
Cf. John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt, Information, Power, and Grand
Strategy: In Athena's Camp-Section 2, in IN ATHENA'S CAMP: PREPARING FOR
CONFLICT IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 2, at 417, 421-27, 429-31
(suggesting the ending of openness in military affairs and forward basing strategy
in the Information Age); Arquilla & Ronfeldt, supra note 571, at 461-65
(suggesting that a military organization like the World War II German submarine
wolfpacks may be appropriate); Gompert, supra note 6, at 28 (advocating
openness). See also supranotes 94-106 and accompanying text.
574. Arquilla & Ronfeldt, supra note 571, at 489. See also supra note 107
and accompanying text.
575.
Cf. Arquilla & Ronfeldt, supra note 571, at 492-93. See also supra
notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
576.
Arquilla & Ronfeldt, supra note 571, at 493. See also supra notes 10405 and accompanying text.
577.
Act of Congress of Vienna, supra note 244, 64 Consol. T.S. at 453,
whose linchpin was Treaty of Alliance, Mar. 15, 1815, 64 Consol. T.S. 27, was
succeeded by Treaty of Alliance and Friendship, Nov. 20, 1815, 65 Consol. T.S.
296. See also supra note 244 and accompanying text.
578.
Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, supranote 479, arts.
1, 3, 36 Stat. at 2271. See also supra note 479 and accompanying text.
579.
Covenant of the League of Nations, Treaty of Versailles, June 20, 1919,
Part I, 225 Consol. T.S. 189, 195-205 (ending World War I for Germany). The
Covenant was also part of other agreements ending the war, for example: Treaty
of Neilly-sur-Seine, Nov. 27, 1919, Part I, 226 Consol. T.S. 332, 335 (Bulgaria);
Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye, Sept. 10, 1919, Part I, 226 Consol. T.S. 13
(Austria); Treaty of Trianon, June 4, 1920, Part I, 113 Brit. Foreign & St. Papers
486, 491-501 (Hungary). Although a signatory to these, the United States never
ratified them, primarily because of U.S. Senate opposition to the Covenant.
Michael J. Glennon, The Constitution and Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter,85 AM. J. INT'L L. 74, 75-76 (1991). The United States concluded bilateral
agreements with Austria, Germany, and Hungary, incorporating parts of the
multilateral treaties but excluding the Covenant. Treaty of Peace, Aug. 29, 1921,
Hung.-U.S., art. 2, 42 Stat. 1951, 1953; Treaty of Peace, Aug. 25, 1921, Germ.U.S., art. 2, 42 Stat. 1939, 1943; Treaty of Peace, Aug. 24, 1921, Aus.-U.S., art. 2,
42 Stat. 1946, 1948.
580.
Pact of Paris, supra note 118, 46 Stat. at 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. at 57. See
also supra note 118 and accompanying text.
581.
The U.N. Charter specifically states: "WE THE PEOPLES OF THE
UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED to save succeeding generations from the scourge
of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind ....
U.N. CHARTER pmbl., para. 1. See also supranote 116 and accompanying text.
582.
EUGENE V. RosTow, TOWARD MANAGED PEACE 337-84 (1993).
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system may be a doubtful vehicle for achieving consensus on IW583
related issues.
Modified and improved by custom and treaties, the jus ad
bellur, the jus in belle, and the law of neutrality remain as factors
states must consider in the Information Age.
Undeniably,
neutrality as a general concept has as much vitality today as in
the pre-Charter era. The claim that there is a customary right to
assert an intermediate status of nonbelligerency between
traditional
neutrality and belligerency
may have been
strengthened
since
1945,
although
most
states
and
commentators do not recognize it. The precedents sometimes are
almost identical with those in the last two centuries. Even if
nonbelligerency cannot be asserted as a customary norm, the
overlay of principles of self-defense, retorsion, reprisals not
involving use of force, and state of necessity apply to support
actions at variance with a practice of strict neutrality in the
traditional sense.5 84 Because of options under the Charter for
nonbinding resolutions by the Security Council, and perforce the
General Assembly, the potential for exceptions even with a
binding Council decision, and relative scarcity of Council
decisions,5 8 5 opportunity for claims of neutrality-perhaps
modified by a new nonbelligerency concept in the Charter eraremains large. "Far from being moribund, these traditional rights
[of neutrality and self-defense] apply logically in conditions of
limited wars'"-the type of conflicts that have beset the planet
since 1945---"even more rigorously than in conditions of total
5 86
war."
The advent of information war may call for modifying
Jessup's theory, published in 1936 when the world was
recovering from a world war and preparing for the next one.5 8 7
Transoceanic communication was dependent on undersea cables
for urgent messages, although radio signals could also reach
across the seas. The most advanced countries had cross-border
telephone and telegraph access by land lines. Most transoceanic
communications went by ship, although the first international air
mail
deliveries
were
beginning
for
transoceanic
and

583.
GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 96-97.
584.
See supra notes 108-84 and accompanying text.
585.
See supra notes 187-218 and accompanying text.
586. 2 O'CONNELL, supra note 44, at 1142.
Some limited or localized
conflicts may have been total war from the belligerents' perspectives, but on a
world-scale basis they were local or limited in nature. A recent example is the
1980-88 Iran-Iraq conflict, the maritime aspects of which Walker examines.
WALKER, THE TANKER WAR, supra note 108, Part II.

587. JESSUP, supra note 109, at 156 ("There is nothing new about revising
neutrality; it has undergone an almost constant process of revision in detail.").
See also supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
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The usual means of
transcontinental communications.
however, was what 5we
for
most
messages,
then
communication
88
call "snail mail" today. The Internet was a Cold War creation.
Today Jessup might say that although the neutrality basic rules
remain in place, and they apply for IW, their application for IW
must be by analogy.
One option is a non-law analysis,5 8 9 although that alternative
is less than appropriate or fashionable today given a tendency to
find some law (perhaps publicists' views if there is no customary
Commentators
law, treaty, or general principle available).5 9 0
correctly assert that it is almost universally accepted that a
considerable body of law applies to states' use of force in
cyberspace contexts.5 9 1 If that is true, a corollary is that the
considerable body of traditional neutrality law also exists-some
of it restated in treaties of longstanding duration that are now
almost universally recognized as declaring custom, and the rest
in customary norms or general principles. If we choose to operate
in the context of law, under a rule of law, the law of neutrality
developed for more traditional warfare modalities offers useful
analysis by analogy where there are no positive standards, such
S 92
as rules governing cables.
Today, exceptions to the traditional law include Charter law,
as well as the inherent right to individual and collective selfdefense, which predates the Charter. Other exceptions include
prohibitions against violating a state's territorial integrity, and the
primacy of U.N. Security Council decisions.5 9 3 Another might be
human rights, although human rights treaties' derogation clauses
reflect traditional rules of suspension or termination during
The policies of peacetime
international armed conflict. 5 94
telecommunications treaties, although perhaps limited in
application during armed conflict because of their terms or

588.
See supranotes 45-52 and accompanying text.
589. Sharp states: "When the legal community first considered the ...
regime that governed state activities and military operations in Cyber Space, some
U.S. government attorneys stated rather boldly that [applying] . . . modern
information systems technology to military purposes was so new that no law
applied." SHARP, supra note 1, at 5. A policy behind this approach is national
sovereignty. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1, art. 103; S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.),
1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7). See also supra note 199 and
accompanying text.
590.
Cf I.C.J. STATUTE art. 38, para. 1; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS §§ 102-03. See also supranote 237 and accompanying text.
591.
See generally GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 17; OFFICE OF
GENERAL COUNSEL, supra note 233; SHARP, supra note 1, at 5; Aldrich, supra note

1; Schmitt, Bellum, supra note 36; Schmitt, supranote 12; Scott, supra note 41.
592. See supra notes 347-52 and accompanying text.
593. U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(4), 25, 48, 51, 103. See also supra notes 116,
124, 166, 168-74, 180 and accompanying text.
594. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
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because of general rules of treaty suspension or termination, are
another. Human rights treaties may also be so limited. s 9s
Analysis of IW issues in a context of the law of neutrality as it
applies to land, sea, and air warfare reveals common
denominators and differences. For example, belligerents have a
duty not to cross neutrals' land territory by land or air, or to use
5 96
it or neutral seas-the territorial sea-for a base of operations.
A neutral's duty to repel these incursions varies with the modality
of incursion. If it is by land, there is apparently an absolute duty
at least to try. If the incursion is by belligerent air or naval
forces, the neutral's duty is relative. It must use means at its
disposal to counter an incursion, including means at its disposal
to intern an intruding aircraft and those aboard. A neutral may
elect to detain a belligerent warship that has remained in port
when it is not entitled to stay there. Undoubtedly the 1907
Hague drafters and the 1923 Commission of Jurists that
prepared the Hague Air Rules believed every country had some
semblance of ground forces to repel a belligerent's troop
movements across neutral lands, but that not every state had the
means of detecting or repelling incursions by air or sea, or of
interning belligerent military vessels or aircraft.5 9 7 The "means at
a neutral's disposal" principle should be the test for a neutral's
duty for belligerents' IW incursions; the neutral should be held to
apply means at its disposal to detect and repel these incursions.
Such being the case, the correlative right of a belligerent
aggrieved by IW incursions should be that the belligerent may
take such actions as are necessary in the territory of a neutral
that is unable (or perhaps unwilling) to counter enemy IW force
activities making unlawful use of that territory, a principle from
the law of naval warfare. 59 8
Beyond these general rules applying to neutrality in a context
of all warfare modes, the rules begin to diverge among the
different kinds of armed conflict, the closest kinship being seen
between the law of naval warfare and aerial warfare, particularly
naval warfare. From a geographic perspective, these mediums for
combat offer more persuasive reasons for analogy to IW. Both are
concerned with "fluid" mediums, like the Internet's electronic
pathways.5 9 9 The law of naval warfare is concerned with warfare

595. The telecommunications treaties might be applied through the analogy
of the due regard principle, primarily taken from the LOS. See supra notes 22328, 232, 233, 306-09, 328 and accompanying text.
596. See supra notes 261, 273, 281, 334-35, 395-97 and accompanying
text.
597. See supranotes 264, 281, 337-38, 398-99 and accompanying text.
598. See supranote 342 and accompanying text.
599. Outer space also has this characteristic, but beyond the Charter and
general principles applicable to any situation, there is little law from which
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on the high seas, a part of the globe that is no nation's property.
It also is concerned with ocean areas over which coastal states
may exercise sovereignty, such as the territorial sea, or
jurisdiction, such as the EEZ. There is also a relatively welldeveloped set of rules or general principles in the LOS, the law of
naval warfare, and the law of air warfare, upon which analogies
for IW may be drawn.60 0 Closer examination of the law of naval
warfare and the law of air warfare in connection with Charter law,
the LOS, and treaty termination or suspension principles may
produce analogies suitable for developing IW principles.
The LOAC is replete with notice requirements. 60 1 The new
technology might be employed to give notice, adequate under the
circumstances, in traditional warfare situations besides the usual
means of doing so.
Given IW technology's fluidity and exponential growth, the
relative lack (thus far) of practice in IW situations, and the
relatively small number (again thus far) of claims and
counterclaims 60 2 in the worldwide electronic arena, any
international agreements on IW would likely be obsolete in terms
603
of hardware and practice before their ink would be dry.

Haphazard as the prospect may be, rules for IW should be left to
developing customary norms and general principles, derived by
analogy from other well-developed bodies of war like the LOS, the
law of naval warfare, and the law of aerial warfare, perhaps with

analogies for neutrality law in the IW context might be drawn from space law. In
that regard the law of outer space has been in a state of development since the
conclusion of several widely-accepted international agreements. The development
of space law is ahead of, but similar to, the present circumstances surrounding
the development of international law to govern the Internet and information
warfare. See supranotes 417-31 and accompanying text.
600. See supra notes 293-416 and accompanying text.
601.
See supra notes 311, 325-32, 345, 354, 358-65, 367, 369-72, 400,
407-12, 416 and accompanying text.
602. Myres S. McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International
Law of the Sea, 49 AM. J. INT', L. 356, 356-58 (1955).
603.
See supra notes 362, 366 and accompanying text. The law for
dropping projectiles from balloons comes to mind. Declaration Prohibiting
Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons, Oct. 17, 1907, 36 Stat.
2439. The Declaration is still in force for twenty-eight countries, including the
United States, and perhaps more if treaty succession principles are taken into
account. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 124, at 450; Symposium, supra note
216; Walker, supra note 216. Roach suggests that a general conference for a
treaty on the law of naval warfare might result in landlocked states and states
without significant naval forces settling matters of importance to naval powers
without the latter's consent. Roach, supra note 309, at 76-77. The same might be
true for any IW treaty conference. Greenberg et al. dismiss the arms control treaty
approach as premature. GREENBERG ETAL., supra note 1, at 100-02.
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help from commentators, 60 4 before serious consideration of a

treaty begins.
The biggest risk may be "The Lure of Inactivity." 60 5 A
problem of employing general principles, perhaps by analogy, and
commentators in place of treaties, is that this invites controversy
after the issue is upon states in a crisis situation, for example.
Countries like the United States have wisely declared in ROE the
general principles under which they will act in hostile intent and
hostile act situations. 60 6 The next steps might be specific policy
pronouncements on perceived IW situations in peacetime selfThere remains, however, one
defense or LOAC situations.
"indispensable role" for the U.S. and other governments:
If and as the IW threat becomes real, the United States should
declare that an IW attack on the nation or its interests will be
treated as a hostile act, that the attacker should be prepared for a
response involving whatever means the United States might select.
By no means should the United States adopt a tit-for-tat (IW-for-IW)
strategy, since an attacker is likely to be far less dependent on
information infrastructure and therefore could be unimpressed by
607
an IW retaliatory threat.

If a state adheres to the view that anticipatory self-defense
responses are appropriate, such a declaration might add that an
IW threat to the nation or its vital interests will be treated as
hostile intent, for which the consequences stated above would
also apply. There is nothing in the international law of selfThere is nothing in the
defense to bar such responses.
international law of reprisals to bar proportionate non-force
responses, and nothing in the international law of retorsions to
bar unfriendly but lawful responses, or application of state of
necessity in appropriate situations, whether information-oriented
8
or not.60

604.

I.C.J. STATUTE art. 38, para. 1, art. 59; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN

RELATIONS §§ 102-03. See also supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
GREENBERG ETAL., supranote 1, at 102.
605.
See supranotes 462-67 and accompanying text.
606.
607. Gompert, supranote 6, at 39.
See U.N. CHARTER arts. 51, 103; supra notes 125, 166, 168-81 and
608.
accompanying text.
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Besides self-defense and LOAC-related ROE, consideration
might be given to revising military manuals to spell out policy and
projected practice in IW contexts, whether a state is a belligerent
60 9
or a neutral.

609.
E.g., NWP 1-14M ANNOTATED, supra note 37 (discussing U.N. Charter
law, the law of the sea, the law of armed conflict, and the law of neutrality,
particularly in the naval warfare context but saying little about IW issues, which
were just emerging as points of discussion among commentators and government
preliminary assessments in 1997 when the Annotated Supplement was published).
See generally GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 1; OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, supra
note 233; SHARP, supra note 1; Aldrich, supra note 1; Schmitt, Belium, supra note
36; Schmitt, supra note 12; Scott, supra note 41.
Undoubtedly the recent
International Law Studies volume, supra note 37, will provide input for future
manuals.

